THE *SANNĪYA* LANDS OF SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II IN IRAQ

BY

ALBERTINE JWAIDEH

The thirty-three years of autocratic rule and all the attendant evils which marked the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) and which hastened the fall of the Ottoman Empire have been the object of many studies. Much has been written about the different provinces with the exception of Iraq about which little has been known. Nevertheless, this period was also one of significant change in the history of the ancient land of Mesopotamia. Though neglected and distant from the seat of power, the fertile lands of the Tigris and Euphrates were never far from the mind of the shrewd Sultan Abdul Hamid who assiduously extended his *sannīya* holdings in this region. In fact, any understanding of Iraq in the late nineteenth century is incomplete without a knowledge of this development, owing to its social, economic, and administrative implications.

Sannīya or crown lands were the *mulk* (private freehold) of the Sultan of Turkey over which he could exercise all the rights granted by law to any possessor of *mulk* lands and the income from which, as the *mallākīya* (owner's share), was his own. [1] The rules which governed it were the same as those for other *mulk*, except in the case of the death of the possessor. All personal properties belonging to Sultans returned to the throne on their death and, in consequence, the heirs could not lay claim to them. After the death of a Sultan, the government would allocate to each member of the family some item of property. [2] This qualification attached to the *mulk* rights of crown properties, however, did not affect the full liberty of the Sultan to

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[1] Compare Saʿīd B. Ḥamāda, al-*Niẓām al-iqṭiṣādī fī 'l ʿIrāq* (Beirut, 1938), 30 f.; G. B. Admiralty, Intelligence Division, *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, I (Calcutta, 1917), 143; Aḥmad Fahmī, *A Report on Iraq* (Baghdad, 1926), 30 f. Cf. Sulaimān al-Bustānī, *Kitāb ʿIbra wa-dhikrā au al-daula al-ʿuthmānīya qabl al-dustūr wa-baʿdah* (1908), 151.

[2] I. A. 55/3, memorandum nº 8746/16/1, 10/11 September 1920, from the Revenue Secretary to the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad; *ibid.*, ref. nº 1498/M. 1091/366, letter from J. M. de Robeck, High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Lord Curzon, 7 November 1920.

dispose of his properties as he willed during his lifetime, nor did it affect his enjoyment of the profits to be gained from them. [1]

Crown lands were to be found in Iraq long before the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid, but they had never been extensive enough to be of much consequence. [2] While their origin is quite obscure, it is probable that what later came to be known as *sannīya* lands had their origin in the *Khāṣṣ Humāyūn*. [3] The period of the great extention of such holdings in Iraq came with the accession of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In fact, within months vast areas of the richest agricultural lands had been registered as the private property of Sultan Abdul Hamid and it was for this reason that *sannīya* land holdings came to be so closely associated with his name. [4]

It is impossible to ascertain the precise extent or proportion of the arable land in Iraq which at any time belonged to the Crown, owing to the inaccuracy and incompleteness of the records, but their concentration in the richest areas made them economically and administratively significant. Most of these lands were to be found in the Ḥilla-Dīwanīya, ʿAmāra, and Baṣra Districts as may be seen from Tables 1, 2, and 3. The largest span of *sannīya* lands took in the exceedingly rich lands occupied by the tribes of Albu Muḥammad and Albu Darrāj in the ʿAmāra District stretching, on the left bank of the Tigris, from the town of ʿAmāra to ʿAzair, including all the lands of the great Chaḥala Canal, and, on the right bank, from the town of Kumait down to ʿAzair. [5] In Baṣra, many previously *mīrī* (state) lands were converted to *sannīya* holdings by Imperial order. From among them the famous gardens of Dauwāsir were developed by Ḥājj Aḥmad b. Ḥājj Niʿma and those of Diʿaijī, Kawūs, and ʿĀmīya by Al Yāsir. [6] There are references to some *sannīya* lands in the

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[1] *Ibid.*, memorandum nº. 8746/16/1.

[2] For example, the lands of Bashiktash and Tophané were crown lands from an early date: cf. *ibid.*

[3] Cf. H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Part 1 (Oxford, 1951), 47 f.

[4] For the extent of new acquisitions within the first two years of Sultan Abdul Hamid's reign, see Table 1.

[5] From information supplied privately by shaikhs in ʿAmāra. Cf. Arab Bureau, *Tribes of the Tigris* (Calcutta, 1917), 10; M. Khalifa al-Nabhānī, *al-Tuḥfa al-Nabhāniya* (Egypt, 1342 H.), 379; O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 530, 9 Jumada I 1294; *Dahliyah* 86, 22 Rajab 1304; *Dahliyah* 725, 1 Rabi I 1312; *Dahliyah* 1706, 11 Rajab 1325; I. A. 30/E/19, reg. nº 34, ref. nº 18058, 13 May 1944, report by Saʿd Ṣāliḥ, former Governor of ʿAmāra, p. 13.

[6] For the history of these lands, cf. A. Basha'yan, *Zubdat al-tawārīkh fī aḥwāl*

Moṣul, Shahrizūr and Baghdad districts. [1] Officials of the Iraq Land Settlement Department have assured me that there had been crown lands in Muntafiq as well, but none of the documents which I found in either the Ottoman Archives or the Iraq Archives listed any such estates within this district.

Sultan Abdul Hamid engaged special agents who travelled throughout the domain seeking lands for acquisition. [2] By careful selection, the lands they acquired were almost always more fertile than others and included the most prosperous districts in the country. [3] By the

TABLE 1

A List of Sannīya *Lands Acquired in* 1294 (1877) [4]

Part I

Name of Liwas	*Name of Qadas*	*Name of Lands*
Karbalā'	Musaiya b	Musaiya b
Karbalā'	Musaiya b	Nāṣirīya
Karbalā'	Musaiya b	Iskandarīya
Ḥilla	Wardīya	Wardīya
Baghdad	Sāmarrā'	Dujail
Ḥilla	Sāmarrā'	Ḥammām Al Kabīr and Arāḍī Al Hawa
Ḥilla	Ḥilla	Arāḍī Banafsha
Baghdad	Ḥilla	Arāḍī Ṭarmīya

Part II

Karbalā'	Ḥilla	Half share of Creet Groves
Karbalā'	Ḥilla	Half share of Maḥmūdīya Groves
Karbalā'	Ḥilla	Half share of the Muṭlaq Sharqī Groves
Karbalā'	Ḥilla	Half share of Mi'ānīd Groves
Karbalā'	Karbalā'	Half share of Muṭlaq Gharbī Groves

Part III

'Amāra	'Amāra	Abū Ḥillāna
'Amāra	'Amāra	Chibīsa
'Amāra	'Amāra	Baqma
'Amāra	'Amāra	Umm al Dibis

ahl al-Baṣra (MS Basha'yan Library, Baṣra), XII, 194 f. Cf. *Reports of Administration of Divisions and Districts*, 1918, I (Calcutta, n. d.), 243.

[1] O. A. *Dahliyah* 332, 11 Shawāl 1306; *Dahliyah* 240, 25 Shawwāl 1304.

[2] Bustānī, *op. cit.*, 149, 151.

[3] *Salnāma Baghdād* (1318 H.), 416 ff. *ibid.* (1322 H.), 243, 255, 259. al-Nabhānī, *op. cit.*, 379; *Zaurā'*, nº 1040.

[4] From the *defter* (record) in which were recorded the lands in the Wilayat of Baghdad added to the *amlāk* (properties) of His Imperial Highness, the Sultan: O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 530, 9 Jumada I 1294.

TABLE 1 (continued)

A List of Sannīya *Lands Acquired in 1294 (1877)*

ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Abū Rummāna
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Tachriba
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Shinbila
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Baghl
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Umm Ṣafrān
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Achcha
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Umm al Rīsh
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Misandaq
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Drūd
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Khanbusha
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Zhairīya
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Athbir
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Abū Jīr
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Arāḍi al-Baḥr
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Abū ʾAl Qubḥ
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Abū Shobri
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Abū Jaʿab
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Arāḍī Balkhas
ʿAmāra	ʿAmāra	Abū Fisaiwa

TABLE 2

Sannīya *Lands in Lower Iraq Acquired after 1294 (1877)*

(A partial list prepared from documents in the Istanbul Archives: this Table does not contain the names of any of the lands listed in Table 1.)

Location	*Name of the Land*
Baghdad	Abū Ghuraib [1]
Baghdad	Al-Riḍwānīya [2]
Baghdad	Al-Ṭarmīya [3]
Najaf	Land along the newly dug Canal of Ḥamīdiya [4]
Between Ḥilla and Hindīya	Abu Gharaq and Abu ʿArāis [5]

[1] O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 1187, 23 Ramadan 1305; *Salnāma Baghdād* (1318 H.), 416.

[2] O. A. *Yıldız Rasmi* 247, 16 Ramadan 1302; *Salnāma Baghdād* (1318 H.), 416 f.

[3] *Salnāma Baghdād* (1318 H.), 416 f.

[4] O. A. *Dahliyah* 615, 10 Muharram 1306.

[5] O. A. *Dahliyah* 143, 3 Shaʿban 1304.

Ḥilla	Shkara Sayid Muhammad, Yusufiya and Maliḥ [1]
Shāmīya	Jaʿāra [2]
ʿAmāra	Dinān, Ṭamrīya and Filḥa [3]
Kūt	Musabḥīya and Abū Thofar and Bghaila [4]
Kūt	Shādī [5]

TABLE 3

A List of Sannīya *Properties in Baṣra* [6]

1. The Muqāṭaʿa of Al Sieba in Dauwāsir and its attachments to the end of Duwaib.
2. Diʿaiji
3. Kāwūs
4. ʿAmīya
5. Part of the lands of Hartha
6. Arāḍa

provisions of law, it would appear that *sannīya* lands could only be extended in the same way as those of any other private individual, that is, by purchase, gift, etc. and the same legal procedures were applied in the acquisition of such lands. [7] The staff of the *Sannīya* Land Department exercised great care in making out their documents recording the purchase of these lands. Each transaction was carefully justified; for example, certain fertile lands were worthy only of the Sultan; [8] the tenants for example, of properties adjoining those of the Sultan were unsuitable; [9] it was necessary to acquire some fertile lands neighboring *sannīya* lands in order to prevent them from falling into foreign hands; [10] tenants of lands irrigated by the creek of a *sannīya* estate were asked to pay for their water privileges and, if they could not, their lands were promptly appropriated. [11] Tenants who happened to have fertile land bordering upon those of the Sultan

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[1] O. A. *Dahliyah* 155, 13 Shawwal 1306.

[2] O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 1187, 23 Ramadan 1305; *Salnāma Baghdād* (1318 H.), 416 f.

[3] O. A. *Dahliyah* 86, 22 Rajab 1304.

[4] O. A. *Dahliyah* 155, 6 Shaʿban 1305; *Salnāma Baghdād* (1322 H., 259).

[5] *Salnāma* (Baghdad, 1322 H.), 255.

[6] *Reports of Administration...*, 1918, I, 243. For the history of these *sannīya* properties except for the last named, see Basha'yan, *op. cit.*

[7] O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 192, 27 Safar 1297; *Yıldız Rasmi* 618, 4 Ramadan 1297; *Yıldız Rasmi* 345, 13 Jumada II 1297.

[8] O. A. *Dahliyah* 143, 3 Shaʿban 1304; *ibid.*, 332, 11 Shawwal 1306.

[9] O. A. *Dahliyah* 86, 22 Rajab 1304.

[10] O. A. *Dahliyah* 240, 25 Shawwal 1304.

[11] O. A. *Dahliyah* 298, 10 Dhu 'l-Qaʿda 1304.

were forced to sell [1] and others whose land prevented direct access to water by the *sannīya* estates were similarly bought out. [2] Even troubles among tribesmen on neighboring lands were considered to be justifiable reason for making them *sannīya*. [3] There were other instances where the traditional grazing lands of neighboring tribes overlapped lands which were already *sannīya* and it was deemed wise to unite all these grazing lands by bringing the remainder within the *sannīya* estates as well. At one time twenty-one estates, ranging from two to one hundred and sixty seven donums each, were acquired on this pretext. [4] Sometimes lands were acquired as gifts from private individuals [5] or as payment for debts incurred. [6] At other times, rich *mīrī* lands along newly dug canals were acquired gratuitously as *mawāt* (dead lands) under the pretext that, by making them *sannīya*, they could be brought under cultivation, whereas otherwise they would remain barren. [7] Not even the *mulk* properties of private citizens were exempt from Abdul Hamid's attentions for many were forced to give him their lands or intimidated into selling. Over against the arbitrary use of authority by the Sultan's representatives, private property holders were powerless; those who demanded their rights could be imprisoned and at least one person died while resisting the confiscation of his lands. [8]

Most of the *mīrī* lands acquired as *sannīya* during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid were "purchased", it would seem, without any indication that a single piaster changed hands. [9] For example, in 1882 the lands of the Saiyids Zuwain in Ja'āra were seized and, without payment, converted into *sannīya*; the legal rights of the Saiyids, who had converted these former "dead lands" into some of the finest date groves of lower Iraq, were completely ignored. [10] In other cases, only a down payment was made, and the remaining installments were

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[1] O. A. *Dahliyah* 143, 3 Sha'ban 1304.
[2] O. A. *Dahliyah* 155, 13 Shawwal 1306.
[3] O. A. *Dahliyah* 86, 22 Rajab 1304.
[4] O. A. *Dahliyah* 27, 5 Rajab 1304. The donum equals 0.62 acres.
[5] O. A. *Dahliyah* 143, 3 Sha'ban 1304.
[6] *Reports of Administration...*, 1918, I, 338.
[7] O. A. *Dahliyah* 615, 10 Muharram 1306.
[8] Al-Bustānī, *op. cit.*, 149.
[9] I.A. 55/3, memorandum nº 8746/16/1, 10/11 September 1920; *ibid.*, ref. nº 1498/M. 1091/366, 7 November 1920; *Reports of Administration..., 1918*, I, 74.
[10] Arab Bureau, *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet, July* 1918 (Calcutta, 1919), 188.

either ignored or conveniently forgotten. The documents recording the acquisition of lands by the *Sannīya* Land Department usually showed the amount to be paid and the source from which it was to be made. While there were probably properties for which a sum was paid from the private treasury of the Sultan, [1] payment did not usually come directly from this source. The most common source appears to have been the State Treasury which paid the *badals* (prices or substitutes in money) in lieu of unpaid allowances or debts owed to the Sultan. [2] But *sannīya* lands were acquired by every sort of means from sheer expropriation to *bona fide* purchase with the Sultan's money. [3]

Sannīya lands were administered by a well-organized establishment known as the *Dā'irat al Sannīya* (*Sannīya Land Department*) which had branch offices in those areas where these lands were concentrated. It was an extensive administrative organization, independent of the local civil administration, and manned by a private staff which was responsible only to Istanbul and under the dirction of the Sultan himself. The jurisdiction of the provincial governor and sub-governors did not permit interference in the affairs of these lands, except to extend help and assistance when needed. [4] However, there was a close tie between the Army and the *Sannīya* Land Department. Usually, the President of the *Sannīya* Land Department of Baghdad was the Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Imperial Army [5] and the President of the *Sannīya* Land Department of Baṣra, the Brigadier in command of the military forces in that province. [6] The explanation for the close link between the Army and the *Sannīya* Land Department is that the former was practically the only source of suitably trained engineers and surveyors and it alone could forcibly collect the revenues of estates from which nothing could otherwise be acquired. [7]

In comparison with other lands, the *sannīya* lands tended during the

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[1] I. A. 55/3, ref. nº 1498/M.1091/366, 7 November 1920.

[2] O. A. *Dahliyah* 298, 10 *Dhu* 'l-Qa'da 1304; *ibid.* 240, 25 Shawwal 1304; *ibid.* 27, 5 Rajab 1304; *ibid.* 332, 11 Shawwal 1306; *ibid.* 86, 22 Rajab 1304; *ibid.* 155, 6 Sha'ban 1305; *ibid.* 132, 17 Sha'ban 1304.

[3] I. A. 55/3, ref. nº 1498/M.1091/366, 7 November 1920.

[4] *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, I, 143.

[5] O. A. *Yıldız Rasmi* 182, 5 Rabi I 1299; Ḥamāda, *op. cit.*, 127; Fahmī, *op. cit.*, 30. f.

[6] O. A. *Dahliyah* 1706, 11 Rajab 1325.

[7] Compare S. Ḥaider, *Land Problems of Iraq* (Ph. D. thesis, London University, 1942, unpublished), 421. f.

reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid to be well administered. [1] The drainage and digging of canals was closely and continuously supervised; [2] bridges were built over the creeks and canals leading to the estates; [3] tenants were encouraged to plant and cultivate trees; [4] adequate storage facilities were provided for the crops; and, when there was threat of natural calamity, the crops of *sannīya* lands suffered the least harm. This latter benefit was due to the close supervision and the more adequate storage facilities which insured that the harvested produce would be safely housed before severe damage from rains and insects would set in. [5] All these facilities, no doubt, added greatly to the productivity and wealth of these estates. Another likely contributory factor making for the discrepancies between *sannīya* and other lands is that a knowledge of the acquisition policies of the *Sannīya* Land Department would tend to discourage the prudent possessor of land rights from making any major improvements on his holdings, with the resultant diminution in yield and wealth this might bring.

There is little evidence that the extention of *sannīya* lands in Iraq had any appreciable effect on either tribal administration or on land tenure practices. For example, in ʿAmāra the responsibility for maintaining law and order among the tribesmen on *sannīya* lands continued to be attached to the lease of the *iltizām*, [6] as had been the case previously. If anything, the existence of the *Sannīya* Land Department only complicated and further confused matters so far as the civil government was concerned. In connection with the modes of land tenure, the *Sannīya* Land Department continued to follow local practices. In ʿAmāra, both *mīrī* and *sannīya* lands continued to be farmed out by *iltizām*. The leases were nominally put up for auction every five years, [7] but their duration varied and they were subject to arbitrary termination. [8] In Ḥilla-Dīwānīya, tribes occupying *sannīya* lands persisted in considering them as their tribal *lazma* (holding) and

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[1] *Civil Administrative Report, 1919, part 1, Mosul*, 24.

[2] For example the yield of the Dujail estate increased greatly after it became *sannīya*: *Zaurā'*, nº 1040. See also Basha'yan, *op. cit.*, XII, 194 f.

[3] *Zaurā'*, no 1355; O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 1187, 23 Ramadan 1305.

[4] Basha'yan, *op. cit.*, 195.

[5] O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 1187, 23 Ramadan 1305.

[6] By *iltizām* is meant the contract which states the terms and conditions of appointment of a *multazim* or contractor who was thereby made the landholder and responsible government authority over a specified area in return for the payment of a fixed sum known as a *badal*.

[7] *Tribes of the Tigris*, 18.

[8] For example, *Zaurā'*, nº 1068, 12 Safar 1300, mentions an *iltizām* of one year

actually held them as such. [1] Likewise, in Baṣra, the customary land tenure practices on the date groves, known as *ta'aba*, continued to be followed. [2]

The proportion of the yield collected by the *Sannīya* Land Department as *mallākīya*, or owner's share, varied considerably, but it usually followed the customary practice which obtained on the lands before they became *sannīya*. It varied from one tenth to one half of the gross produce, [3] while in 'Amāra it ran as high as 60%. It is probable that the 60% figure applied to lands on which previously the tithes or government tax had been set at one fifth, a sum paid jointly by the *mallāk* (land holder) and lessee, but once such lands became *sannīya* the entire tithe, or 20%, together with the *mallākīya* half, or 40%, amounted to a total of 60% of the yield, all of which was claimed by the *Sannīya* Land Department. [4] This was an exorbitant claim, since the remaining 40% was shared out in various ratios by the tribal shaikhs, tribal overseers, threshers, and others, and the fellah, who actually tilled the land, generally still had to pay the expenses of planting and cultivation from the meager amount which remained as his share. It is not likely, however, that the amount claimed as the *sannīya* share was ever paid in full.

The Sultan's private property was exempt from taxation, but this privilege did not extend to the tenants who were required to continue payment of their share of the tithe, in accordance with the customary levy. These tithes were not paid to the State Treasury however, but to the private treasury of the Sultan instead. [5] In this way the Sultan received both the *mallākīya* share and the tithe share. Nevertheless, the te-

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duration only. A document from the Minister of Interior dated 22 Sha'ban 1324 and a letter from the Headquarters of the Sixth Imperial Army dated 30 July 1322 state that the estates were leased for periods of two or three years: O. A. *Dahliyah 2443*, 12 Sha'ban 1324.

[1] F. M. Āl Far'aun, *al-Qaḍā al-'Ashā'irī* (Baghdad, 1941), 159, 170 ff. Compare *Reports of Administration...*, *1918*, I, 72, 121, 134, 186; Sir Ernest Dowson, "Preliminary Notes on Land Settlement in Iraq" (MS, Ministry of Interior, Baghdad), 2 f. For a more detailed treatment of land tenure practices in Ḥilla-Dīwānīya, see A. Jwaideh, *Land and Tribal Administration of Lower Iraq under the Ottomans from* 1869 *to* 1914 (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1958, unpublished), 536-559.

[2] Cf. Basha'yan, *op. cit.*, 194 ff.; *Reports of Administration...*, *1918*, I, 243. The unique pattern of land tenure in the date groves of Baṣra acknowledged certain acquired rights to the land and its product on the part of the *ta'ābs* (occupancy tenants) who undertook the planting and cultivation of the trees.

[3] *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, I, 145.

[4] *Reports of Administration...*, *1918*, I, 244.

[5] *Zaurā'*, nº 1021.

nants did derive certain benefits from tilling *sannīya* lands. They were given interest-free loans toward the purchase of seed,[1] priority in regard to water rights, exemption from conscription and all forms of forced labor,[2] and were not subjected to harrassment from the police.[3] These privileges were granted in order to induce cultivators to work and to remain on *sannīya* lands. But if the cultivators on *sannīya* lands were more prosperous than was generally the case with their counterparts on other lands, it was largely owing to the greater fertility of these lands.

Almost immediately after the Revolution of 1908 the Young Turks obtained from Sultan Abdul Hamid a cession of his private properties which were transferred to the direction of the State. This transaction was recorded in the minutes of the Council of Ministers of September 1, 1324 (September 14, 1908) and received the Imperial Irāda the same day. Although these lands continued to be called *sannīya*, they were transferred to the administration of the newly formed Department of *Amlāk al-Mudauwara*,[4] and other kinds of property, for example, army barracks, public buildings, etc., were added to the same lists. Thereafter, however, these properties were not tended with the same care as before and the yields deteriorated greatly, especially in the case of the *sannīya* date gardens in Baṣra. But the land tenure practices continued substantially the same.[5]

NOTE ON SOURCES

Apart from published reports, historical works, etc., the main sources of this essay are the following:

1. The Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. These are referred to in the footnotes under the heading "O.A.," followed by the name of the ministry or department concerned (*Dahliyah*, *Yıldız Khususi*, *Yıldız Rasmi*) and then by the number of the file, with more detailed references where necessary.

2. The archives of the Land Settlement Department of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. These are referred to under the heading "I.A.," followed by the file number and, where necessary, the register

[1] O. A. *Yıldız Khususi* 1187, 23 Ramadan 1305.

[2] Al-Bustānī, *op. cit.*, 151; S. Ḥaider, *op. cit.*, 422.

[3] *Civil Administrative Report, 1919, Part 1, Mosul*, 24.

[4] For an English translation of the minutes as they were published, compare I. A. 55/3. See also *ibid.*, memorandum nº 8746/16/1, 10/11 September 1920; *ibid.*, ref. nº 1498/M.1091/366; *Reports of Administration...*, *1918*, I, 243.

[5] *Reports of Administration...*, *1918*, I, 243.

number and the reference number of the individual document.

3. *Al-Zaurā'*, the official newspaper of the Ottoman province of Baghdad. Inaugurated by Midḥat Pasha and published in both Arabic and Turkish, it contained not only the text of government decrees, statements and reports, but also items of news. For the greater part of the period dealt with, it was the only newspaper published in Baghdad. It is referred to under the heading "*Zaurā'*," followed by the number of the issue.

ALBERTINE JWAIDEH
University of California at Berkeley

THE EXPEDITION OF BI'R MA'ŪNA

BY

M. J. KISTER

The character of the expedition sent by the Prophet in the month of Safar 4 H., [1] which ended in the killing of the participants at Bi'r Ma'ūna, is rather obscure. Traditions about this expedition are contradictory: [2] the aim of the expedition can hardly be determined; the number of the participants is variously stated in the divergent traditions; the tribal composition of the participants is disputed; the details about the attackers are few; the reason for their attack on the Muslim party is not clear. It may therefore be useful to present a survey of some of the traditions concerning this encounter, in course of which a version apparently hitherto unknown is presented.

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The traditional account of the story as reported by Ibn Isḥāq (d. 151 H.) [3] forms a composite narrative, based on the authority of a number of Muslim traditionists. According to this account, one of the chiefs of 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a, Abū Barā' 'Āmir b. Mālik, [4] nicknamed "Mulā'ib al-Asinna" ("The Player with the Spears"), [5] came to the Prophet and was invited by him to accept Islam. Although he did not embrace Islam, he was not far removed from it. He asked the Prophet to send some of his Companions to Najd to summon its people to embrace Islam, and expressed the hope that they would respond. He assured the Prophet of his protection of the Companions. The Prophet sent forty of his Companions with al-Mundhir b. 'Amr

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[1] Cf. J. M. B. Jones, "The Chronology of the Maghāzī—a textual survey," in *BSOAS* (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*,1957), 249, 267; the anonymous tradition fixing the date of the expedition in Muharram (p. 249 n. 10) is quoted as well in Samhūdī's *Wafā' al-wafā'*, I, 211.

[2] See Max v. Oppenheim, *Die Beduinen*, rev. and ed. W. Caskel, III, 9.

[3] In Ibn Hishām's *Sīra*.

[4] See his biography in Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba* nº 4417.

[5] For this nickname, see Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ansāb al-Khail*, ed. Aḥmad Zakī Pasha (Cairo, 1946), 77; Aus b. Ḥajar, *Dīwān*, ed. Geyer, XVII, 7, 8; XXI, 3; Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, *'Iqd*, III (Cairo, 1935), 335; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, s.v. "Sullān"; al-Zurqanī; *Sharḥ 'alā 'l-mawāhib*, II 1325 H.), 75; al-Suhailī: *al-Rauḍ al-unuf*, II (Cairo, 1914), 174.

al-Sā'idī. [1] When the party reached Bi'r Ma'ūna, [2] they sent Ḥarām b. Milḥān with the Prophet's letter to 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail. [3] He, however, killed the envoy, without even looking at the letter. 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail summoned his people (that is, the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a) to attack the party of the Muslims. But they respected the protection of Abū Barā', and refused to join him. He then summoned the clans of Sulaim: 'Uṣaiya, Ri'l and Dhakwān. They responded and attacked the Muslim party. The Muslims fought, but were killed to the last man. [4]

Two men of the expedition, 'Amr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī and a man from the Anṣār, who were engaged in pasturing the camels of the party, noticed some vultures hovering about the camp. When they drew near, they saw the dead bodies of their companions. The Anṣārī decided to fight, and was slain by the polytheists. 'Amr b. Umaiya was captured, but was released by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, when he stated that he was from Muḍar. [5] On his way, he killed two men of 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a, whom he accidentally met, not being aware that they had been granted protection by the Prophet. The Prophet paid their bloodwit.

Abū Barā' was grieved by the violation of his protection by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, and the death of the Prophet's companions. Ḥassān b. Thābit composed verses inciting the son of Abū Barā', Rabī'a, against 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail. [6]

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[1] See, about him, Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III (Beirut), 555, 618; Ibn Duraid, *Ishtiqāq*, ed. A.S. Hārūn, 456; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Istī'āb*, 275; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, n° 8220.

[2] For the location of the place, see 'Arrām b. al-Aṣbagh al-Sulamī, *Asmā' Jibāl Tihāma*, ed. A. S. Hārūn, (*Nawādir al-Makhṭūṭāt*) VIII, 429; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, s.v. "Bi'r Ma'ūna", "Ublā"; Samhūdī, *Wafā' al-wafā'*, II, 256-57; Thilo, *Die Ortsnamen in altarabischen Poesie*, s.v. "Ublā".

[3] See *EI*², s.v. "'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail" (W. Caskel).

[4] Only one man, wounded seriously, was left. He survived till the Battle of the Trench.

[5] Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamhara*, MS British Museum, f° 45b; al-Balādhurī, *Ansab*, MS, f° 896a.

[6] The rendering of these verses by Nabia Abbott (*Studies in Arabic Papyri*, [Chicago, 1957], 69) is rather inaccurate. "Alā abligh Rabī'ata dhā 'l-masā'ī: fa-mā aḥdathta fī 'l-ḥadathāni ba'dī" is not "*Verily I shall inform Rabī'ah, he of the highest distinctions, of the event you caused to happen (right) behind me.*" "Alam yaru'kum" cannot be rendered: "surely you will make amends": the correct translation is: "were you not shocked (or stirred)." "Wa-mā khaṭa'un ka-'amdī" cannot be translated: "and he (the latter) did not do wrong (to the man of Bi'r Ma'ūna) intentionally." It should be rendered: "a mistake is not the same as an intentional act" (that is, an intentionally committed crime). Cf. the translations of Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad*, 435; Lyall, *The Dīwāns of 'Abīd b. al-Abraṣ*

Rabīʿa b. ʿĀmir, the son of Abū Barāʾ attacked ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail, trying to kill him, but he failed.

Anas b. ʿAbbās al-Sulamī, a maternal uncle of Ṭuʿaima b. ʿAdī b. Naufal, boasted of his killing Nāfiʿ b. Budail al-Khuzāʿī, one of the members of the Muslim party. The martyrs were mourned in verses by ʿAbd Allāh b. Rawāḥa and Ḥassān b. Thābit. Kaʿb b. Mālik composed verses blaming the Jaʿfar b. Kilāb (of ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa) for not carrying out the obligation of protection granted to the Muslim party. [1]

This account of Ibn Isḥāq [2] differs in very essential points from the account of Mūsā b. ʿUqba (d. 141 H.). [3] His account is traced to al-Zuhrī (d. 124 H.). [4] Abū Barāʾ refused to accept Islam. He offered the Prophet a gift, but the Prophet refused to accept the gift of a polytheist. [5] The number of the Companions sent by the Prophet is rendered by the word *raht*, denoting rather a small group.

As in the account of Ibn Isḥāq, ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail summons his people to attack the Muslim party. When they refused, he appealed to the clans of Sulaim. They joined him, attacked the Muslim party and killed all the men, except ʿAmr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī, who was released by ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail. [6]

The same account is partly quoted by Ibn Ḥajar, [7] with an explicit statement that it is taken from the book of the *Maghāzī* by Mūsā b. ʿUqba.

The most important detail in the account of Mūsā b. ʿUqba is the

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and ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail, 87; W. Arafat, "The Development of a Dramatic Theme in the Story of Khubaib," *BSOAS* (1958), 19, line 12.

[1] The verses of Kaʿb b. Mālik were added by Ibn Hishām; see Guillaume, *op. cit.*, 762 (678).

[2] Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, ed. Saqqā, Abyārī, Shalabī, III, 193-99; Guillaume, *op. cit.*, 433-36.

[3] Sachau, "*Das Berliner Fragment des Mūsā b. ʿUqba*," *Sitzungsberichte der phil. Classe, Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1904), 468.

[4] See A. A. Duri, "A Study on the Beginnings of History Writing in Islam," *BSOAS* (1957).

[5] The same saying of refusal uttered by the Prophet when ʿIyāḍ b. Ḥimār al-Mujāshiʿī offered him the gift of a horse; see Ibn Qutaiba, *al-Maʿārif*, (Cairo, 1935), 147; al-Ṭabarānī, *al-Muʿjam al-ṣaghīr* (Delhi), 3; Abū ʿUbaid, *Amwāl*, 256; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamhara*, fº 66a; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 6123. The same expression occurs again, when the Prophet refused to accept the gift of Ḥakīm b. Ḥizām; see Zubair b. Bakkār, *Nasab Quraish*, MS Bodl., fº 65b; *Lisān al-ʿArab*, s.v. "ZBD"; and see the discussion in Abū ʿUbaid's *Amwāl*, 257, whether the gift was presented by ʿĀmir b. Tufail or by ʿĀmir b. Mālik.

[6] See the translation of this document in Guillaume, *op. cit.*, p. xliv (Introduction).

[7] *Iṣāba*, nº 8220.

phrase that al-Mundhir b. ʿAmr al-Sāʿidī was sent by the Prophet with the group as "his spy in Najd" (ʿainan lahu fī ahli Najd). It points to the fact, that the expedition was not a peaceful missionary enterprise.

The papyrus about the campaigns of Muḥammad, edited by Nabia Abbott, [1] contains the story of the expedition of Bi'r Maʿūna. The date of the papyrus is fixed by Professor Abbott at the end of the second century of the Hijra and it is attributed by her to Maʿmar b. Rāshid (d. 154 H.). The story of the expediton shows close affinity to the account of Ibn Isḥāq. It may be remarked that a list of the Anṣār, killed at Bi'r Maʿūna, is given. According to the version of the papyrus, three men were pasturing the cattle of the party. One of them preferred to fight the polytheists, and was killed. The other two went back to Medina, and, on their way back, they killed the two men of Kilāb who had been granted a safeconduct by the Prophet.

The composite account of al-Wāqidī (d. 207 H.) [2] contains quite divergent details. According to this account, the Prophet sent seventy young men of the Anṣār, distinguished by their piety and called *al-qurrāʾ*. The version giving the number as seventy is told on the authority of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (d. 63 or 74 H.) and is repeated by a saying about four battles, in each of which seventy Anṣār were killed, [3] but al-Wāqidī prefers the version of forty men. Further, al-Wāqidī mentions that a guide of Sulaim, called al-Muṭālib (read: al-Muṭṭalib),[4] was sent with the party. Al-Wāqidī gives the name of the man of the Anṣār, who was sent with ʿAmr b. Umaiya to pasture the camels of the party, as al-Ḥārith b. al-Ṣimma. [5] A passage is devoted to the description of the heroic death of the leader of the party, al-Mundhir b. ʿAmr; he refused to be pardoned by the attackers, fought and was killed. Also al-Ḥārith b. al-Ṣimma preferred to die fighting. A special passage, told on the authority of ʿUrwa, reports the death of ʿUrwa (b. Asmāʾ) b. al-Ṣalt, who was on friendly terms with ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail, and whom his people, the Sulaim, tried to spare and par-

[1] N. Abbott, *Studies in Arabic Papyri*, Document 5 (Chicago, 1957), 65-79.

[2] *al-Maghāzī*, ed. v. Kremer, 337-44.

[3] al-Wāqidī, *al-Maghāzī*, 338, 341; Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾrīkh*, VII (Damascus, 1932), 198; Zurqānī, *Sharḥ ʿalā 'l-mawāhib*, II, 77.

[4] See Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 8024.

[5] See Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *Istīʿāb*, 112; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 1423. According to Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 195 the name of the Anṣārī who pastured with ʿAmr b. Umaiya was al-Mundhir b. Muḥammad b. ʿUqba b. Uḥaiḥa b. al-Julāḥ (see, about him, Ibn Duraid, *Ishtiqāq*, ed. A.S. Hārūn, 441; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *Istīʿāb*, 276; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 8225).

doned. He, however, preferred to fight and was killed. [1] The story about the gift offered to the Prophet by Abū Barā' is recorded, but another version of this story is added as well. Abū Barā' sent Labīd and his son Rabī'a with a gift to the Prophet. The Prophet refused to accept the gift. He sent him, however, a remedy for the tumor of which Abū Barā' suffered, as he did request it. According to the account of al-Wāqidī, Rabī'a, the son of Abū Barā', attempted to kill 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail after a talk with the Prophet.

Al-Wāqidī devotes special passages to the story about the Prophet's curse on Muḍar and the clans of Sulaim, [2] mentions the verse of the Koran revealed to the Prophet on the occasion of the slaughter of the Companions (later abrogated) and gives a list of the killed members of the expedition.

Of special importance is a version given by al-Wāqidī, stating that Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ returned to the Prophet with 'Amr b. Umaiya. Al-Wāqidī refutes this version, on the ground that only Anṣār participated in this expedition. [3] Also of importance is the remark of al-Wāqidī about Anas b. 'Abbās al-Ri'lī al-Sulamī, who killed Nāfi' b. Budail al-Khuzā'ī: "He went out on the Day of Bi'r Ma'ūna, inciting his people to fight the Muslim party, in order to avenge the blood of the son of his sister, [4] Ṭu'aima b. 'Adī."

Ibn Sa'd (d. 230 H.) has two versions: [5] (1) a version similar to that of al-Wāqidī, including the description of the expedition as a group of pious young Readers, the action of 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail and his killing of Ḥarām b. Milḥān, the curse of the Prophet, the *āya* revealed to the Prophet and the return of 'Amr b. Umaiya; (2) a tradition transmitted by Ibn Abī 'Arūba-Qatāda-Anas b. Mālik, giving quite a different explanation of the affair of Bi'r Ma'ūna. Ri'l, Dhakwān, 'Uṣaiya and Liḥyān [6] came to the Prophet and sought his

[1] See, about him, Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, IV (Beirut), 377; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS f° 1131b; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Istī'āb*, 491; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharat ansāb al-'Arab*, ed. Levi-Provençal, 250; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, n° 5509.

[2] See Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, ed. A. M. Shākir, n° 7821 (Kor. 3, 128); al-Naḥās, *al-Nāsikh* (Cairo, 1938), 91; Marzūqī, *Azmina*, II (Hyderabad, 1332 H.), 33; J. Kowalski, *O pewnych potrawach spozywanych w Arabii podczas głodu* (R.O. 1914), 223); al-Baghdādī, *Khizāna*, III, 142.

[3] Al-Wāqidī, however, contradicts himself by giving the list of the martyrs: 'Āmir b. Fuhaira was a maulā of Abū Bakr; Nāfi' b. Budail was from Khuzā'a; 'Urwa b. Asmā' b. al-Ṣalt was from Sulaim; al-Ḥakam b. Kaisān was a maulā of Makhzūm; 'Amr b. Umaiya (the survivor of the expedition) was from Kināna.

[4] In the text: *ibni akhīhi*, read *ibni ukhtihi*; al-*Maghāzī*, 344.

[5] *Ṭabaqāt*, II (Beirut), 51-54.

[6] The Liḥyān were in fact cursed by the Prophet with Dhakwān, 'Uṣaiya

aid against their people (probably the unbelievers among their people). The Prophet sent with them seventy pious men of the Anṣār, called *al-qurrā'*. When they reached Bi'r Ma'ūna, these clans betrayed them and killed them. The Prophet cursed these clans daily for a month in his morning prayer. A revelation had been sent down to the Prophet: "Inform your people, that we met our Lord and He was pleased with us and contented us."

Two other versions recorded by Ibn Sa'd in the biography of Ḥarām b. Milḥān deserve attention. Both versions are told on the authority of Anas b. Mālik. The first version states that some people came to the Prophet and asked him to send men to teach them Koran and Sunna. The Prophet sent seventy pious men called *al-qurrā'*. This Muslim party was attacked by these people and slaughtered before they reached their destination. Ḥarām b. Milḥān was pierced with a spear by a man who came from behind and killed him. This version, rather a vague one, is followed by a version more clear and detailed: The Prophet sent seventy men with Ḥarām b. Milḥān to the Banū 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a. Ḥarām volunteered to precede the party. He came to the unbelievers and got a promise of safety. When he talked with them about the Prophet they signaled to one of them, who attacked him and pierced him with a spear. [1]

It may be remarked that the three versions recorded by Ibn Sa'd contradict the version that 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail killed Ḥarām. In these three versions 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail is not mentioned at all.

Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb (d. 245 H.) gives a very short account about the expedition. The Prophet sent al-Mundhir b. 'Amr al-Sā'idī with thirty men to Bi'r Ma'ūna; twenty-six of them were Anṣār, four were Muhājirūn. All of them were killed, except 'Amr b. Umaiya al-Kinānī. [2]

The number of the members of the expedition, given by Ibn Ḥabīb as thirty, is the smallest one mentioned in the sources. Nothing in this account is said about the course of the encounter about the aim of the expedition.

An important tradition in connection with the expedition of Bi'r

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and Ri'l. The Liḥyān were responsible for the slaughter of the Companions at the Day of al-Rajī'. The information about the two disasters reached the Prophet on the same day and he cursed the clans of Sulaim together with Liḥyān; see Lyall, *The Dīwāns of 'Abīd b. al-Abraṣ and 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail*, 86 n. 4; 'Ali b. Burhān al-Dīn, *Insān al-'Uyūn*, III, 195.

[1] *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 514-15.

[2] *al-Muḥabbar*, 118.

Ma'ūna is given by Ibn Ḥabīb in a chapter devoted to "Stories of men who drank undiluted wine till death, because of anger or disdain." [1]

According to this tradition, it was 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail who went out against the Companions sent by the Prophet on the request of Abū Barā' to teach his people Islam, and killed them all, except one. Abū Barā' became angry, because 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail violated his promised protection of the Companions. When the people of Abū Barā' were informed that 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail had died on his way home from a visit to the Prophet, they decided to leave their abode and seek new pastures. When Abū Barā' asked about the unwonted movement in the camp he was informed: "They are departing because of the event which happened." He was surprised to learn that they were about to depart without his order. One of his relatives told him that they suspected that he had had a fit of mental aberration when he was sent to "that man." Abū Barā' became enraged and decided to drink himself to death. "There is no good in life when the Banū 'Āmir disobeyed me." [2]

The tribal tradition of the Banū 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a is reflected in a peculiar sentence quoted by Ibn Ḥabīb: "The Banū 'Āmir say that he did not kill himself. He died as Muslim."

The tradition recorded by Ibn Ḥabīb is a significant and a rare one, stating that Abū Barā' lost influence in his tribe and that he outlived 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail.

Al-Balādhurī (d. 279 H.) has a short record of the expedition. The number of the men was forty or seventy. They went out at the request of Abū Barā' as missionaries, and were killed in an attack launched against them by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, aided by the clans of Sulaim. [3]

Al-Bukhārī (d. 256 H.) quotes the tradition of Qatāda on the authority of Anas, already mentioned above (see Ibn Sa'd), according to which the Companions were treacherously killed by the clans of Sulaim and Liḥyān who invited them. The tradition in which the role of Ḥarām b. Milḥān is stressed, already mentioned above as well, is also recorded. (See, above, Ibn Sa'd, the biography of Ḥarām.) A

[1] *Op. cit.*, 472; this version is given by Bakrī in his *Mu'jam mā 'sta'jam*, s.v. "Ma'ūna". The version is divergent on a detail: 'Amr b. Umaiya and Ḥarām b. Milḥān pastured the camels of the Muslims. Ḥarām decided to fight the polytheists and was killed. 'Amr b. Umaiya returned to the Prophet.

[2] About his drinking of wine till his death, see, Jarīr wa 'l-Farazdaq, *Naqā'iḍ*, ed. Bevan, 199; Ibn Qutaiba, *al-Shi'r wa 'l-shu'arā'*, ed. de Goeje, 224

[3] *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ed. Hamidullah, I, 375.

peculiar tradition told as well on the authority of Anas deserves to be mentioned: the Prophet sent seventy men called *al-qurrā'* for some purpose. They were met by two clans of Sulaim, Ri'l and Dhakwān, at the well of Bi'r Ma'ūna. The men of the Muslim party said to them: "By God, we do not intend you, we are merely passing by to carry out some purpose of the Prophet." They (that is, the clans of Sulaim) killed the men of the Muslim party, and the Prophet cursed them daily for a month in his morning prayer. [1]

Al-Ṭabarī (d. 310 H.) records the account of Ibn Isḥāq but mentions the other versions as well. Both versions about the death of Ḥarām are given: (1) that he was killed by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, and (2) that he was killed by a man from the people of Bi'r Ma'ūna. Four verses of Ḥassān (already mentioned) and nine verses of Ka'b b. Mālik, blaming the relatives of Abū Barā' for not helping the attacked Muslim party, and reproaching the violators of the promise of protection given to the Prophet, are quoted as well. [2].

Al-Mas'ūdī (d. 345 H.) blames 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail of the killing of seventy Anṣār sent to Najd by the Prophet, to teach the people the Koran. [3]

A tradition closely resembling the tradition recorded by al-Bukhārī, in which it was stressed that the missionaries did not intend the clans of Sulaim, is given by al-Ṭabarānī (d. 360 H.). [4] Some details in this account may be stressed: the expedition was sent by the Prophet after the death of Khubaib. It was Ḥarām b. Milḥān who informed the men of Sulaim, that the party had no intentions concerning them (*annā lasnā īyāhum nurīdu*) in order to gain their consent to their passage. There is a description of how the men of Sulaim killed Ḥarām and the Muslim party. [5]

An important version, differing from other accounts, is given by al-Samarqandī (d. 393 H.) in his *Tafsīr*. [6] The Prophet sent a troop commanded by al-Mundhir b. 'Amr. The Banū 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a went out against them, ambushed them and killed them. Three men of the participants of the expedition came back. In the neighborhood of Medina they met two men of Sulaim, who stated that they were of

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1 *Ṣaḥīḥ*, III (Cairo, 1286 H.), 23-25.
2 Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II (Cairo 1939), 219-223.
3 *al-Tanbīh wa 'l-ishrāf* (Cairo, 1938), 212.
4 *al-Mu'jam al-ṣaghīr*, 110.
5 This tradition is quoted in Abū Nu'aim's *Ḥilyat al-auliyā'*, I, 123.
6 MS Chester Beatty, II, f° 228a.

'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a, and killed them. About these three men, *āya* one of sura forty-nine was revealed.

Abū Nu'aim al-Iṣbahānī (d. 430 H.) records, in his *Ḥilya*, the version of Qatāda about the treacherous slaughter of the seventy Anṣār by the clans of Sulaim who invited them. He also records a tradition related on the authority of Ka'b b. Mā'ik, according to which 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail attacked and killed a small group (*nafar*) of Companions sent to the Banū Sulaim. [1] In his *Dalā'il al-nubūwa*, Abū Nu'aim records the version about the sending of a small group (*raht*) of pious Companions at the request of Abū Barā', and their slaughter by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail. From al-Wāqidī are quoted the passages about the heroic death of 'Āmir b. Fuhaira, and about the gift sent to the Prophet by Abū Barā', with Labīd. [2]

A unique tradition is recorded by Abū' l-Baqā' Hibat Allāh.[3] According to this version ten survivors of the Muslim party returned to Medina.

Later sources do not contribute much to the elucidation of the event. The account of Ibn 'Asākir (d. 686 H.) is mainly based on that of al-Wāqidī. [4] On Wāqidī's account is also based the version of al-Maqrīzī (d. 845 H.).[5] Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 H.) records the version[6] given by al-Ṭabarī,[7] on the authority of Isḥāq b. Abī Ṭalḥa—Anas: the forty or seventy Companions were sent to Bi'r Ma'ūna. There stayed 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail. The Muslims entered a cave and sent Ḥarām b. Milḥān to the people of Bi'r Ma'ūna to convey the message of the Prophet. He was killed by a man of the people of Bi'r Ma'ūna. 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, with the people of Bi'r Ma'ūna, attacked the Muslims in the cave and killed them. The *āya* revealed to the Prophet in connection with this event was replaced by *āya* 169 of sura 3. [8]

The account of 'Alī b. Burhān al-Dīn (d. 1044 H.) [9] is mainly based on the accounts of Ibn Isḥāq and al-Wāqidī. The contradictory accounts are quoted, and attempts of scholars to smooth out the con-

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[1] *Ḥilyat al-auliyā'*, I, 123.
[2] Pp. 185-86 (Hyderabad, 1320 H.).
[3] *al-Manāqib al-Mazyadīya*, MS British Museum f° 8a.
[4] *Ta'rīkh*, VII, 195-199.
[5] *Imtā' al-asmā'*, ed. A. M. Shākir, I (Cairo, 1941), 170-73.
[6] *al-Durr al-manthūr*, II, 95.
[7] *Ta'rīkh*, II, 222; and cf. Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, ed. A. M. Shākir, n° 8224 (Kor. 3, 169).
[8] See also Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, Kor. 3, 169.
[9] *Insān al-'uyūn*, III (1353 H.), 194-97.

traditions are recorded. (The number of the members of the party, the curse of Liḥyān with the clans of Sulaim, etc.)

Al-Samhūdī (d. 1056 H.) quotes the traditions of Ibn Isḥāq and al-Bukhārī. Contradictory traditions are discussed (the tribal composition of the expedition, whether Abū Barā' drank wine till death, or accepted Islam and died a Muslim in battle). [1]

The path of reconciliation between contradictory traditions is followed by al-Zurqānī (d. 1122 H.). [2] A case of plausible reconciliation may be quoted here. Quoting the tradition that Ḥarām was killed by ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail and the tradition that he was killed by a man of Sulaim, al-Zurqānī states that ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail was the leader of the people, so the deed was attributed to him. [3]

In summary, it may be said that the traditions about this expedition are contradictory as to whether the expedition was a peaceful one sent to teach Islam and the Koran, or a military enterprise; whether it was sent to the Banū ʿĀmir or to Sulaim; whether the members of the expedition were slain by clans of Sulaim, by clans of ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, by clans of Sulaim led by ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail; whether the envoy, Ḥarām, was killed by ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail; or by a man of Sulaim; whether the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa opposed the relations between Abū Barā' and the Prophet or supported it; whether ten or three or two or one of the members of the party survived and returned to Medina; whether Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās was among the members of the party or not; whether three or two men who returned to Medina killed the two men of Sulaim (or ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa), or whether it was ʿAmr b. Umaiya alone who killed them; whether the members of the party were Anṣār only, or Anṣār and Muhājirūn.

II

Scholars have tried to find an answer to the riddle of the expedition. Muir [4] assumes that "perhaps there were divided opinions in the tribe [that is, ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa]." Muir points out that the Prophet, almost immediately after the massacre, entered into communication with ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail, on the subject of the latter's claim for blood-money for the two ʿĀmirites killed by the returning ʿAmr b. Umaiya, without making any counterclaim for the blood of the martyrs, and

[1] *Wafā' al-wafā'*, I (1326 H.), 211.
[2] *Sharḥ ʿalā 'l-mawāhib*, II (Cairo, 1325 H.), 74-79.
[3] *fa-kāna nisbatu dhālika ilaihi ʿalā sabīli 'l-taǰauwuzi.*
[4] *The life of Moḥammad*, ed. Weir (Edinburgh, 1912), 280 n. 2.

remarks that (all this) "looks as if the attack was not so gratuitous as might appear."

Caetani mentions the same argument (of paying 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail the bloodwite for the two men from Kilāb who had been killed). Caetani supposes that the disaster of Bi'r Ma'ūna was the consequence of a military expedition, not of a peaceful missionary enterprise. He suggests that there might have been some violation of a pact by the Muslims, and that therefore the massacre was an act of legitimate defense or revenge. [1]

Lyall makes a comprehensive study of the question of the aim of the expedition. [2] He reaches the conclusion that it was a warlike expedition "sent by the Prophet to help one section of the Banū Sulaim against another." "The Prophet had reason to think, from his relations with Abū Barā', that the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a were friendly to him and might have been expected to help. In this he was disappointed. The Sulamīs proved to be treacherous, and 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail perhaps joined them in the attack on the Prophet's party." The payment of the bloodwit by the Prophet for the two 'Āmirites serves as evidence, for Lyall, that 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail did not in fact violate an express pledge of protection given by Abū Barā'.

Buhl gives the traditional account of the expedition as a peaceful missionary enterprise. [3]

Watt, trying to solve the problem of the blood money paid by the Prophet to 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, without any counterclaim for the martyrs of Bi'r Ma'ūna, declares that it is improbable, as has been suggested, "that the Muslims had done something which caused them to forfeit the right to blood money." [4] Watt suggests that 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail encouraged the Sulamī clans to massacre the Muslims. "He was morally responsible, he was not their leader in any sense and so not technically responsible." [5] "It was probably also they who killed the letter carrier." Watt suggests that the appeal of Abū Barā' to Muhammad "was at bottom an appeal for help against rivals within his tribe. Muḥammad, anxious to bring Banū 'Āmir to his own side, decided to interfere in the internal politics of the tribe,

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[1] Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam*, I (Milano 1905), 578-80.

[2] *The Dīwāns of 'Abīd b. al-Abraṣ and 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail* (Leiden, 1913), 84-89.

[3] *Das Leben Muhammeds* (Heidelberg, 1955), 261-62.

[4] Cf. Caetani, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

[5] Cf. the opinion of Lyall, *op. cit.*, 89: "The Sulamīs proved to be treacherous and 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail perhaps joined them."

though he realized the riskiness of doing so." [1] ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail was not strong enough to bring the tribe to disown Abū Barāʾ's protection, and "persuaded his neighbours of B. Sulaim to attack the Muslims, and doubtless gave them help by way of information." [2]

C. E. Bosworth suggests [3] that "Muḥammad had apparently been invited to intervene in an internal dispute of Sulaim, but the incident is also mixed up with the quarrel within ʿĀmir between Abū Barāʾ and ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail."

W. Caskel states that "there was an engagement of protection entered into by the uncle of ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail, only that ʿĀmir could not fulfil it among Sulaim, who had killed the 'holy band', in reality a pillaging expedition." [4] Caskel states that after the death of Abū Barāʾ, ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail became formally the head of the Jaʿfar.

Nabia Abbott assumes that "this was not a military expedition but a proselytizing mission to a large confederation of tribes in the prosperous and coveted Najd." [5]

Muhammad Hamidullah mentions the massacre of the seventy missionaries, treacherously slain by ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail in the territory of Sulaim. The Sulaim were evidently discontented, assumes Hamidullah, because of the Muslim expeditions in their territory, in the preceding months. [6]

III

As mentioned above, al-Wāqidī quotes a version stating that Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ returned with ʿAmr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī to the Prophet, after the massacre of Biʾr Maʿūna. Al-Wāqidī seems to refute this information, stressing that only men of the Anṣār participated in this expedition. [7]

The information about the participation of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ in the expedition of Biʾr Maʿūna is included in a significant account recorded by Abu 'l-Laith al-Samarqandī (d. 393 H.): [8]

> ʿĀmir b. Mālik, one of the horsemen of the Arabs (his nickname was Mulāʿib al-Asinna) wrote to the Prophet: 'Send me men to teach us the Koran and instruct us in religion. They will be under my pro-

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[1] Cf. Muir, above, about "The divided opinions in the tribe."
[2] W. M. Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford, 1956), 31-33, 97-98.
[3] *EI*², s.v. "Biʾr Maʿūna."
[4] *EI*², s.v. "ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail."
[5] *Studies in Arabic Papyri*, 76-79.
[6] *Le Prophète de l'Islam*, I (1959), 312.
[7] Wāqidī, *op. cit.*, 342 *infra*—343 *supra*.
[8] *Bustān al-ʿārifīn* (on margin of *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*), 207.

tection.' The Prophet sent him Mundhir b. 'Amr al-Sā'idī with fourteen men, Muhājirūn and Anṣār. After a night's march, they heard that 'Āmir b. Mālik had died. They wrote to the Prophet and he sent four men to help them. They travelled together till they reached Bi'r Ma'ūna. Then they were attacked by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail with some clans of the Bedouins, Ri'l, Dhakwān, Liḥyān and 'Uṣaiya, who killed them all at Bi'r Ma'ūna, except for 'Amr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī, Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and another person. That was because they had dropped behind the party. When they [that is, the three men] learned that the party had been wiped out, they returned to Medina. The Prophet cursed these clans in his prayers for forty days.

This account, quite different from the stories of the heroic death of al-Mundhir b. 'Amr, 'Āmir b. Fuhaira, Ḥarām b. Milḥān and others, was not admitted into the current collections of traditions about the *maghāzī*.

It seems, however, to be an abridged version. Some additional details are given in a narrative recorded by al-Samarqandī in his *Tafsīr*. [1]

'Āmir b. Mālik wrote to the Prophet: 'Send me men to teach us the Koran and instruct us in religion. They will be under my protection.' The Prophet sent al-Mundhir b. 'Amr al-Sā'idī with fourteen men, Muhājirūn and Anṣār and they set out in the direction of Bi'r Ma'ūna. When they were a night's march from Medina, they heard that 'Āmir b. Mālik had died. Al-Mundhir b. 'Amr wrote to the Prophet, asking him to send aid, and the Prophet sent four men: 'Amr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī, al-Ḥārith b. al-Ṣimma, Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and another man. They travelled till they reached Bi'r Ma'ūna. Then they wrote to Rabī'a b. Mālik [that is, to Rabī'a b. 'Āmir b. Mālik]: 'We are under your protection and the protection of your father. Shall we proceed to you or not?' He said: 'You are under my protection, so come.'

Then 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail set out against them and asked assistance of Ri'l, Dhakwān and 'Uṣaiya. They went out against the Muslims who fought them until they killed all of them, except 'Amr b. Umaiya, al-Ḥārith b. al-Ṣimma and Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ.

(These three) had lagged behind (the Muslim party) and alighted under a tree. A bird perched on the tree let drop a clot of blood upon them. They understood that the bird had drunk blood, and said: 'Our friends have been killed.' They climbed a mountain and saw the dead bodies of their friends, the birds hovering over them.

Further on, a passage is devoted to the description of the heroic death of al-Ḥārith b. al-Ṣimma. He refused to save his own life and fought the polytheists till he was killed.

'Amr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī and, with him, two other men returned to the Prophet. The account contains the story of the murder of the

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[1] MS Chester Beatty, II, 263 f.

two men of Kilāb by ʿAmr b. Umaiya, and the curse of the Prophet on Muḍar and the clans of Sulaim.

It may be remarked that whereas in the version of *Bustān al-ʿĀrifīn*, al-Samarqandī states explicitly that the persons who returned to Medina were ʿAmr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī, Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and a third person—he mentions, in the account of his *Tafsīr*, ʿAmr b. Umaiya, not giving the name of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ.

This account is unique in giving the number of the participants of the expedition as fourteen plus four. From among the eighteen participants fifteen were killed. It is evident that this is the account referred to and refuted by al-Wāqidī. The account states explicitly that Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ took part in the expedition, and that both the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār participated in it.

One may venture to say that we have here a very early account. It may be accepted with certainty that this version of the tradition was known and even disputed at the end of the second century.

IV

The assumptions put forward by the scholars, surveyed briefly above, are divergent. Some of them are contradictory. They give rise to a number of questions. One is tempted to ask, why did the Prophet decide to interfere in the internal politics of a polytheist tribe, "though he realized the riskiness of doing so," as assumed by Watt? It is not plausible that the Prophet would have risked the lives of his Companions, if not for the cause of Islam and in the interest of the Muslim community. Further, how could ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail succeed in persuading the clans of Sulaim to attack the Muslims and kill them, as proposed by Watt, when he failed to convince his own people that they should do so? What was the relationship between ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail and the clans of Sulaim?

There is some hope of finding some of the answers and to arrive at some solutions which may elucidate the story of Biʾr Maʿūna. Some details may give a clue to this.

Going through the different accounts of the story of Biʾr Maʿūna one notes that, of the party of the polytheists who massacred the Muslims, only two names are mentioned in the sources: Jabbār b. Salmā b. Mālik b. Jaʿfar [1] killed ʿĀmir b. Fuhaira. [2] Anas b. ʿAbbās al-

[1] Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamhara*, MS fº 123a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *Istīʿāb*, 88; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 1051; Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 196.

[2] Cf. Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 231; Ibn Duraid, *Ishtiqāq*, 25; Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*,

Ri'lī killed Nāfi' b. Budail b. Warqā' al-Khuzā'ī.[1] We are here especially concerned with the case of Anas b. 'Abbās.

Anas boasted of the killing of Nāfi' b. Budail. In one of the two verses of Anas there is mention of Abū Raiyān whose blood Anas avenged. This Abū Raiyān is said to have been Ṭu'aima b. 'Adī b. Naufal b. 'Abd Manāf. Anas was his maternal uncle.[2] Al-Wāqidī says a little more about Anas and about the role he played at Bi'r Ma'ūna. Quoting the two verses of Anas, al-Wāqidī remarks: "Anas went out on the Day of Bi'r Ma'ūna inciting his people (to attack the Muslims), in order to avenge the blood of his sister's son."[3]

Some details about Ṭu'aima may help to elucidate the course of events.

Ṭu'aima b. 'Adī b. Naufal b. 'Abd Manāf b. Quṣaiy belonged to the nobility of Quraish in Mecca.[4] His boon companion was one of the noble quraishites of Mecca, Munabbih b. al-Ḥajjāj al-Sahmī.[5] Like Munabbih, Ṭu'aima was a fierce opponent of the Prophet.[6] According to one of the traditions, the document about the boycott of the Banū Hāshim was entrusted to Ṭu'aima.[7] He attended the meeting at the Dār al-Nadwa at which the problem of the expulsion of the Prophet was discussed, representing the Banū Naufal.[8] He incited the Quraish to fight on the eve of the battle of Badr,[9] and was one of the *muṭ'imūn* during the march.[10] He is said to have killed, at Badr, Sa'd b. Khaithama[11] and Sahl b. al-Baiḍā'.[12] According to a tradition of al-Wāqidī, he killed Ṣafwān b. al-Baiḍā'.[13] Traditions are not unanimous about his death: whether he was captured at Badr and the Prophet ordered Ḥamza to kill him in cold blood,[14] or whe-

nº 4408; Sakhāwī, *al-Tuḥfa al-laṭīfa*, ed. As'ad Darabzūnī (Cairo, 1957-8), nº 1908.

[1] See Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣāba, nº 8644.

[2] Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 197-98.

[3] Wāqidī, *op. cit.*, 344.

[4] Mu'arrij, *al-Ḥadhf min nasab Quraish*, 42.

[5] Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, ed. Lichtenstadter, 177.

[6] al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS, fº 808b; *idem*, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ed. Hamidullah, I, 153-54.

[7] *Ibid.*, I, 235.

[8] Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, II, 125.

[9] al-Balādhūrī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, I, 292.

[10] Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, II, 320.

[11] al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.*, I, 296.

[12] *Ibid.*, I, 225; but see Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, IV, 213.

[13] *al-Maghāzī*, 141; but see Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 416.

[14] Ibn Qutaiba, *Ma'ārif*, 68: "Three were killed in cold blood at Badr: 'Uqba, Ṭu'aima and al-Naḍr"; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS, fº 808b; *idem*, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ed. Hamidullah, I, 148; Ibn Ḥazm *Jawāmi' al-sīra*, 148.

ther he was killed in an encounter with ʿAlī and Ḥamza. Some sources record a vivid description of this encounter. Al-Wāqidī gives this description, [1] but omits the name of Ṭuʿaima. The story is quoted by Muṣʿab al-Zubairī, [2] by Abū 'l-Baqā' Hibat Allāh [3] and by al-Majlisī. [4] Some sources mention only that he was killed at Badr. [5]

The clan of Naufal b. ʿAbd Manāf were opposed to the Hāshim b. ʿAbd Manāf and Muṭṭalib b. ʿAbd Manāf, and were allies of the ʿAbd Shams b. ʿAbd Manāf. [6] ʿAdī b. Naufal competed with ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib in supplying beverages for the pilgrims: al-Muṭṭalib supplied the beverages at Zamzam, ʿAdī b. Naufal, at a spot between al-Ṣafā and al-Marwa; the latter offered them honey and milk. [7] The mother of ʿAdī was Hind, Umm al-Khiyār bint Wuhaib, of Māzin the kindred of Sulaim.

The mother of his sons, Muṭʿim and Ṭuʿaima, was Fākhita bint ʿAbbās b. ʿĀmir b. Ḥuyaiy b. Riʿl, of Sulaim. [8] Of special importance is the information stating that the Sulaim were allies of the Banū Naufal. [9]

It is thus conceivable why the clans of Sulaim responded, according to some accounts, when ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail summoned them to attack the Muslim party. The reasons are clearly expounded in a significant passage of the *Nasab Quraish*: [10]

> The Banū Riʿl and Dhakwān, and they are allies of the Banū Naufal (and they are of Sulaim), gave aid to ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail against the Companions of the Prophet, who were killed at Bi'r Maʿūnà, because of Ṭuʿaima.[11] He who aided ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail was Anas b. ʿAbbās al-Riʿlī, called al-Aṣamm. With him went out (to the attack) the Riʿl, Dhakwān and ʿUṣaiya. The ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa refused to aid

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[1] *Maghāzī*, 87.

[2] *Nasab Quraish*, 199-200.

[3] *al-Manāqib al-Mazyadīya*, MS, fº 8a.

[4] *Biḥār al-anwār*, VI "*Bāb ghazwat Badr al-kubrā*" (quoted from al-Wāqidī).

[5] Muʾarrij, *al-Ḥadhf min nasab Quraish*, 42; Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, II, 366; Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, 177.

[6] Muʾarrij, *al-Ḥadhf min nasab Quraish*, p. 41; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS, fº 808a: "Zaʿamū anna Banī Naufal b. ʿAbd Manāf kānū yadan maʿa ʿAbd Shams ʿalā sāʾiri Banī ʿAbd Manāf."

[7] Muṣʿab, *Nasab Quraish*, 32, 197 (cf. the expression "Ibn al-Siqāyatain").

[8] *Ibid.*, 198; al-Samʿānī, *Ansāb*, fº 255a.

[9] Muṣʿab, *op. cit.*, 97, 198.

[10] *Ibid.*, 198-199.

[11] Jubair b. Muṭʿim b. ʿAdī promised to free his slave Waḥshī, if he would kill Ḥamza (Ḥamza, as mentioned, killed Ṭuʿaima). Wahshī succeeded, in fact, in killing Ḥamza at Uḥud and was freed by Jubair. (See Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 65, 76.)

'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, because Abū Barā' was the protector of the Companions who were killled by 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail at Bi'r Ma'ūna.

We shall now follow the thread of Anas b. 'Abbās who seems to have been the driving spirit behind the attack on the Muslim party.

W. Arafat, in his penetrating study of the story of Khubaib, analyses a verse of Ḥassān in which the name Anas is mentioned, and says: "Anas, according to Ibn Hishām and the note to the poem in the Dīwān, was from the tribe of Sulaim and nothing else seems to be known about him." [1] Every bit of information about Anas may be helpful to elucidate the case of Bi'r Ma'ūna.

The name Anas is glossed by Ibn Hishām as follows: "Anas al-Aṣamm al-Sulamī, the maternal uncle of Muṭ'im b. 'Adī b. Naufal b. 'Abd Manāf." [2] He can thus easily be identified with the chief of the clan of Ri'l, Anas b. 'Abbās b. 'Āmir b. Ḥuyaiy b. Ri'l b. Mālik b. 'Auf b. Imra'al-Qais b. Buhtha b. Sulaim, as mentioned in Muṣ'ab's *Nasab*. [3] His sister was Fākhita bint 'Abbās, the wife of 'Adī, the mother of Ṭu'aima b. 'Adī, whose blood Anas avenged at Bi'r Ma'ūna. His father, 'Abbās, known as 'Abbās b. Raiṭa, was a highly respected chief of his people, and the Sulaim intended to "put a crown on his head." 'Abbās had as antagonist one of his relatives, who offended him, and he left his tribe. He joined the Fazāra.[4] According to al-Jāḥiẓ, he was compelled to leave his tribe because of the small number of his kin in the tribe. [5] 'Abbās was a poet, [6] but his verses were sometimes attributed to his son Anas, [7] who was also a poet. [8]

Anas b. 'Abbās, according to Ibn al-Kalbī, [9] al-Balādhurī [10] and Ibn Ḥazm, [11] was a chief of his people, and was killed by the

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[1] W. C. Arafat, "A Dramatic Theme in the Story of Khubaib b. 'Adiy," *BSOAS* (1958), 26.

[2] Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 188.

[3] Page 198; the same genealogy is recorded in al-Zubair b. Bakkār's *Nasab Quraish*, MS Bodl., f° 191a (in the genealogy of "Zainab bint 'Adī b. Naufal").

[4] *Aghānī*, XVI, 55 (his name is given as "al-'Abbās b. Anas," but see al-Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, quoted below); Nallino, *Raccolta*, III, 66.

[5] *al-Ḥayawān*, I, 359; V, 30, 31.

[6] al-Bakrī, *Simṭ*, 513; Jarīr wa 'l-Farazdaq, *Naqā'iḍ*, ed. Bevan, 392.

[7] al-Marzubānī, *Mu'jam*, ed. Krenkow, 263; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, s.v. "Dafīna."

[8] Sībawaihi, *Kitāb*, I (Būlāq, 1316 H.), 349; Abū Tammām, *al-Waḥshīyāt* (ed. Maimanī), 231.

[9] *Jamhara*, MS, f° 160a.

[10] *al-Ansāb*, MS, f° 1132a.

[11] *Jamharat ansāb al-'Arab*, 250 (erroneously "Ibn Jubair b. Ri'l" instead of "Ibn Ḥuyaiy").

Khathʿam. [1] A story told on the authority of Abū ʿUbaida states that Anas raided, together with Ṣakhr b. ʿAmr al-Sulamī, the Banū Asad. [2] Ibn Saʿd mentions that Anas was a member of the delegation of Sulaim who visited the Prophet. He is said to have embraced Islam. [3]

Of special importance for the elucidation of the relations between Riʿl and ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, and especially between Anas and the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, is the story of *Yaum al-Raghām* reported by Abū ʿUbaida. When the Thaʿlaba b. Yarbūʿ attacked the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, Anas b. ʿAbbās stayed with the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa. He acted in the interest of the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, trying by a stratagem to make possible a counterattack of the Kilāb against the Thaʿlaba b. Yarbūʿ. He was captured and released after paying a ransom of 200 camels. [4] The place of the encounter between the Yarbūʿ and the Kilāb seems to have been al-Ẓilāl. Yāqūt mentions that as the place, stating that it belonged to the Jaʿfar b. Kilāb. "They (that is, the Jaʿfar b. Kilāb) were attacked at this spot by ʿUtaiba b. al-Ḥārith b. Shihāb. He seized their cattle and the cattle of the men of Sulaim." [5] The *Naqāʾiḍ* have an additional phrase, which is of some importance: [6] "...of the men of Sulaim, being under their protection. One of them was Anas b. ʿAbbās al-Riʿlī." This phrase supplies a clue for the understanding of the relations between the clan of Riʿl and the Jaʿfar of ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, and throws light on the action of ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail.

V

It is not easy to establish the true facts about the expedition. In the light of the version recorded by al-Samarqandī, which was omitted

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[1] The information of Ibn al-Kalbī is quoted in Ibn Ḥajar's *Iṣāba*, nº 269.

[2] *Aghānī*, XIII, 130.

[3] *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 307 (erroneously "Anas b. ʿIyāḍ al-Riʿlī"); this information is also recorded in Ibn ʿAsākir's *Taʾrīkh*, III, 137, and in Ibn Ḥajar's *Iṣāba*, nº 269. About the son of Anas, Razīn, see Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 2645. About his father, ʿAbbās, see Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 4496 (al-ʿAbbās b. Anas b. ʿĀmir al-Riʿlī) and al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS, fº 1138b (ʿAbbās b. Anas al-Aṣamm).

[4] Jarīr wa 'l-Farardaq, *Naqāʾiḍ*, ed. Bevan, 410; *Aghānī*, XIV, 84; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS, fº 997b f. Other versions about the capture of Anas by ʿUtaiba b. al-Ḥārith: (1) Anas came to ʿUtaiba as a guest and was treacherously put in fetters, and released after he paid a ransom; (2) he was under the protection of ʿUtaiba and was treacherously tied, put in fetters, and released after paying ransom; see al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, MS, fº 997b and fº 1138b ("Anas b. ʿIyāḍ" and "Anas b. Mirdās," in the MS, are errors).

[5] So Yāqūt, *Buldān*, s.v. "*Ẓ*ilāl"; *amwāla 'l-muslimīna*, in the *Naqāʾiḍ*, 302, is an error; read: "*amwāla 'l-sulamīyīna*". [6] *Naqāʾiḍ*, 302.

in the traditional accounts, and after a closer study of the data quoted above, some suggestions about this expedition may be propounded.

Abū Barā', one of the leaders of the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a came into touch with the Prophet. He was an aged man and was summoned by the Prophet to accept Islam. Neither he nor his son Rabī'a [1] embraced Islam, although the tribal tradition of the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a tried to show that Abū Barā' later embraced Islam, fought and fell in battle. According to the traditions, he agreed to give the Muslim group safe conduct and consented to the propagation of Islam in his tribe. That is quite plausible, and Abū Barā' might have hoped that he would strengthen his influence in the tribe by accepting the Muslim group. A significant phrase in Ibn Qutaiba's *al-Shi'r wa' l-shu'arā'* seems to point to this fact. [2] The Prophet obviously hoped to win over parts of the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a to the cause of Islam. The action brings to mind the despatch of missionaries to Medina before the Hijra. After the defeat at Uḥud, it was the only way of propagating Islam.

The Prophet sent a group of fourteen Companions, relying upon the promise of Abū Barā'. The Companions might have realized on their way that they were only a few, and sent to ask for aid. They received the aid of four men. Two of the four were famous for their valor: Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ was an excellent fighter; 'Amr b. Umaiya was a reckless warrior, although the Prophet's opinion on his moral qualities was rather unfavorable. [3] It is also plausible to assume that the Muslim troop sent word to Rabī'a, the son of the aged Abū Barā', asking him to reaffirm the promise of safe conduct and protection. They wanted to be sure that he would stand by his father's pledge. Whether Abū Barā' died exactly on the night when the Companions set out is rather doubtful. The tradition that he lived a short time after the massacre of Bi'r Ma'ūna seems to be more trustworthy.

The Muslim troop alighted at Bi'r Ma'ūna. Here evidently the clans of Sulaim led by Anas b. 'Abbās al-Ri'lī camped under the protection of the Kilāb. Groups of Kilāb stayed there also. This is indicated by the fact that 'Āmir b. Fuhaira was killed by Jabbār b. Salmā of the Banū Ja'far of 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a. The expedition took place in a

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[1] See, about him, Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba*, nº 2627.

[2] Ibn Qutaiba, *al-Shi'r wa 'l-shu'arā'*, ed. de Goeje, 224, var. "q": *li-yuqārrūhu 'alā riyāsatihi*. In the edition of Muṣṭafā al-Saqqā (Cairo, 1932) it is rendered: *li-yuqātilūhu 'alā riyāsatihi*. In the edition of Shākir(Cairo, 1364 H.) the phrase has been omitted.

[3] See Abū Dā'ūd, *Sunan*, II, 296, "Bāb fī 'l-ḥidhr."

very hot month (Safar/July-August, 4 H.), and the clans evidently gathered with their herds around the well. The envoy of the Muslim troop came to the people staying at the well and informed them that they were not the object of their expedition. The envoy, Ḥarām b. Milḥān, was killed by one of the people.

The attack was a sudden one, as attested by a verse of the sister of al-Mundhir b. ʿAmr. [1]

The attack was led by Anas b. ʿAbbās al-Riʿlī. He fulfilled his obligation as a relative of Ṭuʿaima b. ʿAdī to avenge his death at Badr. The clans who followed him fulfilled their obligation as allies of the Banū Naufal. [2] Some units or individuals of Jaʿfar b. Kilāb might have taken part in the attack. This is indicated by a verse of the sister of al-Mundhir b. ʾAmr, in which she mentions "the wolves of the Ḥijāz, the Banū Buhtha [that is, the Banū Sulaim] and Banū Jaʿfar" [that is, Jaʿfar b. Kilāb of the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa].[3] ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail might have approved the action of Anas or even taken part in the attack. But the responsibility was on the Riʿl and the other clans of Sulaim. It was the Riʿl and clans of Sulaim who were cursed by the Prophet. The action is connected with Mecca and the Naufal b. ʿAbd Manaf were the cause for the launching of the attack on their enemies. The attack was apparently inspired by Mecca.

In fact, the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa are merely reproached for not standing by the pledge of protection. Kaʿb b. Mālik reproaches the ʿĀmir that they did not come to the aid of those attacked when they asked for help. They refrained from coming to their aid, because they knew that the battle would be a seroius one. [4] ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail is reproached by Ḥassān for violation of the pledge of Abū Barāʾ, obviously because he did not prevent the clans of Sulaim, his clients, to attack the Muslim troop. [5]

It is conceivable that Abū Barāʾ was grieved by the violation of

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[1] "Had the group been wary of these troops," Ḥassān, *Dīwān*, ed. Hirschfeld, 57.

[2] The case of al-Rajīʿ is also connected with the clan of Naufal b. ʿAbd Manāf: Khubaib was killed in revenge for al-Ḥārith b. ʿĀmir b. Naufal. Khubaib was bought by Ḥujair b. Abī Ihāb, an ally of the Banū Naufal. He was executed by the son of al-Ḥārith with the assistance of Abū Maisara of the ʿAbd al-Dār. See Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 182.

[3] Ḥassān, *Dīwān*, ed. Hirschfeld, 57-58.

[4] Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 221-22.

[5] Cf. Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*, III, 198: "You left your 'jār' (that is, the Muslim group) to the Banū Sulaim, fearing their hostile action, in (your) abjection and weakness."

his protection. According to the record of Ibn Qutaiba, [1] he commanded his people to kill 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, but they disobeyed. The affair had evidently, in their opinion nothing to do with them. It was the Banū Sulaim who had settled their accounts with the Muslims. They, the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a, considered the sending of Abū Barā' to "that man" as a fit of mental aberration. [2] It was only the son of Abū Barā' who tried to kill 'Āmir b. al-Ṭufail, but failed. Abū Barā', feeling that he had lost authority in his tribe, started to imbibe undiluted wine and drank himself to death. It may be remarked that the verses of Ḥassān are addressed to Abū Barā"s son, Rabī'a; not one verse is addressed to Abū Barā'. He lost influence in his tribe, and must have died shorthly after the massacre of Bi'r Ma'ūna, probably from his tumor.

The tradition about the attendance of Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ was not admitted into the traditional accounts, because of the case of the murder of the two men of Kilāb (or Sulaim) granted safe conduct by the Prophet. The report of Qatāda, as quoted by al-Samarqandī, [3] states explicitly that the two men were killed by the three Companions, returning from Bi'r Ma'ūna. The report of the papyrus states that the two returning Companions killed the two men of Kilāb. [4] Later collections of the *maghāzī* preferred not to mention the version claiming that Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the first who shed blood for the cause of Islam, the hero of al-Qādisīya, did not take part in the battle of Bi'r Ma'ūna but saved his own life, while the other Companions died the death of martyrs, or was involved in the murder of the two men of Kilāb. The blame of the murder of the two men of Kilāb was put solely on 'Amr b. Umaiya al-Ḍamrī.

The Prophet could not demand the bloodwite for the martyrs from the Banū Sulaim, nor from the 'Āmir b. Ṣa'ṣa'a. He promised to pay the bloodwite for the two men of Kilāb, killed by his Companion (or Companions) and started to collect the money of the indemnity. He summoned the Banū Naḍīr to contribute a portion of it. That led to the encounter with the Naḍīr and to their expulsion.

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[1] *al-Shi'r wa 'l-shu'arā'*, ed. de Goeje, 224.
[2] Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, 472.
[3] MS Chester Beatty, I, 228a.
[4] Nabia Abbott, *Studies in Arabic Papyri*, Document 5 (verso), 69, lines 11-12.

M. J. KISTER
Hebrew University, Jerusalem

REFLECTIONS ON THE *IQṬĀ'*

BY

ANN K. S. LAMBTON

Certain superficial resemblances between society and tenures in medieval Persia and certain types of feudalism in Western Europe have encouraged a somewhat loose attribution of the term feudalism to society and government in Persia. Further, just as during the French Revolution feudalism was adopted as a generic description to cover the many abuses of the ancien régime, [1] so in recent years it has become in Persia a term of abuse. Leaving aside this misuse of the term, it may be of some interest to examine whether Persian society can be called feudal, in the narrower sense of the term, and Persian institutions feudal, in a legal sense. The institution most commonly thought of as feudal in medieval Persia is the *iqṭā'* in its various aspects. It was the dominant institution of the Great Seljuq Empire (A.D. 1037-1157). *Iqṭā's* were granted by rulers prior to the Seljuqs, but it was in the Great Seljuq period that the institution became, as it were, regularized. The system continued in Persia down to the twentieth century in its essentials, though the nomenclature varied. An examination of this system and its origins will throw light on the existence or otherwise of feudalism in Persia. In the following pages, I shall not be breaking new ground, but rather restating conclusions reached elsewhere; and I am conscious of my debt to the work which has been done on the evolution of the *iqṭā'* by Professor Cahen.

Among the superficial resemblances between society and tenures in medieval Persia and feudal society and tenures in Western Europe are the following: the fragmentation of authority in the tenth century A. D., and again on the break-up of the empires which were subsequently established in Persia; the grant of land in return for the performance of military service; the grant of land to certain officials in lieu of salary; the grant of immunities; the supremacy of the military class; the existence of a subject peasantry; private armies; and private courts. None of these in themselves constitute or confirm the existence of feudalism. As against these similarities there are certain obvious differences. Among them is the fact that the dominant military

[1] Cf. Ganshof, *Feudalism*, 1952, p. xv.

class, from the ninth century A.D. onwards, was composed, to a great extent, of slaves and freedmen; [1] and they were concentrated in towns, and not dispersed in castles, as was the case in Western Europe. In practice, however, the slave or freedman who rose to high administrative or military office differed very little from the freeman so far as his power and authority were concerned; and the appointment of slaves and freedmen, under the Great Seljuqs, to the office of atabek, meant that their status was second only to that of the sultan. Another difference is that commerce was relatively highly developed in the Abbasid Empire. These facts do not preclude the existence of feudalism; but they make it less likely.

Feudalism is generally believed to have existed in pre-Islamic Persia. A brief examination of this and the circumstances of the Arab conquest will show that the *iqṭāʿ* was not a continuation of Sassanid feudalism in Islamic dress. Christensen traces the origins of Sassanid feudalism back through the Arsacids to the Achaemenids, when the king of kings created vassals, giving them certain parts of his domains as hereditary property with certain privileges, and, probably, certain immunities. [2] Under the Sassanids, there was a strong antagonism between two mutually opposed tendencies, feudalism and bureaucratic centralization, the struggle between which dominated the social and political development of the Sassanid Empire until the reign of Khusrau Anūshīravān.[3] By that time, the great nobles (*shahrdārān*) had become "a court nobility" and had lost the character of a true feudal nobility. The ancient connection between the second rank of nobility (the *vāspuhrān*) and the village, however, remained. No precise details exist of the privileges enjoyed by the feudal nobility, or to what extent the government exercised authority over their fiefs. It appears that the population occupying the land had to pay taxes either to the state or to the lord, or perhaps to both; and were forced to render military service. [4] The lowest in rank among the inferior nobility were the *dihqān*s, village chiefs, whose power came from their hereditary possession of local administrative functions. They were divided into five classes. In some cases the amount of land held by a *dihqān* by hereditary right was small, and he was merely the most important peasant of the district. His main function was to collect the taxes,

[1] This was true of post-Abbasid Persia only at certain relatively limited periods.
[2] *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen, 1936), 14.
[3] *Ibid.*, 45.
[4] *Ibid.*, 101 ff.

a task which his local knowledge of the country and people enabled him to do effectively. [1] He was not so much a member of the feudal nobility as the link between the central government and the population living on the land, which may, or may not, have been held in feudal tenure. When the Sassanid Empire was conquered by the Arabs, the nobility, who by that time had already, to a large extent, lost their feudal character, disappeared as such, and their lands either became state lands or were left in the hands of their occupiers. The *dihqān*s, on the other hand, retained their importance and continued to act as a link between the new government and the people; but their functions were bureaucratic and not feudal. Under the Abbasids, there was, in certain respects, a deliberate and conscious imitation of Sassanid practice; it was not, however, the feudal tendencies of the Sassanid Empire which were imitated, but its bureaucratic centralization.

Land, after the early Arab conquests, fell into two broad categories: (1) land which had not been abandoned by its holders on the conquest continued to be held by them as non-Muslims (though later they were often converted), and paid *kharāj* (land tax), which, in the early period, carried the stigma of inferiority; and (2) land which had been abandoned by its owners, former crown lands of the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires, land which had belonged to the religious institution and land which had no owner (that is, waste lands, etc.). From the second category, grants known as *qaṭī'a* were made to Muslims. Such grants were subject to *'ushr* (tithe), which was regarded as an alms tax payable only by Muslims. [2] The Arab *junds* (citizen armies), on the morrow of the conquests, were largely remunerated by tax-grants; but since, at this period, all Arabs virtually were soldiers and the notion of possession was barely separated from property, such tax-grants tended to be regarded as *qaṭī'a*, that is, land grants, also. These grants differed from the grants of relatively large areas of land as *qaṭī'a* which Becker and others have compared to the emphyteutic grants of the Byzantine Empire and were similar rather to the small estates held in full ownership, in return for military service, by the peasant-soldiers of the Byzantine frontier areas (the *limitanei* or *akritai*).[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 107.

[2] These were long-term grants of public domains to private individuals who, provided they brought the lands under cultivation, were granted full rights of disposal of the land and certain fiscal reductions.

[3] Cahen, "L'évolution de l'iqṭā' du IXe au XIIIe siècle," in *Annales, E.S.C.*. 1953, 26.

In theory, Muslims could not acquire *kharāj* land; but, in practice, it proved impossible to prevent the conquerors from obtaining large areas of land as private property. Land thus obtained became indistinguishable from land granted as *qaṭī'a*. Both were alienable, hereditary, and subject to *'ushr*. Such lands were seldom, in the early period, cultivated by the Arabs personally, but rented in various forms to the peasants, the owner being responsible for the payment of *'ushr*, but exercising no rights other than those of an owner. He enjoyed no immunities, fiscal or otherwise, and had no judicial or administrative functions. In some cases, the *qaṭī'a* was linked to the tribal structure of early Muslim society. The primary need of the Arabs in the early period was not for money, but for pasturage; and a *qaṭī'a* was accordingly sometimes given to the leader of a tribal group and exploited by the group collectively. [1] In general, apart from the grants to tribal leaders and a few leading personages, the area of a *qaṭī'a* was usually relatively small, sometimes only enough to support one family. So far as this was the case, the *qaṭī'a* grants differed from both the large emphyteutic grants of the Byzantine Empire and the large estates which had formerly existed in the Sassanid Empire.

In the course of time, *qaṭī'a* grants also came to be known as *iqṭā'*. Qudāma, writing in the tenth century A.D., uses the term *iqṭā'* to mean a hereditary grant subject to *'ushr*, whereas he calls a non-hereditary grant *ṭu'ma*. Both were made from land other than *kharāj* land, and were under the *dīwān al-ḍiyā'*. Qudāma also mentions grants called *īghār*, that is, land which paid a fixed sum to the treasury and was immune from the entry of the tax collector; and *taswīj*, that is, annual, but renewable, tax-free grants. *Īghār* and *taswīj* were both made on *kharāj* land. [2]

By the tenth century A.D., the *iqṭā'* began to emerge in its medieval form. In order to determine whether it was a feudal grant, at this stage of its evolution, it will be useful to examine briefly some of the contemporary social and economic institutions of the Abbasid Empire. Such an examination will show whether the new development of the *iqṭā'* arose, as the feudal system in Western Europe, from a need for "protection", or whether the need which gave rise to it was of another kind, and the institutions seized upon, different from those seized upon in Western Europe by the need for protection.

[1] Cahen, *op. cit.*, 27 ff.
[2] *Ibid.*, 28.

In later Roman and early medieval society in Europe, the prevailing need was for protection. The institutions which this need seized upon, when it first began to turn away from the state, were twofold: one related to the person, the other to land: the *patrocinium* and the *precarium*. In early Islamic society, there was an institution not wholly dissimilar to the Roman *patrocinium*, namely the relationship of patron and client. This had two aspects, one Arabian in origin and social in its nature, and the other legal in origin and arising from slavery and influenced by Roman institutions. At the beginning of the first century of Islam a Muslim was, practically speaking, an Arab. On the expansion of Islam, converted non-Arabs were affiliated to an Arab tribe and known as *mawālī*.[1] The term carried with it, in the eyes of the Arabs, a social inferiority, and, for some two centuries, the distinction between Arabs and *mawālī* was a live issue. By the tenth century A.D., the social differentiation between them had virtually disappeared, and *maulā* was used only as a legal term to mean a freed slave. Clientship was thus, in Islam, a relationship between two parties arising from a need for social status. It did not carry primarily the implication of service and support; and it never became associated with land as did the *patrocinium*.

The *precarium*, used for protection in Western Europe, gave rise to the commendation of lands (*patrocinium fundorum*). In early Islamic times, an institution known as *taljī'a*,[2] which resembled the *patrocinium fundorum*, also existed. By it, the weak landowner committed his estate to the protection of the strong to indemnify it. The man who ceded his estate by such a transaction lost his ownership in it; but, in some cases, he retained the right to sell it and to transmit it by inheritance. The motive was usually to secure protection from either attack or extortionate demands from the government. It was found, inter alia, in frontier districts and in tribal areas, where security was likely to be precarious. It was often members of the military classes, holding adjacent estates, who undertook this form of protection and responsibility for the payment of the government tax. Conditions for a *taljī'a* contract varied: in some cases, the former owner agreed to pay special dues to the "patron" for protection.[3] There are also instances of landowners transferring their property into crown lands in return for protection; in such cases, they would

[1] Sing. *maulā*.
[2] Plur. *talājī*.
[3] Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period* (Copenhagen, 1950), 67 ff.

hold the property on some sort of life rent. The Abbasids confiscated many Umayyad *talājī*; but various new *talājī* were created during the Abbasid period. [1] Under the later Abbasids, and subsequently, references to *talājī* are rare, perhaps because the small landowners had become fewer. In the nineteenth century in Persia, instances of a similar practice are recorded, possibly because the need for protection had again become urgent. [2] The fact that this type of tenure was not, on the whole, widespread, and was a sporadic rather than a permanent feature of the land tenure system, suggests that "protection" was not the dominant need in Islamic society; and that the need or needs, which gave rise to the *iqṭā'* system must be sought elsewhere.

The accession of the Abbasids had been followed by a great economic revival "based on the exploitation of the resources of the empire through industry and trade, and the development of a vast network of trade relations both within the Empire and with the world outside. The Islamic town was transformed from a garrison city to a market and exchange, and in time to the centre of a flourishing and diversified urban culture." [3] With this development of trade and its concentration in Baghdad and the large Persian cities, a change took place in the financial administration of the state. The old silver standard, which had prevailed in the central and eastern part of the Sassanid Empire, was replaced by the gold standard. [4] The decisive step was taken in Baghdad between A.D. 874 and 915, though the silver standard continued in existence beside the gold standard. The situation, because of the diversity of coins in circulation and their fluctuating relative values, was thus a complicated one. Taxes in various areas, notably Fars, Isfahan, and Ahwaz, which had formerly been paid in kind, were paid in cash; in Syria and Mesopotamia, they were reckoned partly in cash and partly in kind. [5] The process of conversion was performed by *jahābidha*; [6] and a *dīwān al-jahbadha* was set up, the first mention of which occurs in A. D. 928. [7] The functions of the *jahābidha* concerned the administration, remittance,

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[1] Cahen, *op. cit.*, 31.

[2] It is not without interest that there have been cases of "protection" being sought by small landowners in Gurgān in recent years.

[3] *EI*², article on Abbasids.

[4] Fischel, *The Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam*, 3; B. Spuler, *Iran in Früh-islamischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden, 1952).

[5] Mez, *Die Rennaissance des Islams*, 104.

[6] Sing.: *jahbadh*.

[7] Fischel, *op. cit.*, 4-5.

and supply of funds. Prominent officials all had their own *jahbadh*, or agent, with whom they deposited funds for safekeeping and administration. By the tenth century A.D., it was customary to pay debts by letters of credit (*suftaja*), as well as in cash. The use of *suftaja* in private commercial transactions and in the financial administration of the state—particularly with regard to the remission of taxes from the provinces—greatly facilitated the mercantile relations and government business of the Abbasid Empire. [1] The money requirements of the caliph and the state had become, by this time, very considerable; and a rapid supply of funds, especially for military purposes, was necessary. Various devices were adopted to obtain money: tax-farming, the putting up of offices for auction, the sale of crown lands, and the confiscation of private fortunes. Nevertheless, the budget was often unbalanced; and, in spite of the economic revival, there was a progressive deterioration in the financial stability of the state from the ninth century A.D. onwards. This was due to a number of causes, inter alia, the civil war after the death, in A.D. 809, of Hārūn al-Rashīd, internal revolts, foreign wars, the growing luxury of the court, over-taxation, the extortion of officials, and the consequent decline in agricultural production, notably in Iraq.

Considerable changes were also, meanwhile, taking place in the social structure of the caliphate. The most striking was in the composition of the military forces of the caliphate, and the increase in the numbers and power of the Turkish military slave troops, noticeable especially from the reign of Mutawakkil (A.D. 847-861) onwards, and which culminated in the emergence of the *amīr al-umarā'* in A.D. 936. Against this background of change in the economic and social environment (though not in the nature and purpose of government), the *iqṭā'* began to emerge as one of the main institutions of the state.

The dominant need of the state, at this time, was for money to finance its operations, and the crucial problem, the payment of its civil and military officers. Hence, it was the financial and administrative institutions of the state that this need seized upon and transformed; and from this stems a fundamental difference between the feudal institutions of Western Europe and the *iqṭā'*; namely, that whereas a contractual relationship was an essential characteristic of the former,

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[1] *Ibid.*, 12 ff.

the element of contract never became a feature of the *iqṭāʿ*. In Islam, all authority is delegated authority and excludes, therefore, the question of contract. Al-Māwardī, it is true, claims that the imamate was a contract; but this claim had ceased to have any validity, in practice, by the tenth century A.D. The authority of the governor, the tax-collector, and the judge was in all cases delegated. If, therefore, it was the financial and administrative institutions of the state which were the real parents of the *iqṭāʿ*, it is not surprising that the element of contract never became a feature of the new system.

The institutions which were seized upon by the need to finance the state and transformed by the new development of the *iqṭāʿ* were the *ḍamān* and *qabāla*, on the one hand, and the provincial governorate or amirate, on the other. The *ḍamān* was a tax-farm, which often involved the putting up for auction of the right to collect the taxes of a given area, usually annually. Under the early caliphs, the taxes of some districts were handed over to certain Arab towns or to individuals. Thus, Nihavand and later also Hamadan were handed over to Basra by Muʿawiya, and Dinavar to Kufa. Out of this practice grew the tax-farm proper. The whole of Egypt under Manṣūr (A.D. 754-75) was offered to a tax-farmer; and in the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd (A.D. 786-809) tax-farming was common; and by A.D. 900 it was widespread. Sometimes, whole provinces were involved,and the tax-farmers, as witness the case of the Barīdīs in Khuzistan, were often exceedingly powerful. The *qabāla* was not a tax-farm proper, but the undertaking by a local notable to pay the tax quota of the local community, which would be assessed by the method known as *muqāṭaʿa*, that is, assessment at a lump sum, payable according to the lunar year, [1] in contradistinction to assessment by measurement (*misāḥa*) and assessment by a share of the crop (*muqāsama*), payable according to the solar year. The *muqāṭaʿa* method was adopted in many areas for the sake of the convenience of the government. Abū Yūsuf recognized it, but disapproved of it, and recommended control of the activity of the man who accepted the *qabāla* by a military leader (amir) or agent acting on behalf of the imam, whose expenses were to be defrayed by the state treasure. [2] The assessment of taxes by *muqāṭaʿa* continued to be common in Persia until the twentieth century.

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[1] Cahen, *op. cit.*, 29.
[2] Løkkegaard, *op. cit.*, 96 ff.

The second institution seized upon was the provincial governorate. This, under the Abbasids, had been through various vicissitudes. The keystone of the administrative system had been the separation of military and financial affairs, with the amir as the head of the military administration and the *'amil* of the financial. In the provinces, there was a network of officials, the provincial government being virtually a replica of the central administration. The existence of a large body of officials placed a heavy burden on the finances of the province, upon which they were a charge. This burden was further aggravated by the fact that the officials of the bureaucracy were not, even in theory, the servants of the public; they were the servants of the caliph (and later of the sultan), partaking, according to their degree, of his absolute authority. Appointment to an official position was broadly regarded as a passport to wealth—hence the establishment of the *dīwān al-muṣādara*, since all, or virtually all, officials were expected to get rich by illegal means. The burden imposed by the official classes was still further added to by the existence of factions: each important official had his own supporters who rose (and fell) with him. The strain imposed by the bureaucratic administration eventually became too great and the system broke down. In the first place, the difficulty of paying the officials of the bureaucracy and the army led to a wholesale extension of the farming of taxes, thus setting up a vicious circle. The situation was, moreover, complicated by another tendency: already by the death of Ma'mūn in A.D. 833, the balance between the civil and military arms of the administration, whether at the level of the central government or the provincial, had been upset, and the money received from the farming of the taxes soon ceased to be sufficient to pay the army leaders and their troops. As the revenue came in with increasing irregularity, so the practice grew of assigning the taxes, not to the tax-farmers, but to the military themselves. Once a military leader was assigned the right to collect the taxes of a large area, it became relatively easy for him to establish his semi-independence. Moreover, the matter did not stop with the assignment of the taxes. When these still failed to come in regularly, rights over the land itself were then assigned: in other words, the tax-farm swallowed up the land revenue system, and itself, in turn, became assimilated to the provincial governorate, which had become militarized. The result of these various developments was the ruin of the land, on the one hand, and the failure of the military to support or defend the central government, on the other. This militarization of the

state, which is marked not only in Iraq and the neighborhood, but also in the east under the Samanids, and more especially under the Ghaznawids, and the growing tendency of the military to be occupied, not only with the arts of war, but also with administration, have obscured the true nature of the *iqṭāʿ* system, which in its origins was bureaucratic and not feudal.

The assignments made to the military mentioned above were called *iqṭāʿ*s, but they differed from the old *iqṭāʿ*s, which were assignments of *ʿushr* land, in that they were made probably mainly from *kharāj* land (but the distinction between these two types of land had by this time become blurred). They were, therefore, an extension of the *īghār* rather than of the original *iqṭāʿ*. The jurists, in fact, distinguished between the two types, calling the former *iqṭāʿ al-tamlīk* and the latter *iqṭāʿ al-istighlāl*. The difference in theory between them was that the former was a grant of ownership, its purpose the extension of cultivation, and the latter a grant of the usufruct, its purpose remuneration for services. Under the Buwaihids, the military, to whom the *iqṭāʿ*s of the new type were given, did not normally live on their grants, but merely sent their agents to collect their revenues. If the historians of the period are to be believed, they exploited their holdings to the maximum and ruined the countryside. In theory, the *iqṭāʿ al-istighlāl* was not hereditary, or even granted as a life-rent; there were periodic redistributions, and if a *muqṭaʿ* died, his children did not receive his *iqṭāʿ* but pensions. The soldier, in return for his *iqṭāʿ*, had to perform military service and was, in theory, subject to detailed regulations and inspection. The amirs, who also received *iqṭāʿ*s, had no responsibility for the payment of the soldiery, who themselves received pay (*rizq*), or an *iqṭāʿ*, from the state. There was thus no subinfeudation as in Western Europe. A provincial governor could distribute the area under his jurisdiction as *iqṭāʿ*s, but he did this as an official of the state, and not because the area formed part of his private domain. Legally, possession of an *iqṭāʿ* did not give the beneficiary any juridical rights over the inhabitants. But, in practice, it clearly contributed to the spread of patronage and was, in the Buwaihid period, accompanied by widespread acts of usurpation by the military; and Professor Cahen thinks that as a result peasant-proprietorship tended to disappear. [1] Moreover, the tendency for the function of the provincial governor, the provincial

[1] *Ibid.*, 32 ff.

military commander, the tax-collector, the tax-farmer, and the *muqṭaʿ* to be combined in one person, led to the emergence of large properties, virtually independent of the central government. The tendency of the de facto powers of the *muqṭaʿ* to increase was also strengthened by the fact that governors frequently received in their provinces some areas by way of an *iqṭāʿ*. In such cases, they combined in these districts their economic power as *muqṭaʿ* with their functions as governor, and tended to exercise the powers of both throughout the province. [1] Under the Buwaihids and in Fatimid Syria there are cases of *muqṭaʿs* who had, in addition to their obligations as *muqṭaʿ*s, the administrative duties and obligations of *wālīs* or governors also. In such cases, the *muqṭaʿ* carried out all governmental functions; all the towns and fortresses in the province would be under his jurisdiction; all the costs of the provincial government would be defrayed locally; no taxes would be paid to the central government, but, in time of war, a military contingent would be furnished; and the ruler's name would be mentioned in the Friday prayers and on the coinage. Further, the *muqṭaʿ* was free to constitute the area under him into *iqṭāʿ*s. Such a *muqṭaʿ* or *wālī* was, in the view of Professor Cahen, in many respects the brother of a European feudatory. [1] The great difference between the two, and what would seem to be a crucial difference, was that the *muqṭaʿ* held his *iqṭāʿ*, or government, solely at the will of the sovereign and as a matter of grace. This type of *iqṭāʿ* was the exception under the Buwaihids; it did not become widespread until the Seljuq period.

The dominant type of *iqṭāʿ* under the Buwaihids was the military *iqṭāʿ*. These were controlled by the military diwan, the *dīwān al-jaish*, at the head of which was the *ʿāriḍ* or muster-master. The military diwan was thus concerned not only, or even primarily, with military administration, but rather with the fiscal value (*ʿibra*) and characteristics of each *iqṭāʿ*, and the reallocation of *iqṭāʿ*s as they fell vacant. [1] This intimate connection between the assessment of taxes and the levy of troops continued in Persia down to the twentieth century, but did not in itself constitute feudalism. When the central government was strong, control over the allocation of *iqṭāʿ*s was close. The military *iqṭāʿ* did not necessarily involve decentralization or a relaxation of the authority of the central government.

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[1] *Ibid.*, 35-36.
[2] *Ibid.*, 36.
[3] Cf. *ibid.*, 36-37.

Under the Great Seljuqs, there took place an assimilation of the military *iqṭāʿ* to the governorate or "administrative" *iqṭāʿ*. With this the careful estimate of the exact fiscal value of the *iqṭāʿ* tended to be replaced by an approximate estimate; and the *iqṭāʿ* to be defined not by fiscal value but by service; and for the *iqṭāʿ* to become, by usurpation, a hereditary domain over which the *muqṭaʿ* had governmental prerogatives. [1] The situation, however, varied in different parts of the empire. Broadly speaking, five main types of *iqṭāʿ* can be distinguished; but the distinction between them was not absolute, nor did all *iqṭāʿ*s in the same category conform exactly to the same pattern. Moreover, the situation was further confused by the fact that the same persons sometimes held more than one type of *iqṭāʿ*. First, there was the grant of an *iqṭāʿ* by the sultan to a member of his family. These were probably not intended originally to be hereditary, but the tendency developed for certain branches of the family to regard certain districts as its own *iqṭāʿ*; and sometimes, as in the case of the Seljuqs of Kirman and the Seljuqs of Syria, to set up virtually independent dynasties. Originally, the grants to members of the Seljuq family were, perhaps, not unlike the *qaṭīʿa* granted to Arab tribal groups in the early centuries of Islam. The dominant need of the Seljuqs, in the early period of their expansion, was also for pasture for their flocks, but by the end of the period, the *iqṭāʿ*s granted to Seljuq princes were barely distinguishable from "administrative" *iqṭāʿ*s or provincial governorates. These grants were in all cases simply delegations of authority, and did not contain any implication of vassalage or permanent rights. The Seljuq prince held the area at the will of the sultan, who could, and frequently did, revoke the assignment. The usual method by which a prince was dispossessed was to assign the area to a third person, who would then take possession of it by force. The terms of these grants varied. In most cases, complete financial control was handed to the prince, in the sense that all revenue was collected by him; he was usually instructed, however, not to increase taxation and was, in any case, to some extent limited in this by local custom and Islamic theory. The degree to which he could sub-assign the area under him varied. In some cases, the right was accorded; in others, not. The Seljuq sultans also assigned *iqṭāʿ*s to their wives and other Seljuq women; but such *iqṭāʿ*s were in the nature of pensions or personal estates and fell into a different cate-

[1] Cf. *ibid.*, 43.

gory. The practice of the Qajar rulers in the nineteenth century of appointing their sons and relatives to provincial governments was in some respects not unlike the grant of *iqṭā'*s by the Seljuq sultan to members of the Seljuq family. Neither were in a legal or technical sense feudal grants.

The second type of *iqṭā'* was the "administrative" *iqṭā'*, which was in effect a provincial government. In the western part of the Seljuq Empire, this type of grant was normally called an *iqṭā'*, but in the eastern provinces it was known by the traditional terms of *wilāya*, *'amal*, *riyāsa*, or *niyāba*, the term *iqṭā'* being used for the military *'iqṭā*, which continued to exist as a separate category, in spite of the tendency towards assimilation with the "administrative" *iqṭā'*. In the "administrative" *iqṭā'*, the *muqṭa'* (or *wālī*) was granted complete control, and was able to make sub-assignments. This is especially noticeable in the case of *muqṭa'*s who attained to virtual independence. No effective system was devised for maintaining control over the *muqṭa'*. In some cases, there appears to have been an attempt to exert this by "reserving" certain taxes, retaining certain "crown" lands, within the area of the *iqṭā'*, or appointing a deputy (*nā'ib*) to reside in the *iqṭā'* on behalf of the sultan. Under the later sultans, the power of the amirs, relative to that of the sultans, grew; and with this, the grant of an *iqṭā'* tended to become merely official recognition of the possession of a given district by an amir. Simultaneous assignment of the same *iqṭā'* to two amirs, who were then forced to fight it out, became increasingly common. With the increase of the power of the amirs, a hereditary tendency began to appear in the "administrative" *iqṭā'* also; but this was by usurpation and not by right. There were various cases of *iqṭā'*s being granted to members of former ruling houses. These merged, on the one hand, into those *iqṭā'*s which were pensions or personal estates, and, on the other, into the "administrative" *iqṭā'*. They differed from the latter in that the assignee, or his family, had sometimes had a past connection with the area assigned to him.

The relations between the sultan and *wālī*, or *muqṭa'*, who held an "administrative" *iqṭā'*, were not those of lord and vassal. The source of all grants of authority or land was the absolute sovereignty of the sultan; and the grant, a matter of grace. Moreover, the fact that the amirs, who were the dominant group among the assignees, were for the most part slaves of freedmen, militated against the emergence of a feudal society in which there was a union of vassalage

and benefice; and, in theory, a freely negotiated contract between equals. By Islamic law, on the death of a slave, his possessions escheated to his master. In practice, it often happened that, on the death of a royal slave, the sultan would grant his possessions to one of his descendants. Many amirs and atabeks succeeded in establishing hereditary dynasties, but they did this by usurpation. The holder of a provincial government or an *iqṭāʿ*, "administrative" or military, owed the obligation of obedience and service to the sultan, but there was no obligation of protection or maintenance upon the sultan. There was, in fact, no contract involving mutual fealty. The grant was arbitrary, subject to regrant at irregular intervals, and to revocation without cause. There is in some of the Seljuq documents an injunction to the assignee to "consult", but this, I think, derived from the practice of the steppe and was not part of the *iqṭāʿ* system. Under the Safawids, there appears to have been a council of amirs (*umarā-yi jānkī*). Details of its procedure and activities are scanty; but in the absence of evidence, there seems no reason to regard it as a "feudal court"; under the Qajars, the *jānkī* was not a regular part of the organization of the central government, but a tribal council dealing with affairs concerning the Qajar tribe, which appears to have sat, not under the shah, but under the head of the tribe, the *īl-khānī*.

It seems likely that in Persia, at least, the fact of the amirs in medieval times often being slaves or freedmen had very little influence on their status. There are two trends running through society, mutually opposed, but in fact seldom coming into conflict: namely, the "equalitarian" theory of Islam reinforced by the generally levelling tendency of Turkish military government on the one hand, and, on the other, the "social" but not functional pre-eminence of "old" families (the *buyūtāt*). There was, however, nothing in the nature of a hereditary aristocracy. Repeated conquest and the inheritance laws of Islam effectively prevented the emergence of such a class. The sayyids occupied a special position, deriving from hereditary descent, but this was not combined, except by coincidence, with landownership. The only other class which had perhaps some claim to be regarded as a hereditary aristocracy was that of the tribal leaders. So far as they constituted such a class, their authority was essentially personal, and derived from their possession of flocks and tribal followers: not from the possession of land (though tribal leaders often eventually acquired land). Further, the vicissitudes of conquest, invasion, and

economic pressure resulted in a frequent dispersal of tribal groups and the disappearance of chiefly families.

The third type of *iqṭāʿ* was the military *iqṭāʿ*, which was a continuation of Buwaihid practice. This type, as stated above, was becoming assimilated to the "administrative" *iqṭāʿ*, and it is not always easy to distinguish between the two. In theory, the military *iqṭāʿ* was a grant on the revenue, and the beneficiary did not live on the land on which the draft was made; but in practice he very often did. A hereditary tendency appeared in the military *iqṭāʿ* also and became normal under Nūr al-Dīn Zangī (the ruler of Aleppo A.D. 1146-73). In addition to the military assignments to individuals, there were, in the time of Malikshāh (A.D. 1072-92), a number of areas throughout the empire constituted into *iqṭāʿs* for the standing army, so that, when passing through that area on campaigns, fodder and provisions were ready. This too was an "administrative" device to ensure that commissariat difficulties would not impede the progress of the army when it was marching through the countryside; it was not a feudal arrangement.

Fourthly, there were *iqṭāʿs* granted to officials of the "civil" government. Such grants resemble, perhaps, the sergeanty of Western European feudalism. These *iqṭāʿs* took the form either of grants on the revenue or grants of land. The wazir apparently received one-tenth of the produce of the soil as an *iqṭāʿ*. We have no precise details of what was implied by this. In the first place, much of the empire was alienated from the control of the central government in the form of "administrative" *iqṭāʿs*, and therefore the sum involved may not have been very large. Secondly, as the alter ego of the sultan, the wazir was probably expected, from the proceeds of such a levy, to carry out some of the traditional duties of the sultan, such as the provision of pensions for the religious classes, the upkeep of hospices, bridges, roads, and so on. In addition to grants of revenue, the Seljuq wazirs also held assignments of land. These differed from the "administrative" and military *iqṭāʿs* in that there was no explicit or implicit obligation to furnish the sultan with troops; but the distinction was obscured by the fact that the maintenance of "private" armies was the rule for all prominent persons, with the exception of the religious classes. Various members of the religious classes also held *iqṭāʿs*; where these were held by qadis or others of the religious hierarchy, the *iqṭāʿ* was in lieu of salary; in others, it was rather a pension and belonged to the fifth category of *iqṭāʿ*, namely the "personal" *iqṭāʿ*

granted to private persons and others as a gift on a life, or hereditary, tenure. Lastly, there was another type of *iqṭāʿ* which was a personal estate of a rather special nature; namely, the *iqṭāʿ* granted to the caliph to meet the expenses of his position. This practice was not a new one, but one which survived from earlier times. The first person to grant the caliph an *iqṭāʿ* was Nāṣir al-Daula, the Hamdanid (A.D. 929-68), a grant which clearly underlined the fact that the caliph no longer collected the revenues of the empire and expended them on its administration, and that control had passed to the "military", who had taken possession of the resources of the empire and merely allotted to the caliph a "pension".

The Seljuq period, broadly speaking, marks not the dissolution of the fiscal administration of the central government—in the details of the local arrangements for assessment and collection there is a striking continuity—but its militarization and a contraction in the area of its direct operation. This contraction was, however, accompanied by the emergence of what tended to become a "hereditary" domain, over which the *muqṭaʿ* had governmental prerogatives, which included the collection of taxes, the holding of the *maẓālim* court and general supervision of security and religious affairs. This system was not feudalism in a technical sense. If a comparison is to be sought, it is to be found with the Byzantine *pronoia* rather than the Western European fief. In the early stages, the adoption of the *iqṭāʿ* system did not coincide with weakness in the control of the central government, but rather with a change in the military forces of the state. The power of the Seljuq state, when it was first established, was based on the Turkoman tribes; they proved an unreliable source of power and, eventually, the military forces of the state came to be largely composed of slaves and freedmen. With this change in the state, the problem of the payment of the military forces, and the financing of the administration in general, received a new urgency. The *iqṭāʿ* was a device to solve this problem. It was only partially and temporarily successful. In the long run, it contributed to a decline in the relative power of the sultan vis-à-vis the amirs and, eventually, to the disintegration of the Seljuq Empire.

A not dissimilar course of events occurred in Safawid times. [1] Tribal forces also formed the original basis of Safawid power, and

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[1] Questions of space forbid a discussion of Īlkhān practices and the reforms of Ghāzān Khān.

were eventually replaced by an army composed largely of slaves and freedmen, paid by assignments of the revenue and of land. A new terminology had by this time developed, the term *iqṭāʿ* having been superseded by *tuyūl* and *suyūrghāl*. There is a certain lack of precision in the use of these terms. Broadly, the former covered grants of lands which were not in theory hereditary, and were made, for the most part, in outlying areas, amounting in effect to provincial governments. The holder was entrusted with the administration of the area and provided military contingents, when called upon, and presents (*pīshkash*) to the shah at the New Year. This was similar to the Seljuq "administrative" *iqṭāʿ*. Secondly, the term *tuyūl* was used to designate land assigned in lieu of salary; some areas, presumably originally crown lands, were permanently attached to certain offices. Thirdly, it covered the grant of immunities in private property; and fourthly, the grant of crown lands to the standing army. The latter were hereditary and passed to one of the male heirs of the holder, unless these refused to bear arms. Originally, this type of *tuyūl* was merely a grant on the revenue, made, in some cases, jointly to a group. The proceeds were collected, not by the soldier or soldiers personally, but by a *taḥṣīldār*. The term *suyūrghāl* was sometimes used to cover the first sense of *tuyūl* mentioned above; but it came to be used mainly to designate hereditary or life grants of crown land, waqf land, and usufructory property; it often also involved some sort of grant of immunity. [1]

In the 19th century, under the Qajars, with the tendency towards the centralization of the administration, in this sense, that the revenue demand was drawn up and allocated to the different provinces and districts by the central government, the term *tuyūl* ceased to be applied to what was in effect a provincial government. The provincial governor, however, was frequently assigned a *tuyūl* in lieu of salary. In the second half of the century, with the increasing difficulty which the central government experienced in financing the administration, many of the provincial governments and government offices were farmed. The position of the provincial governor, whether he farmed the provincial revenues or not, was in practice not very different from that of the *muqṭaʿ/wālī* or *tuyūldār* of earlier times. [2]

[1] There were various other grants made on the revenue and grants of exemptions, known as *muqarrarī*, *muʿāfī*, and *hamasāla*.

[2] He had, in practice, a free hand in the collection of the quota due from him and of what was required to defray the expenses of the local administration.

In the frontier districts and tribal areas, *tuyūl*s continued to be granted in return for the provision of military contingents. From the middle of the century onwards, the tendency was to assess villages in terms of taxes and military contingents (though some areas were exempted from the provision of the latter), and to assign them as *tuyūl*. Cause and effect were reversed: originally the military *iqṭāʿ* had been given for service and not vice versa. Thus under the later Qajars, service was, in some cases at least, given for the *tuyūl*. Such grants usually carried with them certain immunities. In the course of time, it sometimes happened that the liability to provide contingents was neglected, and the grant was converted by usurpation into private property enjoying immunities and exemptions. There were also, under the Qajars, cases of grants of land (*tuyūl*) being assigned to certain offices; these similarly tended to become assimilated to private property. Lastly, grants known sometimes as *tuyūl* and sometimes as *suyūrghāl* continued to be made on crown land, waqf land, and usufructory property. [1]

There is thus a striking continuity between the *iqṭāʿ* and the *tuyūl*/*suyūrghāl*. The latter, like the *iqṭāʿ*, were, in the main, devices for financing the administration of the state and the upkeep of the army. Under the Seljuqs, there was a general tendency for the military leader to become also an administrator and to exercise jurisdiction. This was also true in subsequent periods of Persian history up to the second half of the nineteenth century. There was also, throughout, a connection between military functions and the possession of land, but this was not based on a feudal contract involving mutual fealty between sovereign and vassal.

The period of the *iqṭāʿ*/*tuyūl* was preceded by a spread in the tax-farm; its decline was also accompanied by a somewhat similar phenomenon. Whereas, however, the spread of the tax-farm in the ninth and tenth centuries A.D. had heralded the development and regulari-

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Any surplus remaining after the payment of the central government quota was retained by him. He usually exercised rights of jurisdiction within the province; and, if called upon to do so, provided military contingents.

[1] An interesting example of a *tuyūl*/*suyūrghāl* on usufructory property is the statement in the *Fārs-nāma-i Nāṣirī* of Ḥājjī Mīrzā Ḥasan Fasāʾī (Tehran, lith., 1894-96, ii, 314) that the Gāvbāz tribe of Fārs, who earned their living by fattening cattle and selling them as fatstock, were in the *tuyūl* and *suyūrghāl* of the *naqīb* of the *qalandars* and *darvīshes* of Fars; this presumably meant that the *naqīb* had the right to collect the taxation due from the Gāvbāz, and possibly also to settle disputes among them.

zation of the *iqṭāʿ*, the growth in tax-farming in the nineteenth century was followed by a fundamental break in the administration: the old institutions were no longer adequate for the changing needs of the country and were eventually superseded by institutions based on those of the democratic countries of Western Europe. These institutions had developed in Western Europe out of feudalism and feudal practice. In Persia, however, the *iqṭāʿ*/*tuyūl* had not given rise, as feudalism had done in Western Europe, to a belief in the binding force of engagements freely entered into, or to the idea that one is not bound to obey an order incompatible with one's dignity as a free man. Nor had there been anything in the relationship between the *muqṭaʿ* and the sultan, or the *tuyūldār* and the shah, like the *foi* which had bound together lord and vassal in Western European feudalism, and to which the high importance attached in Western Europe to the virtue of fidelity goes back. [1] The *iqṭāʿ* was not a feudal institution in a legal sense; and Persian society was not, in the narrower sense, feudal. When, therefore, Persia adopted modern institutions based on those of Western European democratic states, the break with the past was a complete one; and she passed to the new age without any of the intermediary experience of feudalism.

[1] Cf. Ganshof, 154.

ANN K. S. LAMBTON
University of London

LA CLASSIFICATION DES SECTES DANS L'HÉRÉSIOGRAPHIE ASH'ARITE

PAR

HENRI LAOUST

Le professeur H. A. R. Gibb s'est souvent attaché, au cours de sa longue et fructueuse carrière, à étudier la structure de la pensée musulmane et, partant, à s'interroger sur la fonction qu'il convenait d'assigner respectivement, dans l'ensemble de cette pensée, à ces disciplines spécifiquement musulmanes que sont le *ḥadīth*, la jurisprudence (*fiqh*), la théologie spéculative (*kalām*), la philosophie d'inspiration hellénistique (*falsafa*) et le soufisme. A plusieurs reprises l'étude de l'ash'arisme l'a retenu, aussi bien dans sa méthodologie que dans le contenu de sa théodicée et de sa politique; nous voudrions joindre modestement nos efforts aux siens en nous interrogeant, à notre tour, sur la manière dont les grands représentants de l'école qui furent aussi des hérésiographes, Ash'arī, Baghdādī, Shahrastānī et Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, ont pour leur part compris la classification des sectes musulmanes. [1]

Ces classifications, loin d'être fixées *ne varietur* dès l'origine, présentent souvent d'assez notables divergences. C'est à les dégager dans une vue fort schématique, et d'une façon purement descriptive, que nous nous bornerons ici, dans les limites nécessairement étroites qui nous sont imparties, sans rechercher dans quelle mesure ces divergences, au demeurant inséparables de l'évolution de l'ash'arisme, peuvent trouver leur explication dans la personnalité des auteurs considérés, leurs propres systèmes ou les circonstances politiques dans lesquelles ils ont vécu et enseigné.

Dans le *Kitāb al-maqālāt*, qui constitue le premier grand traité d'hérésiographie qui nous soit parvenu, les sectes musulmanes sont rangées, sans le souci d'une grande rigueur dans la systématisation, entre les dix catégories suivantes: [2]

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[1] Les références que l'on trouvera dans le corps de cette note renvoient aux éditions suivantes: Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn*, éd. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1930). *'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī*, *Al-farq bain al-firaq* (Le Caire, s.d.); *Kitāb uṣūl al-dīn* (Istanbul, 1928). Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-milal wa 'l-niḥal*, 3 vols. (Le Caire, 1948). Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *I'tiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa 'l-mushrikīn* (Le Caire, 1938).

[2] Nous reprenons ici quelques unes des conclusions de notre article sur „La

1° Les *shī'ites*, qui eux-mêmes comprennent les *ghulāt* ou extrémistes, les *imāmīya* (auxquels sont rattachés les *kaisānīya*) et les *zaidīya*.

2° Les *khārijites*, avec leurs nombreuses subdivisions, mais dont les quatre sectes fondamentales sont celles des *azāriqa*, des *ibāḍīya*, des *ṣufrīya* et des *najadāt* (p. 101).

3° Les *murji'a*, qui englobent une grande diversité de sectes ou d'écoles qui n'eurent souvent, dans la réalité, aucun lien historique: ainsi les *jahmīya*, *najjārīya*, *karrāmīya*, *ḥanafīya* et *marīsīya*.

4° Les *mu'tazila*, sur lesquels al-Ash'arī apporte une documentation d'une exceptionnelle valeur, en particulier quand il s'agit de préciser la doctrine d'Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī (m. 303 H.).

5° Les *jahmīya*, très sommairement définis.

6° Les *ḍirārīya*, 7° les *najjārīya* et 8° les *bakrīya*, dont les systèmes composites sont rapidement analysés.

9° Les *aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* ou *ahl al-sunna* dont la profession de foi fait l'objet d'un résumé précis, mais qui surprend toutefois par sa brièveté et sa sérénité quand on songe qu'al-Ash'arī sera souvent par la suite présenté comme le grand, sinon le plus éminent, théoricien du sunnisme.

10° Les *kullābīya*, ou disciples de 'Abd Allāh b. Sa'īd al-Qaṭṭān (m. 240 H.), connu sous le nom d'Ibn Kullāb, dont l'importance, dans l'histoire du *kalām* ash'arite, a été vigoureusement soulignée par Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī dans son *Kitāb uṣūl al-dīn* (p. 309).

On remarquera d'autre part qu'une allusion rapide est faite aux ascètes (*nussāk*) et aux *ṣūfīya*, qui s'imposent des règles de dévotion particulières ou enseignent des idées suspectes touchant le *ḥulūl*, l'incarnation de l'Esprit divin dans certains corps d'une exceptionnelle beauté, ou la *ru'ya*, la vision de Dieu réservée en ce monde à des saints privilégiés, sans que le soufisme, en tant que tel, soit condamné (p. 288).

Il y a tout lieu de penser qu'al-Ash'arī a composé ses *Maqālāt* à une époque où il était encore mu'tazilite. On ne peut s'empêcher d'être frappé d'abord par le fait qu'Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal n'est à aucun moment cité, alors qu'al-Ash'arī, ainsi qu'on le sait, mit sous le patronage du grand traditionniste de Bagdad son *Ibāna*, l'un de ses plus célèbres *credo*. La brièveté du passage consacré à Jahm b. Ṣafwān et aux jahmīya, ne saurait non plus manquer de surprendre, alors que

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classification des sectes dans le Farq d'al-Baghdādī," publié dans la *Revue des Etudes islamiques* (1961), 19-59.

de nombreuses réfutations avaient déjà vu le jour dans les milieux de traditionnistes contre ces hérétiques auxquels on entendait rattacher, historiquement et doctrinalement, les mu'tazila.

Il est difficile d'imaginer qu'al-Ash'arī, écrivant à l'époque même où le ḥanbalisme se constitue fortement en école, entre 247 et 334 H., et intervient souvent dans la vie sociale par des manifestations qui ne pouvaient passer inaperçues, ait pu tout ignorer des réfutations des jahmīya que composèrent tour à tour, à côté de bien d'autres, des hommes comme Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (m. 241 H.), Abū 'Āṣim Khashīsh (m. 254 H.), 'Uthmān al-Dārimī (m. 280 H.), Abū Muḥammad al-Rāzī (m. 327 H.) ou, à plus forte raison, al-Barbahārī (m. 329 H.).

Né en 260 H., c'est vers la quarantaine — sous le califat si agité d'al-Muqtadir, où la rivalité entre le sunnisme et le shī'isme s'aviva, et où tant de sectes tenues pour schismatiques vinrent se heurter au traditionalisme ḥanbalite — qu'al-Ash'arī rompit avec le mu'tazilisme de ses premières années dans des circonstances qui n'ont pas été pleinement éclaircies. On peut même, nous semble-t-il, avancer que c'est entre 291 et 300 H., approximativement, que les *Maqālāt* ont dû être composées; on y trouve en effet (p. 85) une allusion à l'insurrection qarmaṭe de Syrie que le calife al-Mustakfī entreprit de réprimer en 291 H. et dont plusieurs chefs furent suppliciés à Bagdad.

Bien différente, en tout état de cause, est la classification générale des sectes que l'on trouve dans le *Farq bain al-firaq* d'Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī, de la grande école de Nīshāpūr qui, après la prise de la ville par Maḥmūd b. Subuktakīn en 389 H., s'en alla vivre à Isfarā'in où il mourut en 429 H. Jurisconsulte shāfi'ite et théologien ash'arite, disciple d'Abū Bakr b. Fūrak et d'Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarā'inī, Baghdādī, qui assista à la fin des Sāmānides et au début des Ghaznévides, fut étroitement mêlé, comme toute sa production en témoigne, aux luttes que le sunnisme eut à soutenir, dans les provinces orientales, contre les karrāmīya, les mu'tazila, le shī'isme et l'ismā'īlisme. C'est, en définitive, entre trois grandes catégories que peuvent se répartir les nombreuses sectes musulmanes dont le *Farq* entreprend la définition et la classification: d'une part les hérétiques schismatiques (*aṣḥāb al-ahwā'*); de l'autre les hérétiques renégats ou apostats (*aṣḥāb al-kufr*), qui prétendent appartenir à l'Islam, mais doivent en être exclus; enfin les traditionnistes communautaires (*aṣḥāb al-sunna wa 'l-jamā'a*) qui seuls détiennent la plénitude de la vérité révélée.

A. Les *aṣḥāb al-ahwā'*, les schismatiques hérétiques qui se rattachent

à l'Islam par certaines de leurs options de foi mais s'en détachent par d'autres, comprennent les sectes suivantes:

1° Les *rawāfiḍ*, parmi lesquels figurent les *zaidīya*, les *kaisānīya* et les *imāmīya* — les shī'ites extrémistes ou *ghulāt* étant rejetés parmi les renégats.

2° Les khārijites, eux-mêmes groupés autour de huit sous-sectes (*muḥakkima*, *azāriqa*, *najadāt*, *ṣufrīya*, *'ajārida*, *tha'āliba*, *ibāḍīya* et *shabībīya*).

3° Les *mu'tazila* ou *qadarīya*, qui se divisent en une vingtaine de sectes, et contre lesquels Baghdādī avait déjà composé un *Kitāb faḍā'iḥ al-mu'tazila*.

4° Les *murji'a*, avec leurs cinq principales subdivisions (*yūnusīya*, *ghassānīya*, *tūmanīya*, *thaubānīya* et *marīsīya*).

5° Les *najjārīya*, dont les thèses sont, sur certains points, celles des mu'tazila, et sur d'autres, celles des „gens du *ḥadīth*."

6° Les *jahmīya*, *bakrīya* et *ḍirārīya* qui se trouvent ainsi assez étrangement réunis sous une même rubrique.

7° Les *karrāmīya* dont l'étude est d'autant plus précieuse que Baghdādī a eu à sa disposition le *Kitāb 'adhāb al-qabr* d'Ibn Karrām et qu'il avait pu discuter, en 370 H., en présence du sāmānide Nāṣir al-Daula b. Simjūr, avec un théologien connu de la secte.

8° Les *mushabbiha* enfin, qui groupent un ensemble composite de sectes, allant de la simple hérésie à l'apostasie caractérisée, mais qui toutes participent de la même hérésie, le *tashbīh*, la comparaison de Dieu avec ses créatures, qui présente des degrés variables de gravité.

B. On arrive ainsi à la deuxième grande catégorie de sectes hérétiques, celle des *aṣḥāb al-kufr*, des hérétiques renégats ou apostats qui, contrairement à leurs prétentions, se sont mis d'eux-mêmes hors de la communauté musulmane. Dans cette catégorie entrent les sept groupes de sectes suivants:

1° Les *ghulāt* ou shī'ites extrémistes qui voient dans leurs imams une incarnation (*ḥulūl*) de l'Esprit Saint, ou leur confèrent le qualité de prophète (*sabā'īya*; *bayānīya*; *mughīrīya*; *ḥarbīya*; *manṣūrīya*; *jarrāḥīya*; *khaṭṭābīya*; *ghurābīya*; *mufauwiḍa*, *dhammīya*; *shura'īya* et *namīrīya*).

2° Les *ḥulūlīya*, ou partisans de l'union substantielle de l'Esprit Saint avec l'homme, parmi lesquels on retrouve plusieurs sectes précédemment énumérées, mais auxquels viennent s'ajouter les *rizāmīya*, *muqanna'īya*, *ḥulmānīya*, *ḥallājīya* et *shalmaghānīya*.

3° Les *mubāḥīya* ou *aṣḥāb al-ibāḥa*, qui désignent avant tout les *khurrāmīya* ou *khurramdīnīya* (*bābakīya* ou *māzyārīya*) qui considèrent comme licites toutes les interdictions légales.

4° Les *tanāsukhīya*, ou partisans de la transmigration des âmes, parmi lesquels on retrouve la plupart des sectes précédemment énumérées parmi les *ghulāt* et les *ḥulūlīya*, et auxquels viennent s'ajouter les *rāwandīya*.

5° Deux sectes mu'tazilites extrémistes: les *ḥā'iṭīya* (également considérés comme tanāsukhīya) et les *ḥimārīya* de 'Askar Mukram.

6° Les deux sectes khārijites extrémistes: les *yazīdīya* et les *maimūnīya*.

7° Les *bāṭinīya* enfin contre lesquels le *Farq* se décha]ne avec une particulière violence et dont il fait, en définitive, des matérialistes athées (*dahrīya zanādiqa*).

C. A ces schismatiques et hérétiques s'oppose enfin le parti des *ahl as-sunna wa 'l-jamā'a*, des gens de la tradition et du regroupement communautaire, auquel appartiennent, sous réserve de la rectitude de leur *credo*, les théologiens dogmatiques, les jurisconsultes fondateurs d'écoles et leurs disciples, les traditionnistes qualifiés, les lexicographes des écoles de Baṣra ou de Kūfa, les maîtres en sciences coraniques, les ascètes et les mystiques énumérés par al-Sulamī (m. 412 H.) dans son histoire du soufisme (à l'exception d'Abū Ḥulmān al-Dimashqī, d'al-Ḥallāj et d'al-Qannād), les guerriers de la foi qui montent la garde aux frontières (*murābiṭ*), et enfin la grande masse (*'āmma*) des Musulmans qui résident dans les pays où les emblèmes de l'Islam ont triomphé.

De ce *credo* des „gens de la sunna et de la communauté" tel que le *Farq* l'analyse, Abū 'l-Muẓaffar al-Isfarā'inī (m. 471 H.) donne, à son tour, un fidèle tableau dans le résumé qu'il a fait de l'oeuvre d'al-Baghdādī. 'Abd al-Razzāq b. Rizq Allāh al-Ras'anī (m. 660 H.), pour sa part, s'en dispense; on devine aisément la raison de ce silence. Originaire de Jazīra, avant d'aller enseigner à Mossoul, Ras'anī avait reçu une solide formation de jurisconsulte et de traditionniste ḥanbalite; il avait même été à Damas un élève du cheikh Muwaffaq al-Dīn b. Qudāma (m. 620 H.). Ecrivant à une époque où le ḥanbalisme syrien réagissait vigoureusement contre les progrès de l'ash'arisme, il lui eût été difficile de contribuer à donner, du *credo* d'al-Baghdādī, une plus large diffusion en en faisant figurer le résumé dans son propre *Mukhtaṣar*. [1]

Pour en revenir au *Farq* d'al-Baghdādī, dont la rigueur avait tout

[1] On trouvera une notice sur Ras'anī dans le *Dhail 'alā ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila*, II (Le Caire), 247-276. Pour son *Mukhtaṣar*, cf. l'édition de P. Hitti (Le Caire, 1942).

pour séduire un sunnite militant comme paraît l'avoir été Ras'anī, la distinction entre *aṣḥāb al-kufr* et *aṣḥāb al-ahwā'* repose en définitive sur une distinction bien connue de tous les traités de droit musulman entre la peine légale (*ḥadd*) et la peine discrétionnaire (*ta'zīr*). Dans la catégorie des schismatiques renégats figurent toutes les sectes auxquelles le chef de l'État, l'imam, doit appliquer la peine prévue pour l'apostat (*murtadd*) à qui on demandera de faire acte de repentir et auquel, en cas de refus, on appliquera la peine de mort avec la confiscation des biens.

Les hérétiques schismatiques rangés dans la catégorie des *aṣḥāb al-ahwā'*, qui appartiennent encore à l'Islam par certaines de leurs croyances, mais s'en détachent par d'autres, relèvent des peines discrétionnaires (*ta'zīr*) que la Loi confère à l'imam et dont il est en définitive seul juge. C'est, d'autre part, à une mise systématique à l'écart (*mujānaba*) de ces schismatiques que les membres de la communauté sont pour leur part conviés, en refusant de prier derrière eux, de faire sur eux la prière des morts, de les enterrer dans les cimetières musulmans, de considérer comme licites les bêtes qu'ils égorgent ou de contracter mariage avec eux — sans pour autant cesser d'entretenir avec eux des relations commerciales ou de les utiliser à l'occasion contre un ennemi commun.

Si nous passons au troisième grand traité d'hérésiographie ash'arite, au *Kitāb al-milal wa 'l-niḥal* d'al-Shahrastānī (m. 549 H.) — lui aussi shāfi'ite et élève en *kalām* d'Ibn al-Qushairī (m. 514 H.) — nous arrivons à une classifications des sectes qui, tout en différant sensiblement, dans son ordonnancement et sa structure, de celle d'al-Baghdādī, n'en participe pas moins, dans une large mesure, du même esprit. Nous nous trouvons devant la classification suivante aussi peu respectueuse de l'ordre de la succession chronologique des sectes et de leur formation que l'avait été celle du *Farq bain al-firaq*:

1° Les *mu'tazila* (I, 57-112), toujours étudiés école par école.

2° Les *jabrīya* (I, 112-123), ou partisans de la toute-puissance divine et de la prédestination, parmi lesquels figurent des écoles aussi différentes les unes des autres que peuvent l'être celles des jahmīya (113), des najjārīya (116) et des ḍirārīya (116).

3° Les *ṣifātīya* (I, 123-170) qui tous admettent en Dieu l'existence d'une pluralité d'attributs et qui comprennent les ash'arites (127), les *mushabbiha* (145) et les *karrāmīya* (159).

4° Les *murji'a* (I, 222-234) proprement dits avec leurs six subdivisions.

5° Les *khārijites* (I, 170-222) ramenés à six sectes fondamentales (*azāriqa*; *najadāt*; *ṣufrīya*; *ʿajārida*; *ibāḍīya* et *thaʿāliba*) dont toutes les autres dérivent.

6° Les *shīʿites* (I, 222-345) qui comprennent les *imāmīya*, les *zaidīya*, les *kaisānīya*, les *ghulāt* et les *bāṭinīya* (dont la nouvelle secte fondée par Ḥasan b. al-Ṣabbāḥ (m. 518 H.) fait l'objet d'une longue analyse (339-345).

La critique fort vive que Shahrastānī fait de la doctrine des *bāṭinīya*, comme tous les grands ashʿarites depuis Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (m. 403 H.), montre, notons-le au passage, combien tendancieuse fut l'accusation souvent portée contre lui d'avoir été un crypto-bāṭinite. [1]

7° Les *ahl al-furūʿ* (I, 345-368), c'est-à-dire tous les jurisconsultes dans la mesure où leurs divergences portent non plus sur le dogme proprement dit (*uṣūl*), mais sur des problèmes pratiques de droit (*furūʿ*) dans lesquels tout *mujtahid* de bonne foi et dûment qualifié a nécessairement raison.

Tous ces jurisconsultes sont eux-mêmes censés appartenir soit à l'école de la tradition soit à l'école du libre examen (*raʾy*) qui s'opposent sur le problème de la place qu'il convient d'attribuer respectivement au raisonnement analogique (*qiyās*) et aux traditions isolées (*akhbār āḥād*). Parmi les „gens du *ḥadīth*" figurent les jurisconsultes de l'école du Hedjaz: Mālik, Shāfiʿī, Sufyān al-Thaurī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal et Dāwūd b. ʿAlī, tandis que l'école du *raʾy* comprend avant tout Abū Ḥanīfa et, plus particulièrement, parmi ses disciples, al-Shaibānī (362-368).

La deuxième grande partie du *Kitāb al-milal*, de beaucoup la plus longue (tomes II et III), est consacrée, comme l'on sait, à l'étude des religions extérieures à l'Islam; elle n'est pas cependant sans avoir une incidence sur l'hérésiographie musulmane telle que Shahrastānī la conçoit.

Après les religions qui ont un Livre (Juifs et Chrétiens) (II, 1-52) et qui jouiront, dans la communauté musulmane, d'un statut préférentiel, et celles qui ont un pseudo-livre (*Majūs*) (II, 52-104) et qui, en conséquence, ne pourront aspirer, dans l'État musulman, qu'à une situation inférieure à celle des précédentes, viennent en effet les religions naturelles qui n'ont pas de Loi révélée (*sharīʿa*), mais qui

[1] Sur les discussions autour des positions prises par Shahrastānī à l'égard du shīʿisme et de la *falsafa*, cf. les remarques d'Ibn Taimīya dans le *Minhāj al-sunna*, III, 209.

reposent uniquement sur les opinions personnelles de leurs fondateurs et de leurs adeptes. Dans cette dernière catégorie entreront donc, après les philosophes de l'antiquité grecque (II, 231 et suiv.), tous les philosophes musulmans (*falāsifat al-islām*) (II, 1-245) et, en particulier, Avicenne dont l'étude, pour objective qu'elle soit, s'accompagne, par la place même qui lui est assignée, d'une condamnation sans équivoque — condamnation qui, d'une part, montre là encore combien est tendancieuse l'accusation faite à Shahrastānī de s'être fait un défenseur de la philosophie avicénienne et, d'autre part, avec quelle fermeté, tout au long de son histoire, le *kalām* ash'arite a banni la philosophie de l'Islam.

C'est, en effet, à des conclusions fort voisines de celles de Baghdādī et de Shahrastānī que parvient enfin, à son tour, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (m. 606 H.) dans son remarquable essai de classification des sectes, le *Kitāb i'tiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa 'l-mushrikīn*, dont on doit l'édition au regretté Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Rāziq. C'est cependant, là encore, devant une classification nouvelle sur bien des points que nous nous trouvons — classification qui a dû faire leur place à des sectes nouvelles, mais qui donne parfois aussi, des sectes les plus connues de l'Islam, une définition quelque peu différente de celles auxquelles les précédents traités nous avaient habitués. Les sectes ainsi définies sont rangées sous les dix rubriques suivantes:

1° Les *mu'tazila*, avec dix-sept subdivisions, mais dont les thèses fondamentales sont ramenées à trois au lieu de cinq: la négation des attributs de Dieu, la création du Coran et la liberté humaine. On trouve d'autre part, parmi les *mu'tazila*, les *ghailānīya*, disciples du *qadarī* Ghailān al-Dimashqī dont l'appartenance au mu'tazilisme proprement dit n'est pas toujours attestée.

2° Les *khārijites*, avec leurs vingt-et-une subdivisions, et dont les thèses communes sont aussi ramenées à trois: excommunication pour fautes graves; excommunication de 'Alī, Ṭalḥa, Zubair et 'Ā'isha, et glorification toute particulière d'Abū Bakr et de 'Umar.

3° Les *shī'ites* (ou *rawāfiḍ*), dont les nombreuses sous-sectes se répartissent entre les quatre groupes des *zaidīya*, *imāmīya*, *ghulāt* et *kaisānīya*.

4° Les *mushabbiha* (p. 63) ou anthropomorphistes. Rāzī considère, on le remarquera au passage, que ce sont les *rawāfiḍ* qui furent les premiers *mushabbiha* dans l'Islam, en particulier avec Hishām b. al-Ḥakam et Hishām al-Jawālīqī. Il soulève à cette occasion le problème du *tashbīh* chez Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rahawaīh et Yaḥyā

b. Ma'īn. „Ce sont les mu'tazila, nous dit-il en substance, qui ont accusé ces docteurs de la Loi d'être des *mushabbiha*, et c'est là une erreur. Ces théologiens voulaient, tout à la fois, prendre position contre le *ta'ṭīl* et le *tashbīh*, mais se refusaient à discuter sur les termes ambigus du Coran (*mutashābihāt*) se bornant à affirmer leur croyance dans la réalité de ces termes, sans soulever le problème du 'comment' et tout en affirmant que Dieu est comparable à rien." (p. 166)

5° Les *karrāmīya*, avec leurs sept subdivisions sur lesquels, contrairement à toute attente, Rāzī, qui avait si vivement polémiqué contre eux, ne nous donne que fort peu de renseignements (p. 67).

6° Les *jabrīya* (p. 68) qui constituent un ensemble hétéroclite de sectes où voisinent les *jahmīya*, les *najjārīya*, les *ḍirārīya* et les *bakrīya*.

7° Les *murji'a* (p. 70), avec cinq subdivisions dont certaines sous-sectes n'avaient pas encore été mentionnées dans les traités antérieurs.

8° Les *soufis* (p. 72), qui font ainsi leur entrée pour la première fois — après les vives critiques dont ils avaient été l'objet dans l'œuvre d'Abū 'l-Faraj b. al-Jauzī — dans un traité général d'hérésiographie sunnite. Fidèle à la grande tradition de l'ash'arisme, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī leur est favorable et estime que c'est une erreur que de ne pas leur avoir fait une place dans les *kutub al-firaq*; il n'en dénonce pas moins, avec vivacité, en condamnant comme hérétiques les *ḥulūlīya* et les *mubāḥīya*, les tendances de tant de soufis vers l'incarnationnisme et l'antinomisme.

9° Sous le titre de *sectes qui font extérieurement profession d'islam mais sont à exclure de la communauté musulmane* (p. 76) figurent les *bāṭinīya* (ou Fatimides d'Égypte), les *ṣabbāḥīya*, disciples de Ḥasan b. al-Ṣabbāḥ, le fondateur de la nouvelle *da'wa* nizāride, les *nāṣirīya*, disciples de Nāṣir Khusraw, les *qarāmiṭa*, les *bābakīya*, les *muqanna'īya* et les *sab'īya*.

10° *Les sectes extérieures à l'Islam*, qui terminent cette classification (p. 82), comprennent tout à la fois les *juifs*, les *chrétiens*, les *majūs*, les *thanawīya*, les *sabéens* et finalement les *falāsifa* (p. 91). En parlant de ces derniers, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī tient à énumérer les nombreux ouvrages qu'il avait composés contre eux, en faisant remarquer que nul avant lui ne s'était acharné, avec autant d'application, à dénoncer l'hérésie de la *falsafa* et en protestant de son fidèle attachement au *credo* des gens de la tradition et de la communauté (p. 92).

Une exclusive toute particulière, tout au long de ces grands traités d'hérésiographie ash'arite, auxquels la renommée de leurs auteurs a donné et continue de donner une audience et une autorité toutes

particulières, a ainsi frappé les *ghulāt*, les *bāṭinīya* et les *falāsifa*, que l'on s'est ainsi obstinément refusé à faire entrer dans le décompte des sectes musulmanes. Mais ce qu'il importe avant tout de retenir, c'est le sens et la portée de cette hérésiographie telle qu'elle s'est trouvée infléchie depuis le *Farq* de Baghdādī. Son dessein prédominant n'est certes pas de tracer l'histoire des sectes, mais d'arriver avant tout à une classification normative de ces sectes en fonction de leur éloignement plus ou moins grand du sunnisme dont chacun de ces auteurs se considère en définitive comme l'interprète le plus autorisé. Tous ces ouvrages constituent en définitive, tout autant que des traités de théologie dogmatique, de véritables *traités de politique juridique* dont le but est d'éclairer l'État et chaque membre de la communauté sur leur comportement à l'égard des schismatiques qu'on leur dénonce. A ce titre, on ne saurait oublier qu'à la condition d'être éclairés à la lumière des circonstances de temps et de lieu qui les virent naître, ces traités d'hérésiographie — comme beaucoup d'autres documents de ce genre — constituent des sources de tout premier ordre pour l'étude de l'histoire musulmane — domaine où, là encore, la part du professeur H. A. R. Gibb a été si enrichissante.

HENRI LAOUST
Collège de France

THE RECONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION OF TETUAN: THE PERIOD OF ANDALUSIAN IMMIGRATION

BY

J. D. LATHAM

I

Towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, the inexorable advance of the *Reconquista* swept before it, one by one, the last remaining vestiges of Islamic sovereignty in Spain. Reluctant, or unable to cut the roots that held them to the ancestral soil, the vanquished Muslim population, for the greater part, accepted terms and peace with vassalage. To some, however, departure from the homeland seemed less distasteful than allegiance to the Catholic throne, and such of them as had the means and freedom to depart left Spain for Barbary. Among the emigrants went fervent spirits eager to resume the jihad wherever, and as best they might, against the forces of triumphant Christendom. It is with a group of exiles of such ilk that Tetuan, as it stands today, begins its history. Raised from the ruins of an earlier foundation, the town owes its restoration to a colony of Spanish Muslims who fortified the place and made of their retreat a base from which they could pit themselves against the Portuguese in North Morocco, principally in Ceuta and Tangier, and make descents upon the coasts of Spain.

For the reader who desires a more detailed knowledge of the origins of new Tetuan and the circumstances of its reconstruction, but who is compelled by linguistic limitations to rely on works in European languages, the principal source of reference remains the history section of A. Joly's well-known monograph on Tetuan, published more than half a century ago. [1] A more recent publication, which may be regarded to some extent as a supplement to Joly's work, is T. Ruiz de Cuevas's *Apuntes para la historia de Tetuan.* [2] While the pages of the *Apuntes* do contain much that is useful for certain periods and aspects of Tetuanese history, it cannot be recommended to the reader whose unfamiliarity with the subject prevents him from

[1] "Tétouan: 2me partie: historique", *Archives Marocaines*, V, 1905.
[2] Tetuan, 1951.

differentiating between accurate and inaccurate, likely and unlikely, typical and aberrant. It is, in any case, quite disappointing as regards the matters with which we shall be presently concerned. More disappointing than the *Apuntes* is a paper published by F. de Carranza in the *Archivos del Instituto de Estudios Africanos*, No. 13, Madrid, 1950 and bearing the rather promising title "Sidi Abul Hassan al-Manziri." Here, the aim of the author is to establish more accurately the identity of the man with whose name the rebirth of the town is associated, and, by so doing, to solve the problem surrounding the date at which the work of reconstruction actually commenced. Unfortunately, there are so many weak links in his chain of evidence that it is impossible to place much faith in his conclusions. [1] For the rest, suffice it to say that the more general sources of information (for example, encyclopedias, histories of Morocco, etc.) have little to offer in the way of enlightenment. On the contrary, the diversity of accounts which they present confronts us with some bewildering contradictions, especially in the matter of dating. For these discrepancies, there are several reasons of which the most important, perhaps, is the arbitrary presentation of matters of opinion as matters of established fact, and of which the least important is certainly the utilization of new source material; for much the same material as was available to Joly has in fact been used time and again, while it is but rarely that some new item of information, or illuminating observation, has been introduced to lend a little flavor to the rehash.

The data assembled and discussed—not always with the same level of competence—by Joly derive essentially from (a) the two celebrated sixteenth century "descriptions of Africa" by Leo Africanus [2] and Marmol, [3] and (b) the *Kitāb al-istiqṣā'*, a comprehensive history of Morocco compiled in the nineteenth century by Aḥmad b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī. [4] Since all but a small portion of what is said on our subject in the *Istiqṣā'* is taken on trust from the work of Nāṣirī's Spanish

[1] References to sources are lacking, and the author is often confused and inconsistent. See, for example, his handling of the *nisba* "al-Manẓarī," 93-94.

[2] *Descrittione dell' Africa*, in Gio. Ba. Ramusio, *Navigationi et viaggi*, I (terza edit.), (Venetia, 1563). A. Épaulard's French translation, 2 vols. (Paris, 1956), is of the first Italian edition corrected at the discretion of Épaulard and collaborators against a manuscript which is believed to be "une bonne copie dont s'est servi Ramusio." In the absence of a critical edition of the latter, I hesitate to rely unquestioningly on the French version.

[3] Luys del Marmol Caravajal, *Descripcion general de Affrica*, 2 vols. (Granada, 1573).

[4] References are to the Casablanca edition, IV, 1955.

contemporary, Manuel Pablo Castellanos, [1] whose uncorroborated word it is dangerous to accept, the importance of the Moroccan compilation is, for our particular purposes, reduced to almost negligible proportions. Notwithstanding its inaccuracies, the *Istiqṣā'* nevertheless remained, until quite recently, virtually the only source in the Arabic language to which the historian had access. In 1959, however, a Moroccan historian, Muḥammad Dāwūd, published the first volume of a history of Tetuan, [2] his native town, which clearly frees us from our dependence on the work of Nāṣirī. Aspiring to European, rather than traditional Moroccan, standards of scholarship, Dāwūd draws on a wide range of primary sources, and writes with method and discrimination. Although one cannot always agree with his conclusions or processes of reasoning, he does acquaint us with data drawn from hitherto inaccessible or unpublished Arabic sources, or from the fund of his long experience of Tetuan and its traditions; and since there is no cause to suspect that he is careless in reporting his evidence or reproducing the texts of his *loci probantes*, the value of his work is clear. While it cannot be claimed that anything Dāwūd has to offer will solve some of the more vexing problems of our subject, his work is yet sufficiently informative to justify the appearance of the present paper, in which the restoration of Tetuan and its expansion under the impact of protracted Andalusian immigration will be accorded closer consideration than has hitherto been attempted or even possible.

Those sources which are relatively well-known in the context of Tetuanese history (for example, Leo, Marmol, etc.) and whose general value has been assessed in readily accessible works call for no special review here; such comment as is necessary will be made as and when the occasion demands. Of the unfamiliar Arabic sources with which we shall be concerned, on the other hand, some detailed account is required. The earliest and, to my mind, the most important of these is an untitled record of events in the history of Tetuan by the celebrated biographer, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-'Arabī al-Fāsī (988-1052/1580-1642) who is known to us principally as the author of the *Mir'āt al-maḥāsin*. Dāwūd had access to two privately owned copies of Fāsī's "*taqyīd*," as he calls it: one incorporated in an old miscellany, in the hand of al-Tuhāmī b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Raḥmūn al-

[1] 1843-1911. References are to his *Descripcion histórica de Marruecos* (Santiago, 1878).

[2] *Tārīkh Tiṭwān* (Ma'had Mawlāy al-Ḥasan, Tetuan, 1959).

Tiṭwānī (fl. in Tetuan 1143/1730-31), and another in the hand of Maḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fāsī (1035-1116/1625-1704). Both copies were made from the original. [1] So far as one can judge, Fāsī, who spent the latter part of his life in Tetuan, is as reliable an authority as one is likely to find. He appears to write carefully, and inspires confidence.

The second oldest source which Dāwūd brings to light is a fairly short and incomplete manuscript of more recent date. Both the title and the name of its author are lacking, but from internal evidence Dāwūd puts it at more than a hundred and fifty years old, and strongly suspects it to have been the work of a certain Abū Zaid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥāʾik, Qadi of Tetuan, and one of the shaikhs of the Tetuanese compiler whose work we shall mention next. [2] In the second section of this manuscript, the author gives some account of the history of Tetuan which he describes as his native town. Where it has been possible to control its contents, Dāwūd has found it to be an accurate source of information. Because of its lack of title, Dāwūd proposes in his introduction to refer to the manuscript as *The Tetuanese Manuscript*, but later he more frequently speaks of it as "the old manuscript." I shall refer to it as the *Anonymous Manuscript*.

Not quite so old as this last source is a work whose title we may conveniently shorten to *Nuẓhat al-ikhwān . . . fī binā' Tiṭwān* by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām b. Aḥmad Sukairaj (1145[?]-1250/1732[?]-1834). [3] Skīraj, as this author is more commonly known, was a native of Tetuan, who, apart from a brief interlude during which he studied at the Qarawīyīn in Fez, passed the whole of his adult life as a jurist and notary in his home town. He is an uncritical compiler, but the *Nuẓha*, Dāwūd asserts—and rightly, we may suppose—does contain a good deal of interesting material which can be found nowhere else. Where this is not incompatible with established fact or probability, it cannot reasonably be rejected. The *Nuẓha*, which, it seems, still exists only in manuscript and in an incomplete form, was made available to Dāwūd by his friend and former teacher, Abū 'l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī (1871-1953). The complete work is said to have been in two parts, each containing not less than two hundred and fifty leaves of quarto size.

Ruhūnī, the last on our list, is himself the author of a history of

[1] *Ibid.*, 59, 95.
[2] *Ibid.*, 58-59.
[3] *Ibid.*, 48-49.

Tetuan—with a biographical bias—entitled *ʿUmdat al-rāwīn fī tārīkh Tiṭṭāwīn.* [1] Of the *ʿUmda* there are three manuscripts: the original and two copies. The first is now to be found in what was formerly the Biblioteca General of Tetuan, while the two copies are the private property of ʿAbd al-Khāliq Torres and Dāwūd, respectively. The first four parts of Dāwūd's copy, which is the work of several copyists including himself, were taken from the original, the remaining six from the Torres copy. Of the original manuscript, to which the author, it seems, made numerous additions and alterations between 1925 and 1946, an edited Spanish translation exists, [2] but it is of indifferent quality and clearly a far from satisfactory substitute for the unpublished Arabic text. Quite apart from the fact that, at certain points, only a short abstract of content is given, one can never be quite sure that the carelessness and inaccuracy reflected in the footnotes have not been responsible for errors and omissions in the body of the translation. It does, however, give some idea of the nature and content of the *ʿUmda*, which—rather like the *Nuẓha* on which it draws freely —turns out to be an undiscriminating compilation, yet, at the same time, a mine of raw material from which unique items of useful information can be extracted by the critical investigator.

In spite of the very recent date of the *ʿUmda* and the comparative lateness of the *Anonymous Manuscript* and the *Nuẓha*, their degree of usefulness for our purposes is not necessarily less than that of many earlier, but comparable, compilations with which, for want of better, the Islamic historian has so frequently to make do. Their testimony, therefore, must be admitted or rejected according to the principle normally adopted in such cases; namely, that uncorroborated items of information resting on the word of a single author, but to all appearances realistic, are admissible until contradicted by whatever unimpeachable or more reliable sources the future may bring to light, or until shown beyond reasonable doubt to be in conflict with circumstantial evidence.

II

The history of Tetuan prior to the period with which we are concerned need not long detain us. The close of the fourteenth century is as far back as we need go. By this time, so we are most

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[1] *Ibid.*, 50-58.

[2] *Historia de Tetuan . . . por . . . R'honi . . . traducida por Muhammad ibn Azzuz Haquim* (Tetuan, 1953) hereafter abbreviated to *ʿUmda tr.*

commonly told, the piratical activities of the inhabitants of the place had attained such serious proportions that Enrique III of Castile determined to eradicate what had become a painful thorn in the side of Spain. Accordingly, in the year 1400, the Castilian monarch—to quote from the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*—"sent a squadron of ships which penetrated into the mouth of the Martīn and destroyed the corsairs' fleet; troops were landed who took the town, destroyed it and carried off many of the inhabitants as prisoners. Tetuan remained deserted for about eighty years." [1] The course of events is somewhat similarly described in most other reputable histories and works of reference. [2] Although there is—for reasons which will soon be apparent—no unanimity on the period of time which elapsed between the destruction of Tetuan and its restoration, the general picture which emerges and which is most often accepted as historical fact is that, after its destruction by Enrique III in 1400, the town remained a deserted ruin for at least something more than three-quarters of a century. That such was actually the case is a proposition to which there are cogent objections. In the first place, the historicity of the Castilian expedition, of which there is surprisingly no mention in López de Ayala's chronicle of the reign of Enrique [3] and for which, in the last resort, we seem only to have the word of Marmol, [4] has yet to be proved. Leo, significantly enough, makes no reference to the operation, but, on the contrary, attributes the desolation of the town to the Portuguese. [5] Furthermore, if some misfortune, whatever its true nature or description, did indeed overtake Tetuan and result in its depopulation *at the turn of the century*, then either the disaster cannot have been so absolute, or its effects so enduring, as we are usually led to believe. Such must be our conclusion, if we accept the evidence of Portuguese sources. For in the year 1435 Tetuan, so far from being a scene of utter devastation, was a "lugar cercado de muros, e torres, e em que havia Castello de Menagem, e fronteiros." [6] It seems, then, at this date, to have been essentially a garrison town.

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[1] *EI*, s.v. "Tiṭṭāwīn".

[2] Cf. A. Cour, *Dynastie marocaine des Beni Waṭṭās* (1920), 78; H. Terrasse, *Histoire du Maroc*, II (Casablanca, 1950), 116, etc.

[3] Cf. D. López, in D. Peres and E. Cerdeira, *Historia de Portugal*, III (Barcelos, 1931), 538, n. 1; R. Ricard, in *Hespéris*, XXIII (1936), 126, n. 2.

[4] *Descripcion*, II, f° 131, col. 1. [5] *Descripcion*, 48 f.

[6] R. de Pina, *Chronica do Conde D. Duarte de Menezes* in J. Correa da Serra, *Collecção de livros ineditos de historia portugueza*, III (Lisboa, 1793), 56. Cf. Zurara, *Chron. do Conde D. Pedro de Menezes*, in Serra, *op. cit.*, II (1792), 600.

As such, it must have had a certain importance, for the prospect of its continued existence was so uncongenial to the Portuguese that they determined to be rid of it. Accordingly, in the year 1437, it was attacked and reduced by D. Duarte de Menezes and, in consequence, abandoned by its inhabitants. [1] It would seem, therefore, that Leo is right in regarding the Portuguese as the decisive factor in the ultimate ruin of old Tetuan.

Before the close of the century, a new Tetuan, raised and, for the most part, inhabited by Spanish Muslim exiles, stood on the site of the old. The date at which its history begins is problematical. Traditionally, it is held to be embodied in the *abjad* chronogram *TFĀḤT*, which, in numerical terms, amounts to 889 or 1484-5 of the Christian era. [2] Greater precision is offered by three verses of uncertain date which Dāwūd has discovered in what he describes as "an ancient miscellany" (*kunnāsh qadīm*): [3]

> Tiṭṭāwan was for certain constructed in the year *tuffāḥat* [= *TFĀḤT*]. On *ẓā'* [7] in the month of Sha'bān they began to dig and to build. It was completed at the end of *kāf* [20]. I find this correct and undisputed. [4]

This, then, would give the date 7 Sha'bān 889 H. or 30 August 1484. Fāsī, on the other hand, who is our oldest datable Arabic source, puts the date at 7 Sha'bān 898, [5] that is, 24 May, 1493. Leo, our oldest known source, speaks in no such precise terms, but it is nevertheless clear from what he says that, for him, new Tetuan began its existence after the capitulation of Granada. [6]

In considering the discrepancy between the dates 889 and 898, the possibility of numerical transposition cannot be excluded since

[1] *Ibid.*, III, 79-80; cf. II, 623.

[2] *Istiqṣā'*, IV, 125; Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 95-96 (*Anonymous Manuscript*, etc.). T = 400, F = 80, Ā = 1, Ḥ = 8, T = 400.

[3] *Ibid.*, 86. If the miscellany is that of al-Tuhāmī (see *supra*), TFĀḤT goes back at least as far as the first half of the eighteenth century.

[4] *Kāf* can hardly mean 20 or 27 Sha'bān. Dāwūd's suggestion of twenty *years* (*op. cit.*, 91) is feasible only if the completion of the second *qaṣaba* on Jabal Darsa (see *infra* and *ibid.* 92-93) were held to mark the completion of new Tetuan. The work of restoration proper is more likely to have taken twenty *months*, i.e., if we accept Fāsī's date, up to Rabī' I 900/December 1494, or, in other words, shortly before we hear of al-Manẓarī in action against the Portuguese (see *infra*, p. 395).

[5] Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 95-96.

[6] After a period of eighty, ninety or ninety-five years according to the edition. If the last figure (*Descripcion*, 48 f.) is correct, and if it was thought at the time of Leo's visit to Tetuan that the town was destroyed in 1400/802-3, then 898 is a feasible date *by hijra reckoning*.

confusion of two different combinations of the same digits can occur as easily in Arabic as in English. The possibility is only slightly less if the numbers are expressed verbally. The fact that 7 Sha'bān occurs both in Fāsī's dating and in that indicated by the verses immediately induces the speculation whether there could be any connection between the two. If so, one is entitled to wonder whether the notorious Granadan *imāla* (ā > ē or ī) had not been responsible for introducing an element of confusion into the traditional chronogram; for we have only to substitute *yā'* (= 10) for *alif* in *TFĀḤT* and read *TFYḤT* (= *TFĒḤT* or *TFĪḤT*) to arrive at the date offered by Fāsī. If this last could be regarded as accurate—and Fāsī is not a careless writer—one might suppose the original chronogram to have been a diminutive, perhaps, of *TuFfĀḤaT*, to which form it changed either at some stage in the evolution of local pronunciation or when committed to paper by a writer or writers who mistakenly assumed the word to represent the Granadan pronunciation of the classical *TuFfĀḤaT*. But even if the hypothesis of a phonological influence of some kind is valid, and if, in fact, the date is to be found in a chronogram at all, there is no way of knowing for certain at what stage and in what direction it operated since other possibilities equally feasible suggest themselves which, in the absence of objective criteria, make it unwise to choose between alternatives. A third date is offered by Skīraj in the chronogram *TFḤT*, that is, 888, [1] but as he seems to be the sole source for it, and as he is not a discriminating historian, the variant cannot be taken too seriously. It is best regarded as illustrating the possibility of error to which a chronogram is exposed.

For his part, Dāwūd is prepared to accept all three dates with the suggestion that they may indicate various stages in the history of the new town, 888 representing the year in which actual building operations began, 889 the year in which works of major importance were completed, and 898 the year in which the small initial group of exiles forming the early population of Tetuan was swamped and obscured by a great wave of immigration following the fall of Granada. [2] This interpretation scarcely carries conviction. It owes its conception and its weakness to Dāwūd's respect for two principles which are understandable in an Arab historian, but whose logical deficiencies will be immediately apparent to the Western critic. The first is that the inha-

[1] Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 95.
[2] *Ibid.*, 95-96.

bitants of a town know their own history best, the second, that preference must be given to a tradition which has been handed down from generation to generation. Far sounder is his reluctance to dismiss the evidence of Fāsī, on the grounds that he is a careful and reliable writer and the earliest known Maghribī historian to mention the subject. As regards the speculation that the post-1492 influx may have obscured the earlier establishment of a sparse primitive population, the suggestion is not unreasonable, but whether its presence there could be supposed to go back as far as 1484 is another question, [1] for in no reliable source of my acquaintance is there any mention of al-Manẓarī's operations against the Portuguese before 1495. [2]

As regards the chronogram, one may feel that it cannot be lightly dismissed since it represents a strong and possibly ancient tradition. But is the form *TFĀḤT* correct, and does it go back much beyond the beginning of the eighteenth century, if indeed so far? [3] To the second of these questions, one may reply that there is no evidence that it does. Since there is a general tendency to assign, not always correctly, a post-1492 dating to the Granadan phase of emigration, the date which it embodies—889/1484—may well commend itself to champions of the principle *difficilior, ergo potior*. On the other hand, it would be highly imprudent to reject the evidence of our oldest datable sources, Leo and Fāsī, whose knowledge of Tetuan and its inhabitants was the fruit of personal experience. Furthermore, the apparent absence of any mention of al-Manẓarī in the field against the Portuguese before 1495 is strange, especially if it implies an eleven year period of military inactivity. [4] A fourth date frequently quoted in European works, usually on Cour's authority, is 892/1487, but since the date is nowhere, to my knowledge, substantiated by the evidence of any primary source, it cannot be accepted as fact. [5]

III

In whatever other respects the chroniclers and historians of Tetuan may conflict with one another, there is at least one point on which

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[1] We have concrete proof of Andalusian refugees in North Morocco in 896/1491, but whether they were connected with Tetuan one cannot say. (M. J. Müller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der westlichen Araber*, I [München, 1866], 42-44).

[2] Cf. also D. López, in Peres and Cerdeira, *op. cit.*, III, 539.

[3] See *supra*, p. 393, n. 3.

[4] See also my comments p. 393, n. 4.

[5] Cour, *op. cit.*, 77-78. Cf. *EI*, *loc. cit.* Cour accepts that Tetuan was deserted for ninety years. Does he accept its destruction in 1400/802-3 and reckon in

they agree. All concur in associating the work of reconstruction with a certain Granadan *ra'īs* whose *nisba* was al-Manẓarī, [1] and whose *ism* and *kunya* may, despite the variant, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Alī, [2] be quite confidently accepted as Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī. Of this person's background, prior to his appearance in the Maghrib, next to nothing is known with any certainty, and indeed there are surprisingly few tangible facts to acquaint us with anything but the military aspect of his subsequent career. Apparently a native of Baza, al-Manẓarī took an active part in the military operations which finally lost Islam its last strongholds in the Granadan kingdom. [3] Beyond the fact of his eventual emigration to Morocco, nothing more can be said for certain of his Andalusian background. The assertion that his *nisba* derives from a fortified place called al-Manẓar located in the vicinity of Granada, while not improbable, is as likely as not a late a priori assumption on the part of Ruhūnī. [4] Into a somewhat similar category falls the affirmation that al-Manẓarī's Granadan family were of Zanātan stock originating from Ghumāra. [5] Finally, the suggestion that the man is to be identified with a certain Muḥammad b. Ḥasan 'Alī, otherwise known by the Spaniards as "el Veterano," who, after the surrender of Baza in 1489, sought leave from Ferdinand to cross to Africa with his arms and a troop of cavalry, is a hypothesis developed from a process of reasoning which is too unsound to merit serious consideration. [6] The exact date of his arrival in Morocco, like that of the reconstruction of Tetuan, must be regarded as uncertain.

Initially, the Andalusian colony at Tetuan seems to have comprised only a fraction of its subsequent strength. Until the appearance of Dāwūd's history, the only figures to which there was ready access

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hijra years, thus arriving at 892? Carranza suggests that al-Manẓarī emigrated following the surrender of Baza, December 1489, but this date rests on his identification of al-Manẓarī. (See *infra*).

[1] This is the classical transcription. In the vernacular the ẓ becomes ḍ, hence *al-Manḍarī* and its variations.

[2] Skīraj in *'Umda tr.*, 28.

[3] Cf. *Sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc* (hereafter abbreviated to *SIHM*), ed. H. de Castries and others, 1905-, 1*re Série*, *Espagne*, I, 97, n. 5.

[4] *Apud* Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 107. There were probably several places of this name. Cf. F. J. Simonet, *Descripcion del Reino de Granada* (Madrid, 1860), 212. The *nisba* al-Manẓarī occurs in Granadan documents contained in L. Seco de Lucena, *Documentos arábigo-granadinos* (Madrid, 1961), 31, 66 (Ar. text).

[5] Carranza, *op. cit.*, 94. See *supra*, p. 388, n. 1.

[6] *Ibid.*, 94-95.

were those of Leo and Marmol. To these we can now add those offered by the Arabic sources available to Dāwūd. As precisely as the manner in which he dates the reconstruction of the town, Fāsī puts the size of the founder group at forty-six men and ten women. [1] Between this figure and that embodied in two further verses of the "*kunnāsh qadīm*" [2] there is a difference of one man and eight women:

> The number of dedicated men was *mīm* [40] and *ẓā'* [7]—no more, and the number of women the points of the *yā'* [2]. These persons laid the foundations. [3]

Other figures supplied by the author of the *Anonymous Manuscript* and Skīraj, are, respectively, forty households and eighty individuals. [4] While no objective control of any of these figures is possible, it may nevertheless be observed that those of our most credible source have the merit of not representing a conveniently round number. The same may be said of those contained in the verses. The *Anonymous Manuscript*, on the other hand, has the demerit of yielding a figure which is not only a round number, but which is frequently used in Morocco to denote nothing more than an indeterminate group of moderate aggregate. [5] As regards the last figure of eighty individuals, one need hardly reiterate that the uncorroborated evidence of Skīraj should be viewed with caution. The point is not, in any case, of major importance since the essence of the matter is that the original number of inhabitants could only be computed in multiples of ten. Such an evaluation is consistent with what might be expected of a small advance group of Granadan militia whose principal concern, at this stage, must have been to assess their prospects of life and livelihood, and to create the physical conditions of security before committing their wives and families to the uncertainties of exile.

According to Fāsī, it was through the good offices of the Sharīf ʿAlī b. Rāshid al-ʿAlamī, "amir of the Jabal [ʿAlam] and builder of Shafshāwan (Xauen)" that they came to settle on the site of Tetuan. [6] After disembarking at the Wadi Martīl, he relates, they dispersed in the mountain villages of the hinterland, and then established contact with Ibn Rāshid. The substance of this last sentence is also

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[1] Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 86. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] Dāwūd misinterprets "the points of *yā'*" as "*yā'*" thus bringing the number of women to ten.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] See my comments in *BSOAS* (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*), XXIII (1960), 143.

[6] Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 90.

contained in the *Anonymous Manuscript*. [1] The author does, however, add certain details which make it clear that, for him, it was Ibn Rāshid from whom the Andalusians sought permission to restore Tetuan and to whom they subsequently turned for help in the face of local opposition. No mention of this role which these accounts assign to Ibn Rāshid is to be found either in Leo or Marmol. For the latter, it was the ruler of Fez to whom al-Manẓarī addressed himself. "Supplico al rey de Fez," he remarks briefly, "le hiziesse merced de le dexar fortalescar y poblar aquella ciudad . . ." [2] It is also around this ruler that the somewhat more detailed accounts of the nineteenth-century historians revolve. The author of the *Istiqṣā'* merely confines himself to repeating the version of Castellanos which derives from an unspecified source. [3] According to this, the first step taken by the emigrants was to seek out the Sultan of Fez, in order to beg hospitality and land on which to build a town as a protection against the turbulent tribes of the Rīf. The Sultan gladly acceded to the request and appointed al-Manẓarī leader and governor of the place. Skīraj, as reported by Dāwūd, has it that when the emigrants began to build on the site of old Tetuan, they were faced with local opposition. [4] They therefore took their case before the amir of the day, who pleaded shortage of money. He did, however, permit the nazir of the Qarawīyīn to make them a loan from *ḥabs* funds, whereupon they were granted an advance of 40 *qinṭār*s or 40,000 *mithqāl*s. [5] The last two sentences are far from explicit, and Dāwūd's use of oratio obliqua, in which possibility of abridgment cannot be discounted, is regrettable in the light of what purports to be a verbatim version—presented by Ruhūnī—of the situation as recounted by Skīraj. The arrival of the emigrants once mentioned, the text runs as follows:

> They began to build their dwellings in the quarter known as al-Balad. The people of the *qabīlat Banī Ḥuẓmar* opposed them, claiming that the land belonged to them and served as pasture for their flocks. They therefore submitted their differences to the judgement of the reigning prince, who ordained that the land be acquired for 40,000 *mithqāl*s. This question, together with the construction of the walls, he placed in the hands of his *ʿāmil* in Shafshāwan, Sīdī ʿAlī ibn Rāshid al-ʿAlamī who delegated his functions to the heroic . . . al-Manẓarī . . . [6]

[1] *Ibid.*, 90, 97-98.
[2] *Op. cit.*, II, f°. 131, col. 1.
[3] *Istiqṣā'*, IV, 124-125. Cf. Castellanos. *op. cit.*, 23.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 89.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *ʿUmda tr.*, 27-28.

Even if allowance be made for the fact that the opposition of the Banū Ḥuzmar is mentioned elsewhere in Dāwūd's history, and similarly attributed by him to Skīraj, [1] there nevertheless remain points of difference between the two presentations which are obvious enough to require no demonstration. Whatever view may be taken of Ruhūnī's version, it certainly clarifies the two comparatively inexplicit sentences in Dāwūd's reported account; more specifically, we are told the reason, or a principal reason, for the visit to Fez, and likewise the reason, or again a principal reason, for the financial aspect of the affair. The loan from the Qarawīyīn mentioned in the one version and conspicuously absent from the other is puzzling, since it can safely be assumed that in utilizing the *Nuẓha*, both Dāwūd and Ruhūnī were served by one and the same manuscript. [2] The omission of the detail by Dāwūd would be understandable since what he writes is evidently a précis in oratio obliqua; it is less so in the case of Ruhūnī who—from the Spanish translation of his work, at any rate—appears to quote Skīraj verbatim. Whether he does so in fact, and that in extenso, is open to doubt, if account also be taken of the absence in Ruhūnī of certain other details recorded by Dāwūd and attributed by him to Skīraj. Clearly, the question can only be decided by inspection of the original manuscript of the *Nuẓha*; but, until this becomes available, the fact that differences in the two versions reside in omissions, rather than contradictions, gives us every reason to suspect that they are both selective and are, in fact, complementary to one another.

The tribes with whom the Andalusians are said to have come into conflict are, as noted by Skīraj, the Banū Ḥuzmar [3] or, as indicated by his anonymous predecessor, the Banū Ṣāliḥ and the Banū Sālim. [4] Their opposition seems to have been intense, for Fāsī goes so far as to say that they appealed for Christian assistance against the intruders.[5] Since no mention of such an appeal is made by other Arabic writers, one wonders whether later chroniclers have chosen to ignore what, in the conditions of their time, seemed to them a most unpalatable, or even unacceptable, aspect of the conflict. However that may be, we are left in no doubt that constant skirmishes, in which the policy

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[1] *Op. cit.*, 97.
[2] See Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 48-49.
[3] *Ibid.*, 97.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*

of the tribal raiders appears to have been the systematic demolition of the nascent town, presented such a serious obstacle to building operations that the Andalusians were compelled to seek outside assistance. According to the *Anonymous Manuscript*, it was Ibn Rāshid to whom al-Manẓarī addressed himself, and who responded by raising a troop of 400 horse from the tribes of the Rīf to protect the colony. [1] Reference to a defensive force is also found in Skīraj, but the details are somewhat different in that this force was supplied by the Sultan after the negotiations in Fez and was made up of forty *aʿyān*—in whatever sense this might be interpreted—of Fez and forty Rīfans. [2]

With the possible exception of certain numerical details, which fit too snugly into stereotyped moulds for them to be taken too literally, none of the foregoing data conflicts with ascertainable historical fact or probability. That the reconstruction of Tetuan was more than the comparatively effortless outcome of independent action on the part of a small group of Granadan emigrants is abundantly clear. It is equally clear that, without effective material and moral support, the undertaking must surely have failed. To suspect a problem of choice between Ibn Rāshid and the Waṭṭāsid ruler as the source of such support will, perhaps, be the first reaction of those unfamiliar with the political situation in North Morocco towards the end of the fifteenth century. Upon closer acquaintance with the background, the existence of such a problem will be doubted.

Let us begin by considering the position of Ibn Rāshid and the role of Xauen. With the occupation of Ceuta in 1415, the Portuguese succeeded in establishing a foothold in North Morocco which they maintained and consolidated by the capture of Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr (1458), Arzila (1471), Tangier (1471), and other coastal towns. [3] From these bases on the littoral, their expeditions penetrated as much as fifty miles inland. They were by no means met with universal opposition, for, amongst tribes held in the vassalage of powerful local overlords of sharifian family or pretensions, there was much dissatisfaction with the impositions of their masters. The discontented and rebellious were not, therefore, altogether dismayed at the advent of the Portuguese, while the *shurafāʾ*, for their part, saw in the jihad against the

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[1] *Ibid.*, 97-98.

[2] *Ibid.*, 97. The figure forty is probably not intended as an exact figure. See *supra*, p. 397, n. 5.

[3] On the general background, see *EI*, *loc. cit.*; Cour, *op. cit.*, 58-72; Terrasse, *op. cit.*, II, 111 f.; D. A. Yebbur, *Los Ber-Rached de Chefchauen* (Tetuan, 1953).

Christian invader an excellent opportunity to restore their positions and make good their losses, and to do so with the official approval and support of Fez, as far as that was possible or practicable. It was in circumstances such as these that Abū 'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Abī Muḥammad, a sharif of the Jabal ʿAlam, proclaimed himself amir and leader of the jihad and laid the foundations, or possibly undertook the restoration, of Xauen, which he planned as a haven of refuge and center of resistance against the Portuguese circa 876/1471-2. Treacherously murdered by the inhabitants of Kharrūb in concert with their Portuguese allies, he was succeeded by his cousin, ʿAlī b. Rāshid, who constructed and fortified the town on new foundations. [1]

In what capacity, or on what authority, Ibn Rāshid applied himself to this undertaking, the absence of explicit texts prevents us from saying with absolute certainty. Nor is it clear in what sense we are to understand the term "amir" as applied either to himself or to his predecessor. His position vis-à-vis the Waṭṭāsid is perhaps most correctly described as that of the Sultan's amil, [2] for we have to do with a family of great local power and prestige, virtually independent, but apparently enjoying some legitimate basis for their authority in Fez.

In the light of what we know of the life and times of the new master of Jabal ʿAlam, the testimony of those who present him as the dominant personality behind the restoration of Tetuan carries conviction. In the first place, a distinct Andalusian bias runs through the history of his personal and domestic life. A veteran of the Granadan campaigns, he was married to a woman whom we know as Lālla Zahra, an Andalusian *renegada* from Vejer de la Frontera. [3] The nature of the family circle, which developed around his union with Lālla Zahra, is easily assessed. In his son and successor, the Spanish-speaking hispanophile, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, we readily detect the influence of a Spanish mother—an influence which is also reflected in the character and talents of his daughter ʿĀ'isha—the politically renowned Sitt al-Ḥurra—through whom he chose to ally his family with the house of the Granadan al-Manẓarī. [4] The already pronounced

[1] *Istiqṣā'*, IV, 121 (quoting Fāsī's *Mir'āt*); cf. Cour, *op. cit.*, 72.

[2] *ʿUmda tr.*, 28.

[3] R. Ricard, "Moulay Ibrahim, caïd de Chechaouen" in *SIHM*, 1*re Sér.* Portugal, III, 146-147.

[4] After prolonged research into the confused and confusing family tree, I agree with Dāwūd (*op. cit.*, 114, 118) that *Sitt al-Ḥurra* was married, not to Abū 'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī, as commonly supposed, but to his grandson, second qaid of Tetuan, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad.

Andalusian tone of the household can only have been heightened by the arrival, in due course, of Lālla Zahra's brother, Martin Fernandez —in aftertimes, Martinho Elche, of the Portuguese sources—and various other members of his family. [1] Impressed by the respect shown to his sister and her offspring, or rather—Bernardo Rodrigues is more specific—influenced by the favors accorded his nephew, Ibrāhīm, Martin decided to throw in his lot with the accommodating sharif and, taking the name 'Alī Fernando, embraced the Islamic faith. [2] In addition to the family and relatives of Ibn Rāshid, Xauen also sheltered what must have been a substantial Andalusian community encouraged and supported by the sharif, and it is scarcely surprising that it should have assumed the aspect of a town in the Alpujarras, an aspect which it still retains and which imparts to it the most purely Hispanic appearance of any town in Morocco today. [3]

Whatever the personal sentiments or predilections of Ibn Rāshid, it requires no unusual depth of insight to recognize the expediency of his interest in the fortunes of such Andalusians as might be persuaded of the need to withdraw to Morocco. In his efforts to consolidate his position in the Rīf, the support of Andalusian expatriates would count for more than the uncertain prospects of support from fickle tribes, or a Fez committed to trucial inactivity. [4] The military qualities and experience of the Andalusians, [5] combined with a desire for retaliation and an acute awareness of the threat of further Christian penetration in the Maghrib, would make them a valuable asset.

For their part, the Andalusians must have had as great a need of Ibn Rāshid as he of them. The lot of the Andalusian immigrant could be hard. This much is clear enough from the contents of a document dating back to 896/1491, issued as an authoritative response to the declared grievances of an unspecified group of expatriates. [6] This document reveals complaints of indifference to their straitened circumstances, of a general lack of personal security restricting freedom of movement in the country, and the difficulties of obtaining the means of subsistence. It cannot be supposed that the position of al-Manẓarī and such of his fellow-immigrants as lacked the security

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[1] Ricard, *op. cit.*, 147.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] See plate XXVII.
[4] See Cour, *op. cit.*, 71, 81-82.
[5] These were highly valued in Morocco.
[6] Müller, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*



General view of Xauen (Shafshāwan)

which bonds of relationship, or other connections with local tribes, might afford, could, in the ordinary course of events, have been any more favorable. On the contrary, it is likely to have been less so. It is axiomatic that, beyond the towns and cities, the position of the unprotected outsider who found himself in the midst of a tribal society, by nature suspicious and inordinately jealous of its rights, could be precarious in the extreme. It is, therefore, not difficult to assess local tribal reactions to an alien group aspiring to survival as an independent community on the site of a town which had reverted to the rural domain.

As we have already seen, there are, in fact, specific reports of conflict, and these, no less than the alleged cause of conflict, namely, the infringement of tribal territorial rights, may be regarded as wholly consistent with probability. Indeed, a parallel situation is observable in the circumstances surrounding the foundation of the Algerian town of Blida which, like Tetuan, owes its existence to a colony of Andalusian refugees. [1] Compelled by tribal hostility to migrate from the ancient site of Tipasa, which they had attempted to colonize about the year 1533, the community moved to the banks of the Wadi Rummām, so as to profit the more effectively from the good offices of the then most influential personage of the region, Sidi Aḥmad al-Kabīr. The prestige of this widely venerated marabout might have sufficed to check all active expression of local antipathy to the intruders, had not the resentment of the neighboring Banū Abī 'l-Naṣā'ir at what they alleged to be an encroachment on tribal territory culminated in physical conflict with the settlers. To this problem, a final solution was reached only when the Andalusians, through the intervention of Sidi Aḥmad, were able to acquire an exclusive and undisputed title to land. This they eventually secured from the tribe Aulād al-Sulṭān, who, though sharing the general dislike of the newcomers, felt obliged to repay the marabout for past favors and to accede to his appeal for the grant of a suitable site to his Andalusian protégés. Vis-à-vis the indigenous population, then, there appears to have been little essential difference between the respective positions of the Andalusians of Tetuan and those of Blida.

Quite apart from any question of xenophobia or rights of land, the possibility of fiscal exactions and other irksome demands, which

[1] C. Trumelet, *Blida*, I (Alger, 1887), 573-6.

could normally be expected to follow the creation of a new urban center, is unlikely to have escaped the attention of the rural population. Whether there were also the disaffected who, being aware or suspicious of an understanding between al-Manẓarī and Ibn Rāshid, saw the projected restoration of Tetuan as an attempt on the part of the latter to extend or strengthen his control over the region, we do not know. What we do know is that, whereas there is nowhere any suggestion that the aggrieved parties either sought or received any support for their case from the ruler of Xauen, we do have Fāsī's unequivocal reference to an appeal for Christian—presumably Portuguese—intervention. It is, in my view, precisely to this stage in the sequence of events that the mission to Fez is most likely to belong, because it is precisely at this point that the details supplied by the fullest accounts of this mission fall most naturally into place.

With the data derived from our sources, and a knowledge of the background, we shall, perhaps, not err too widely if we reconstruct the situation somewhat as follows. The refusal of the Granadans to withdraw from Tetuan had provoked an outbreak of hostilities which must have made it difficult enough for them to hold their ground, let alone consolidate their position. Numerically, they were at a great disadvantage and, in the long run, military experience, courage and determination could be no substitute for paucity of numbers. The colonists had thus been obliged to apply to Ibn Rāshid for reinforcements. To their frustrated neighbors, the most promising source of help in these circumstances must certainly have seemed to lie in the very enemy which the *mujāhidūn* sought to combat—the Christians. From this impasse, the only practicable avenue of escape for the Andalusians lay in the payment of compensation for the site. Held to ransom for a settlement which neither they nor, evidently, Ibn Rāshid could afford, the colonists had no alternative but to refer their case, probably after due consultation with, or on the advice of, Ibn Rāshid, to the only authority capable of lending the appropriate material and moral support. It seems improbable that we shall ever learn the details of the case which they put before the sultan, but one may assume that much was made of the dangers of militant Christianity and the strategic value of a fortified Tetuan as a bulwark against the threat of renewed encroachment on the Waṭṭāsid realm. [1] Here, it could be argued, was an excellent opportun-

[1] It may be noted that after the capture of Melilla in 1497, the deserted but strategic site of Tāzūṭā was assigned to a Granadan captain who colonized it

ity for the ruler to avail himself of his truce with the Portuguese to strengthen his defenses. Moreover, rich prizes could be won which would more than offset any initial outlay on the undertaking. Whatever their submissions, they are of little account; the outcome was in their favor. Their cause was formally approved, and the mission returned with a military detachment and the wherewithal to conclude a settlement with the tribal plaintiffs.

IV

From small beginnings, the Andalusian population of Tetuan must soon have assumed more ample proportions. Each new phase in the series of upheavals which bedevilled Spain for more than a century must surely have contributed to its growth. Only a few years after the fall of Granada, for instance, we hear of Mudejares, exasperated by Christian efforts to suppress religious freedom, departing for Tetuan and surrounding areas from Ronda, Baza, Muchar and Motril. [1] Writing in the early years of the sixteenth century, Leo, for his part, speaks of Tetuan's force of three hundred horses, "huomini tutti granatini & il fiore di granata," [2] while Marmol in his day has this to say of the town and its Andalusian inhabitants: [3]

> La fortaleza de la ciudad cõsiste en la gente, porque ay de ordinario dentro quatrocientos de a cavallo buena gente de guerra, y mil y quinientos peones escopeteros y vallesteros, y despues que los Moros del reyno de Granada se rebelarõ ay muchos mas.

If we are to credit a statement that, in the early years of the seventeenth century, Tetuan "had 800 good houses and a fleet which was the scourge of the 'Gut of Gibraltar'," [4] it is a reasonable inference that by that time the total number of inhabitants stood at not less than 5,000 souls. Since by the beginning of the seventeenth century the town was inhabited by an increasingly heterogeneous population, such an estimate can tell us nothing of the rate and manner of growth —or otherwise—of the Andalusian element. If tolerably accurate, however, it can be usefully compared with a perfectly plausible assessment which we have for the latter part of the seventeenth century.

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with Andalusians (Marmol, *op. cit.*, II, f°. 156, col. 3. Cf. Leo, *op. cit.*, 52 F.).

[1] *K. nubdhat al-ʿaṣr* (Anon.). Ed. and tr. A. Bustani and C. Quiros, (Larache, 1940), p. 48/tr. 56.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 49A.

[3] *Op. cit.*, II, f°. 131, col. 4.

[4] Hakluyt Society edition of J. Pory's translation of Leo (London, 1896), 632, n. 138.

"Les Habitans de Tetoüan," writes Pidou de St. Olon, "qu'on fait monter à plus de quinze mille, se disent Andalous, & parlent presque tous Espagnol . . ." [1] For such a dramatic increase in population as the comparison implies, an explanation is not far to seek. Towards the end of 1609, Spain began to implement the policy of general expulsion which was finally adopted as the definitive solution to the Morisco problem. By the middle of 1610, some 40,000 Moriscos, according to a contemporary Spanish report, were concentrated in Tetuan and region. [2] While it cannot, for a number of reasons, be supposed that Tetuan was the ultimate destination, or even the ultimate goal, of so numerous a body of refugees, it is nevertheless fairly certain that the exodus from Spain accounted for a substantial increase in population. This much seems to be borne out not only by the remarks of St. Olon, but also by the account which a Moroccan Jewish source gives of a fine imposed on the Tetuanese, in December 1610, by Mawlāy al-Shaikh. [3] For the purposes of this exaction the population was broken down into three groups, namely, Muslims, Andalusians and Jews, who were required to pay, respectively, 100,000, 150,000 and 10,000 *ūqiya*s. It is unfortunate that we have no knowledge of the principle on which each of these three amounts was assessed, for if the sum demanded of the Andalusians—who in this context can only be the Moriscos [4]—could be regarded as a per capita assessment, it would follow that they were sufficiently numerous to form the majority of Tetuan's inhabitants. Whether this was the case or not, we are nevertheless left with the impression that the newcomers constituted an important and sizeable section of the population, of whom it could soon be said that they had "made it [Tetuan] of a dunghill a pleasant and fruitfull place." [5] In support of this impression, it remains only to take into consideration the contribution which the Moriscos made to the physical expansion of the town.

From the time of its reconstruction by al-Manẓarī and his followers, Tetuan had been gradually expanding. The primitive urban unit known as al-Balad (vulg. *Blād*)—the nucleus of the present Ḥaumat

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[1] *État présent . . . du Maroc* (Paris, 1694), 12.

[2] *SIHM*, 1*re Sér.*, *Pays-Bas*, V, vi (*Lettre du Marquis de Villa Real*, gouverneur de Ceuta).

[3] G. Vajda, *Recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocaines* (Paris, 1951), 23.

[4] The Moriscos were linguistically and culturally distinct from the indigenous population. Cf. J. D. Latham, "Towards a study of Andalusian immigration," etc. in *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1957, 225-26, 230.

[5] *SIHM*, *Ire Sér.*, *Angleterre*, III, 56. (Harrison, *Relation*, 1627.)

al-Balad—seems to have been a comparatively small but well defended stronghold. Described as "a quadrangular town with its *qaṣaba* in the [Southwest] corner," it had, according to Fāsī, three gates and was well fortified with a wall seven cubits thick around which ran a second wall surrounded by trenches. [1] Before the middle of the sixteenth century, a second *qaṣaba* had been constructed on Jabal Darsa [2] and, from all accounts, work had already begun on an extension of the city wall to incorporate the increasingly populous southern suburb—the so-called "lower suburb," or al-Rabaḍ al-Asfal (vulg. *Rbāṭ es-Seflī*)—within the boundaries of the expanding urban organism. [3] Whether or not this development was largely a consequence of Andalusian immigration, as one might be inclined to suspect, is a question to which the silence of our sources permits no positive answer. During the same period, the "upper suburb," or al-Rabaḍ al-Aʿlā, situated to the north beneath Jabal Darsa, seems to have been extending westwards before finally branching out into the two great districts of al-ʿUyūn (vulg. *ʿAyūn*) and al-Ṭrankāt (vulg. *Ṭrankāts*). [4] The development and expansion of the first is closely associated with the settlement of the Moriscos in that area, who were responsible for the emergence of a new quarter located at the upper end of al-ʿUyūn and called al-Sāniya, or also more commonly at that period, Rabaḍ al-Andalus. [5] Also attributed to the Moriscos, and rightly so, if we are to judge by the Spanish origin of the name [6] and the spirit of the Renaissance so evident in its street plan, [7] is the accretion, also to the West, of the Ḥaumat al-Ṭrankāt. [8]

With the expulsion of the Moriscos, Andalusian immigration came to an end. The general picture of its history and its vital significance for the history of Tetuan will be clear enough. On the other hand, with serious gaps in our knowledge which may never be bridged, important matters of detail remain irritatingly problematical. Certain

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[1] Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 91. Parts of the *qaṣaba* wall can still be seen in Sūq al-Ḥūt al-Qadīm, Gharsa al-Kabīra and al-Ṣabbāghīn.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, 100-101.

[4] *Ibid.*, 101.

[5] *Ibid.*, 102. Cf. *ʿUmda tr.* 54, according to which both al-ʿUyūn and al-Sāniya took the name Rabaḍ al-Andalus.

[6] Beaussier derives Ṭrankāt from the Spanish *trinquete*. It may, however, be a sound feminine plural of the Spanish *tranca*.

[7] Cf. Latham, *op. cit.*, 214 and n. 79.

[8] Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, 102, 103, 182. Ṭrankāt is mentioned in a document dated 1032/1622-3 (*ibid.*, 284).

of these may prove less so once we have the opportunity of examining the original texts of Dāwūd's manuscript sources, whose apparent importance leads one to express the hope that their publication will be undertaken and that without too much delay. [1]

[1] For assistance with the preparation of the map I am indebted to Professor Crowe and his staff of the Department of Geography, University of Manchester.

J. D. LATHAM
University of Manchester

TETUAN
THE ARAB TOWN



FROM THE S. CORNER OF SŪQ AL-ḤŪT DĀWŪD TRACES THE ORIGINAL CITY WALL NORTHWARDS, FIRST, TO QAWS AL-SAFFĀJĪN, THE ARCH DIVIDING THE OLD CITY FROM G. AL-KABĪRA, AND THEN BEYOND TO THE VICINITY OF B. AL-MAQĀBIR; EASTWARDS TOWARDS B. AL-JIYĀF; SOUTHWARDS ACROSS THE COMMENCEMENT OF SAL. SĪ. SAʿĪDĪ AND BEHIND PROPERTY SITUATED E. OF J. AL-KABĪR; WESTWARDS PAST ZĀWIYAT SĪ. B. NĀṢIR TO SĀQIYA AL-FAWQĪYA AND BACK TO THE POINT OF DEPARTURE.

THE THREE GATES ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE STOOD (1) ON THE SITE OF AN ARCH MARKING THE COMMENCEMENT OF SAL. SĪ. SAʿĪDĪ (2) BESIDE Z. SĪ. B. NĀSIR (3) EITHER BETWEEN ṢAYYĀGHĪN AND KHARRĀZĪN OR ON THE SITE OF Q. AL-SAFFĀJĪN.

AL-RABAḌ AL-AʿLĀ COMPRISED AL-SŪQ AL-FAWQĪ, KHARRĀZĪN, DABBĀGHĪN, ZANQAT AL-MUQADDAM AND AL-ṬĀLIʿA.

From map by J. HAZRA

ALESSANDRO IL MACEDONE, KOTYS L'ODRYSIO E AL-BĪRŪNĪ

DI

G. LEVI DELLA VIDA

Il capitolo sul cristallo di rocca (*billaur*) nel *Kitāb al-jamāhir fī 'l-jawāhir* di al-Bīrūnī, 181-89 nell'edizione Krenkow (Hyderabad 1355), [1] è conosciuto anche fuori del gruppo specialistico degli arabisti grazie alla traduzione dottamente annotata datane da Paul Kahle molti anni fa, prima che ne fosse pubblicata l'edizione, di su due manoscritti. [2] Dopo una diffusa descrizione delle diverse qualità di cristallo, delle località dei suoi giacimenti, degli usi che se ne fanno (con abbondanti citazioni di versi) al-Bīrūnī riferisce varie storie nelle quali ha parte il cristallo (*Fī dhikr akhbār fī 'l-billaur*, 186-89; trad., 337-43): nella prima di esse si racconta di un padiglione (*qubba*) di cristallo posseduto dall'imperatore Nerone (così va letto naturalmente anche nell'edizione pagine 186, linea 14 e 187, linea 8 in luogo di *Iyārūn*), il quale era stato ammonito da un filosofo al suo seguito che esso gli era piuttosto di danno che di vantaggio, giacché se l'avesse perduto non sarebbe riuscito a procurarsene un altro simile, e ne sarebbe rimasto profondamente afflitto; il che infatti avvenne. [3]

Al-Bīrūnī menziona come sua fonte Plutarco nel „Libro dell'ira"; [4] e infatti l'aneddoto compare in uno dei *Moralia* plutarchei, περὶ

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[1] *GAL*, I, 476, II, Suppl. III, 874, 1242. La bibliografia recente su al-Bīrūnī può vedersi nell'articolo di J. Boilot in *EI*², I, 1236.

[2] „Bergkrystall, Glass und Glassflüsse bei Bērūnī", *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XC (1936), 322-56 (la sezione sul cristallo di rocca, 325-43).

[3] Lo stesso testo è tradotto anche da Mohamed Jahia Haschmi, *Die Quellen des Steinbuches des Bērūnī* (Diss. Bonn, 1935), 39; essendo la dissertazione stata composta per suggerimento e sotto la direzione del prof. Kahle, le due traduzioni sono quasi identiche; in ambedue la proposizione *fa-innahā idhā faqadtahā lam ta'man an yaᶜūzaka al-fauẓ bi-mithlihā* (p. 186, linea 17-18 dell'edizione) è tradotta poco felicemente „wenn sie für dich verloren ist, so bist du nicht sicher, dass du nicht das Bedürfnis hast, eine ähnliche zu besitzen" (Haschmi); „wenn du sie verlierst, so bist du nicht sicher, dass du den Wunsch haben wirst, dir eine ähnliche zu verschaffen" (Kahle); mentre è ovvio che significa „se la perderai, non sarai sicuro di riuscire a ottenerne una eguale." È quasi superfluo rilevare che *tanajiuḥ* di Kahle va corretto, coll'edizione linea 16, in *tabajjuḥuhu*.

[4] *Kitāb al-ghaḍab*. Nell'edizione *al-ghaṣb* è evidente errore tipografico, ripetuto peraltro nell'indice p. 40b.

ἀοργησίας (*De ira cohibenda*), 13 (p. 146 C), peraltro in forma alquanto più breve e, circostanza notevole, senza menzione del cristallo come materia del padiglione. [1]

Il periodo che segue [2] è stato fraiteso da Kahle (Haschmi non lo traduce): un al-Khātam al-Ismāʿīlī autore di un racconto non è mai esistito, e *khātam* deve intendersi come nome comune, „anello"; *Ismāʿīlī*, o anche *Ismāʿīl*, è il nome che fu dato a uno smeraldo di straordinaria grandezza e purezza donato dal califfo al-Mahdī a suo figlio Hārūn (al-Rashīd), mentre donava all'altro figlio Mūsā (al-Hādī) un rubino altrettanto splendido nominato *al-Jabal*, „la Montagna." *Man ṭālaʿa ḥadīth al-khātam al-ismāʿīlī* significa dunque „chi consideri attentamente la storia dell'anello *ismāʿīlī*," ossia la storia che al-Bīrūnī ha narrata in un luogo precedente del suo libro (p. 61, linea 18-62 penult.): al-Hādī, succeduto al padre nel califfato, manda ordine perentorio a Hārūn di consegnargli l'Ismāʿīlī, ed egli, fingendo di consentire e di voler portarglielo in persona, giunto a metà del ponte sul Tigri a Bagdad lo getta nel fiume. Divenuto poi califfo egli stesso, comanda di ripescarlo; dopo molti tentativi riusciti vani, uno dei sommozzatori (*ghauwāṣūn*) suggerisce che dal punto preciso del ponte donde Hārūn aveva gettato l'anello si getti una pallottola di argilla delle stesse dimensioni e dello stesso peso di questo, e si segua l'inclinazione che essa compirà affondando nella corrente: nel punto del fondo dove andò a posarsi fu effettivamente ritrovato l'Ismāʿīlī (cf. anche p. 165, linea 8). L'intento di al-Bīrūnī è dunque quello di far notare come, poiché fu possibile determinare il luogo preciso dell'affondamento di un oggetto così minuto come l'anello di al-Rashīd, è da stupirsi che a Nerone non sia riuscito di recuperare il padiglione, di dimensioni tanto maggiori; e ciò benché avesse presso di sé (è questo il significato di *maʿa mā kāna maʿahu*, p. 186, linea 1, e non già „zusammen mit denen, die bei ihm waren") i più provetti ingegneri e maestri di artifici meccanici.

Da questa osservazione sull'alto grado delle cognizioni di meccanica idraulica degli antichi al-Bīrūnī è indotto a raccontare (p. 187, linea 2-7, Kahle p. 338-9, Haschmi p. 37-8) la nota storia dell'accorgimento

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[1] Della presenza dell'aneddoto in altre fonti letterarie arabe e siriache e delle questioni che ne sorgono sarà detto più avanti.

[2] „Und wer den Bericht von al-Khātam al-Ismāʿīlī studiert, der wundert sich über die Unfähigkeit des Nero, die Kuppel herauszubringen, zusammen mit denen, die bei ihm waren von den hervorragendsten der Ingenieure und der Kenner der Tricke, die bekannt sind als die mechanischen."

usato da Archimede per determinare la proporzione di oro e di argento nella corona di Hierone di Siracusa, [1] storia che altrimenti non si vedrebbe in che relazione potesse stare coll'argomento di cui sta discorrendo: si tratta dunque di una digressione strettamente tecnica, che interrompe la serie degli aneddoti relativi al cristallo di rocca. Questa serie riprende ora con un secondo aneddoto (p. 187, linea 7-11, Kahle p. 339) desunto anch'esso dalla tradizione della antichità classica, senza tuttavia che ne sia indicata la fonte:

> Da un dolore simile a quello di Nerone si guardò Alessandro [2] quando gli furono donati dei vasi di cristallo preziosi: li ammirò, ma poi ordinò che fossero spezzati. Essendoglisi fatta osservazione su ciò, rispose: 'io sapevo che essi sarebbero stati rotti uno dopo l'altro per mano dei miei servi, e ogni volta l'ira mi avrebbe sconvolto: così in una volta sola ho sollevato me stesso da (ciò che mi sarebbe occorso) tutte quelle volte, e ho sollevato essi (ossia i servi) da me (ossia dagli effetti della mia ira)'. [3]

Di questo aneddoto [4] Kahle afferma che né egli stesso né il classicista K. Kalbfleisch da lui consultato hanno potuto trovare la fonte;

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[1] Non è qui il luogo di discutere se abbia o no fondamento l'attribuzione che al-Bīrūnī fa di questa storia a Menelao (di Alessandria) in un suo libro sul peso specifico che è perduto nell'originale ma che gli Arabi conobbero in traduzione.

[2] *'an mithl asaf Iyārōn* (l. *Nērōn*) *iḥtarasa al-Iskandar*. La traduzione di Kahle: „Als Parallele zum Kummer des Nero: Alexander nahm sich in Acht" non rende esattamente il senso del testo.

[3] Che i servi colpevoli della rottura di stoviglie e cristallerie corrano grave pericolo di subire dolorosamente le conseguenze dell'ira dei loro padroni era senza dubbio già noto anche prima che l'affermasse autorevolmente Alessandro Magno, e ha continuato a esser noto fino ai nostri giorni; che talora si sia provveduto a proteggerli contro quel pericolo risulta, almeno per l'Oriente islamico del secolo VIII/XIV (né è improbabile che alcunché di simile si riscontri in altri luoghi e tempi), da ciò che Ibn Baṭṭūṭa racconta di un waqf istituito a Damasco per ripagare il prezzo del vasellame rotto inavvertitamente dagli schiavi (I, 238-39, ed. Defrémery-Sanguinetti; I, 75, Cairo, 1322 H.; I, 149, trad. H. A. R. Gibb; pp. 29-30 della traduzione antologica di F. Gabrieli, Firenze 1961, il quale ha avuto la bontà di segnalarmi il passo).

[4] Si tralasciano, perché non pertinenti all'oggetto del presente studio, gli aneddoti che seguono. Sia peraltro consentito osservare che nel primo di essi (p. 187, linea 11-12, Kahle, p. 399) „al-'Ibādī" non è, come parrebbe dalla traduzione, un appellativo individuale, bensì è la designazione generica di uno tra gli 'Ibād, ossia i cristiani nestoriani di al-Ḥīra sull'Eufrate, capitale in età preislamica del regno dei Banū Lakhm, i quali dopo l'avvento dell'Islam emigrarono in massima parte nella vicina Kūfa. Sembra che si attribuissero loro atti e detti improntati sia a stupida goffaggine sia ad astuzia buffonesca analoghi a quelli attribuiti a Juḥā, Naṣruddīn Khōja e simili (cf. in generale F. Rosenthal, *Humor in Early Islam* (Leiden, 1956), dove tuttavia non è menzione degli 'Ibād). In un inedito frammento pergamenaceo del University Museum di Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, contenente parte di una raccolta di *nawādir* distribuite secondo

né essa era nota all'informatissimo R. Walzer allorché lo definiva „storiella sconosciuta" (p. 32[4] dello scritto citato più avanti, p. 414[1]). Eppure essa è presente in uno scritto attribuito, a ragione o a torto che sia, proprio a quello stesso Plutarco cui è fatto risalire l'aneddoto sul padiglione di Nerone: negli ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν (*Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*), p. 174 D si legge che Kotys re degli Odrysii [1] „avendogli un ospite straniero portato del vasellame di ceramica fragile e sottile, lavorato con somma abilità a incisione e a cesello, fece sì doni all'ospite, ma spezzò tutto il vasellame 'affinché' disse 'non mi avvenga per ira di punire troppo acerbamente coloro che lo rompessero.'" [2]

Nonostante alcune differenze formali, non può esservi dubbio sulla perfetta corrispondenza dei due racconti. La priorità di Kotys su Alessandro nell'impersonare il re saggio sembra assicurata dal criterio metodologico che si esprime nel detto „on ne prête qu'aux riches": mentre riuscirebbe difficile rendersi conto della degradazione fino all'oscuro sovrano di un popolo barbaro di una storia che sarebbe stata narrata originariamente del Macedone che ha riempito della propria fama la storia e la leggenda, l'opposto appare ovvio, specialmente se si tenga presente che nella tarda grecità (e ancor più nel mondo arabo) Alessandro ha finito coll'assumere la figura del „re filosofo." [3]

È da escludersi che al-Bīrūnī abbia desunto l'aneddoto direttamante dagli *Apophthegmata*. Pur prescindendo da ogni discussione (che sarebbe fuori di luogo e alla quale non sono preparato) intorno alla composizione e alla trasmissione di quest'opera, sembra certo che soltanto un esiguo numero di scritti „morali" di Plutarco, o a lui

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categorie etnico-geografiche, un capitolo acefalo conserva nella parte superstite tredici *nādira* aventi ciascuna un 'Ibādī come protagonista. A p. 342 (p. 189, linea 11, dell'edizione) deve leggersi, come nell'edizione, *idh ṣummu 'l-ḥijārati ruṭbatun*, e il senso è, naturalmente, „quando le pietre (che ora sono) dure erano (come) erba tenera."

[1] Popolazione della Tracia che ebbe un proprio regno indipendente venuto poi sotto l'egemonia della Macedonia e durato fino all'età romana. Il re Kotys, che sostenne lunghe lotte contro gli Ateniesi, morì nel 360 a.C.

[2] . . . . σκεύη ποτὲ κεραμεᾶ ξένου κομίσαντος εὔθραυστα καὶ λεπτά, πιθανῶς δὲ καὶ περιττῶς ἐργασμένα γλυφαῖς τισὶ καὶ τορείαις, τῷ μὲν ξένῳ ἔδωκε δῶρα, τὰ δὲ σκεύη πάντα συνέτριψε, 'ὅπως' εἰπὼ 'μὴ δι' ὀργὴν πικρότερον κολάκῳ τοῦς συντρίβοντας· — Perché non mi si attribuisca una conoscenza degli autori classici che purtroppo non posseggo avverto che mi sono imbattuto nella storia del re Kotys negli *Essais* di Michel de Montaigne, dove essa è narrata nel libro iii, capitolo 10. Benché ivi la fonte non sia segnalata, non è stato difficile rintracciarla.

[3] R. Walzer nello scritto citato a p. 414[1], p. 23.

attribuiti, è stato tradotto in arabo. Prima che agli Arabi, almeno tre opuscoli plutarchei sono stati noti ai Siri e sono giunti fino a noi in veste siriaca, alquanto compendiata rispetto all' originale: *De ira cohibenda* (col titolo semplificato „Intorno all'ira"); *De exercitatione* (περὶ ἀσκησεως), non conservato in greco e di dubbia autenticità; *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* (πῶς ἄν τις ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν ὀφελοῖτο);[1] di tutti tre il *Fihrist*, p. 254, linea 5-8 registra la traduzione araba (del secondo attesta esplicitamente che esiste in siriaco), e vi aggiunge quella di uno scritto sull'anima (di quello che verosimilmente ne era l'originale greco, περὶ ψυχῆς, *De anima*, non rimangono se non frammenti) e inoltre, dandole anzi il primo posto nella serie, quella dello pseudepigrafico *Placita philosophorum*;[2] altrove, p. 301, linea 5, cf. 246, linea 18-19, registra il commento di al-Rāzī al περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας (*De animae procreatione in Timaeo*), sul quale v. S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin 1936, p. 69, 73, 90 no. 7 (e cf. 90[1]). Non può naturalmente escludersi *a priori* che altri scritti plutarchei oltre a quelli registrati nel *Fihrist* siano giunti agli Arabi, ma la cosa appare poco verosimile.

D'altra parte non è possibile che fonte di al-Bīrūnī per la storia del padiglione di Nerone sia stato il testo del *De ira cohibenda* quale lo possediamo, testo che la traduzione siriaca ricalca da vicino,[3] giacché il racconto di al-Bīrūnī è molto più diffuso: ciò non è sfuggito a Kahle, il quale (p. 339[1]) propone l'ipotesi che esso dipenda da un altro degli opuscoli morali di Plutarco, περὶ ὀργῆς (*De ira*), che è perduto nell'originale, salvo un unico frammento, mentre al-Bīrūnī lo avrebbe conosciuto integralmente in traduzione araba.[4] Poco dopo

[1] R. Duval, *La littérature syriaque*, 3me éd. (Paris, 1907), 264-267; A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, 169 e note 6, 7, 8.

[2] Che per il suo contenuto doxografico ebbe larghissima diffusione tra gli Arabi (v. P. Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān*, II [Le Caire, 1942], 331-39 [Mémoires présentés à l'Institut d'Égypte, XLV]) ed è giunto fino a noi nella traduzione di Qusṭā b. Lūqā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī in *Arisṭū fī 'l-nafs* . . . [Cairo, 1954; Dirāsāt islāmīya, 16], che purtroppo non ho potuto vedere). Anche il pseudepigrafico *De fluviis* (περὶ ποταμῶν καὶ ὀρῶν ἐπονυμίας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς εὑρισκομένων) era noto agli Arabi come opera di „un altro Plutarco" (*Fihrist*, 254, linea 17-18, cf. P. Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān*, II, 71, linea 1).

[3] Sola differenza notevole è che il padiglione è esagono anziché ottagono (v. anche più avanti p. 414[2]).

[4] In questo caso il *Kitāb al-ghaḍab* del *Fihrist*, p. 254 linea 5 si riferirebbe a esso e non al *De ira cohibenda*. Senonché il *Fihrist* nel luogo citato lo registra insieme con altri due scritti dei quali esiste la traduzione siriaca, e in effetto il siriaco „Intorno all'ira" è traduzione, peraltro compendiosa, proprio del *De ira cohibenda*. Ciò senza dubbio costituisce una difficoltà ad accogliere l'ipotesi di Kahle, tuttavia non insuperabile.

l'apparizione dell'articolo di Kahle la pubblicazione di un opuscolo di al-Kindī intorno all'arte di allontanare la tristezza scoperto da H. Ritter in un manoscritto d'Istanbul [1] rivelava un'altra versione (testo p. 40-41, traduzione p. 56) dell'aneddoto neroniano, stilizzata con ampiezza molto maggiore che il testo greco-siriaco e molto vicina al testo di al-Bīrūnī, col quale in alcuni punti coincide letteralmente (in particolare nel descrivere il padiglione come fatto di cristallo). Ciò indusse Walzer a respingere l'ipotesi di Kahle e a supporre (p. 23[7]) che „al-Bīrūnī, conoscendo tanto lo scritto di al-Kindī quanto una versione orientale del trattato di Plutarco, abbia contaminato tutte e due le cose."

Ma un siffatto procedimento eclettico non sembra conforme alla abitudine di al-Bīrūnī, il quale generalmente riproduce con esattezza, dettata da scrupolo scientifico, i testi che cita; e inoltre il testo di al-Bīrūnī contiene qualche tratto che non trova riscontro né in al-Kindī né nel *De ira cohibenda* così nel testo greco come nella traduzione siriaca. [2] D'altra parte, poiché Walzer ha reso molto verosimile che l'opuscolo di al-Kindī rappresenti una traduzione appena leggermente modificata di un opuscolo di Themistio perduto, forse il περί ἀλυπίας, e poiché Themistio, vissuto più di due secoli e mezzo dopo Plutarco, non di rado „riproduce pensieri ed esempi già usati da altri filosofi" (Walzer p. 24), non è punto impossibile che egli si sia valso, per l'aneddoto su Nerone, del *De ira* plutarcheo, copiandone il testo con appena qualche variazione stilistica, mentre lo stesso testo (naturalmente in traduzione araba) sarebbe stato usato direttamente da al-Bīrūnī. [3] L'ipotesi di Kahle rimane dunque valida; e se piuttosto che il *De ira cohibenda* è stato il perduto *De ira* la fonte immediata di al-Bīrūnī per la storia del padiglione di Nerone (che dunque Plutarco

[1] H. Ritter e R. Walzer, „Studi su al-Kindī II. Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindī", *Memorie dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, Cl. sc. mor., ser. vi, vol. viii. 1 (1938).

[2] Con quest'ultima al-Bīrūnī concorda soltanto, in contrasto colle altre versioni, nel dare al padiglione forma esagonale (*musaddasa*) anziché ottagonale quale la dà il greco. Al-Kindī tace il particolare della forma, a meno che *thamīna* di p. 40 linea 14 non sia da emendarsi in *muthammana*, nel qual caso concorderebbe col greco contro il siriaco e al-Bīrūnī; ma è più probabile che corrisponda a *ghāliyat al-thaman* di al-Bīrūnī, πολυτελεία(ι) del greco.

[3] Non vi è motivo di sorprendersi delle concordanze verbali tra al-Kindī e al-Bīrūnī, giacché le traduzioni dal greco che essi riproducono provengono senza dubbio da un medesimo ambiente, la scuola dei traduttori nestoriani del sec. III/IX, dove ovviamente si aveva uniformità di lessico e di stile. Non è neppure da escludersi che lo stesso traduttore abbia tradotto tanto Themistio (se di lui si tratta) quanto Plutarco.

avrebbe ripetuta, con qualche variante, in due scritti diversi, il che non è punto inaudito), è molto verosimile che nel *De ira* fosse narrata anche la storia di Kotys/Alessandro, che al-Bīrūnī colloca immediatamente di seguito a quella di Nerone (si è veduto sopra che tutto ciò che sta in mezzo non è se non una digressione tecnica) ricollegando esplicitamente l'una all'altra storia. Anche l'omissione di ogni indicazione di fonte per la seconda è indizio che la fonte è la stessa della storia precedente. Si noti infine che tanto nel greco quanto nell'arabo si fa esplicito riferimento all' „ira" della quale Kotys/Alessandro dichiara di temere gli effetti funesti: sicché la storia trova luogo opportuno in uno scritto dedicato alla descrizione e all'esame di questa passione.

Nulla di strano, invero, che un racconto inserito nel *De ira* si trovi riprodotto negli *Apophthegmata*: questi infatti, secondo l'opinione prevalente tra i filologi classici, non sono se non una raccolta di *excerpta* da vari scritti plutarchei, probabilmente messa insieme da altri che lo stesso Plutarco. Anche nel *De ira*, naturalmente, protagonista dell'aneddoto sarà stato Kotys l'Odrysio e non Alessandro il Macedone, e questi sarà stato sostituito a quello soltanto nel processo di traduzione. [1] È curioso come nemmeno in questo secondo racconto l'originale greco faccia menzione del cristallo: il prezioso vasellame offerto al re Kotys è di ceramica. È senz' altro da escludersi, nell'uno e nell'altro caso, che si tratti di un' intrusione arbitraria dello stesso al-Bīrūnī, non soltanto perché essa sarebbe in contrasto colla ben nota onestà e serietà del suo spirito scientifico, [1] ma anche perché, come si è veduto, la menzione del cristallo, in relazione al padiglione di Nerone, si trova già nello scritto di al-Kindī (Walzer, p. 40, linea 14): se in ambedue i racconti il cristallo sia una novità della quale dovrebbe tenersi responsabile il traduttore arabo o se esso fosse già menzionato nell'originale greco del *De ira* è naturalmente impossibile decidere.

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[1] Gli esempi di scambi di attribuzioni, dovuti a cause varie, non ignoti alla letteratura aneddotica greca (di che m'informa amichevolmente il collega R. Cantarella), sono numerosi nella trasmissione agli Arabi della materia gnomica greca: alcuni ne cita Walzer, p. 25.

[2] Di esse egli dà prova anche qui (p. 186, linea 15-18, Kahle, p. 337) nello osservare, a proposito del padiglione di cristallo di Nerone, che l'autore ha omesso d'indicarne le dimensioni, e se fosse di un sol pezzo (il che doveva sembrare sommamente inverosimile ad al-Bīrūnī) oppure risultasse dal montaggio di vari pezzi (*qiṭa*^{ca}*n tuhandam waqt*^{a} *naṣbihā*).

G. Levi Della Vida
Università di Roma

NAZARETH IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, ACCORDING TO THE OTTOMAN *TAPU* REGISTERS

BY

BERNARD LEWIS

The *tapu* series in the Ottoman state archives in Istanbul contains four detailed registers of the Sanjak of Safed, of the type known as *Mufaṣṣal taḥrīr defteri*. [1] They are

n° 427	ca. 932/1525-26
n° 1038	ca. 940-45/1533-39
n° 300	963/1555-56
n° 559	reign of Selim II (974-82/1566-74). [2]

These registers, representing the results of four separate surveys conducted at intervals during the first half-century or so of Ottoman rule in Palestine, contain extensive information on the population and revenues of the towns and villages, and thus provide material for a detailed and documented study of change and development. As an example of this type of material I have chosen the village of Nazareth, in the *nāḥiye* of Tiberias. The descriptions of Nazareth in the four registers are as follows:

I Register no. 427

قريه ناصرا [sic] تابع م [3]
[names]
خانه ٤٣
جماعت يهوديان

[1] On the tapu series, see Ö. L. Barkan, "Les grands recensements de la population et du territoire de l'Empire ottoman", *Revue de la faculté des sciences économiques de l'Université d'Istanbul*, II (1940), 21-34, 168-179; *idem*, "Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'Empire ottoman au XVième et XVIième siècles", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* (1957), 36-39; *idem*, "Daftar-i Khāḳānī", *EI*[2]. On the material relating to Palestine, see B. Lewis, "The Ottoman Archives as a source for the history of the Arab lands," *JRAS* (1951), 139-155; *idem*, *Notes and documents from the Turkish Archives* (Jerusalem, 1952); *idem*, "Studies in the Ottoman Archives — I," *BSOAS*, XVI (1954), 469-501. For parallel material on other areas, see L. Fekete, *Die Siyāqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung* (Budapest, 1955); S. Jikia, *Gurjistanis vilaiethis didi davthari* (Tbilisi, 1941-47) (with the full text of a *mufaṣṣal* register of the vilayet of Gurjistān). For archive material on Palestine of another type, see U. Heyd, *Ottoman documents on Palestine 1552-1615* (Oxford, 1960).

[2] On these registers, see Lewis, "The Ottoman Archives", 154; "Studies", 471.

[3] An abbreviation for *mazbūr*, above-mentioned.

[names]
خانه ٦

حصل

المشاهره بر وجه مقطوع ١٠٠٠٠

حنطه	شعير	قطن	سمسم	دراه [sic]	فول	اشجار
١٥ غ	٦ غ	٤ ق	١ غ	١ غ	٢ كيله	زيتون رومانى مع معصره
١٥٠٠	٤٢٠					٦٠٠

مال سلطان	رسم المعز	جزيه يهوديان بهر نفر فى ٨٠
٤٠٠	٧٠٠	٤٨٠

The village of Nazareth, dependent on the above-mentioned
[names of inhabitants]
households 43
Community of Jews [1]
[names]
households 6

Yield of the monthly payment (*mushāhere*), as fixed by *maqṭu'* [2] 10,000

wheat	barley	cotton	sesame	durra	beans
15 *ghirāra* 1500	6 *ghirāra* 420	4 *qinṭār*	1 *ghirāra*	1 *ghirāra*	2 *kaila*

Rūmānī
olive trees
with press
600

money of the Sultan	goat tax	*jizye* on Jews, at the rate of 80 per person
400	700	480

II Register n° 1038

قريه ناصره تابع طبريه خاص ميرلوا
[names]
نصارى در قريهء م
[names]
خانه مسلمين ٩٥ امام ١
خانه نصارى ٦

[1] An error for Christians. See below.
[2] See below, p. 422, n. 2.

حاصل

قسم من الربع

حنطه	شعير	قطن	سمسم	خراج زيتون
٥٠ غ	٢٠ غ	٥٠ قنطار	٥ غ	ورسم معصره
٦٥٠٠	١٤٠٠	٣٨٠٠	١٨٠٠	٢٠٠

رسم يكون جزيه نصارى ٦ نفرا بهر

معز ١٣٨٠٠ نفر فى ٨٠

١٠٠ ٤٨٠ [1]

The village of Nazareth, dependent on Tiberias.

Khāṣṣ of the Sanjak Bey.

[names]

Christians in the said village

[names]

Muslim households 95 Imam 1

Christian households 6

Yield: share of a quarter

wheat	barley	cotton	sesame	*kharāj* on olives
50 *ghirāra*	20 *ghirāra*	15 *qinṭār*	5 *ghirāra*	with press
6500	1400	3800	1800	200

goat tax	total	*jizye* on Christians 6 persons
100	13,800	at the rate of 80 per person

480

III Register n° 300

قريه ناصره تابع م خاص ميرلوا

[names]

خانه ٢٠٠ مجرد ١١ اعمى ٢ مكنح ٢

امام ١ مؤذن ١ خطيب ١

جماعت نصارا [sic] در قريهء مزبوره

[names]

خانه ١٧

حصل

قريه مزبوره قسم من الربع

حنطه	شعير وغيره	قطن	خراج	رسم
غراره ٨٢١/٢	٢٤ غ	قنطار ٥	اشجار وغيره	معصره
١٠٧٢٥	١٦٨٠	١٠٠٠	١٢٠٠	وزيتون رومانى
				١٠٠

[1] The figures are given in *siyāqat* numerals. On this form of writing, see L. Fekete, *op. cit.*; Mahmud Yazır, *Siyakat yazısı* (Istanbul, 1941); *idem*, *Eski yazıları okuma anahtarı* (Istanbul, 1942); on the numerals, see Salâheddin Elker, *Divan rakamları* (Ankara, 1953).

رسم	رسم		
معز ونحل	عروس وبادهوا	يكون	جزيهء نصارا در قريه مزبوره
٥٠٠	٥٠٠	١٥٧٠٥	خانه ١٧ فى ٨٠
			فى سنه
			١٣٦٠

The village of Nazareth, dependent on the above-mentioned.
Khāṣṣ of the Sanjak Bey.

[names]

Households 200 bachelors 11 blind 2 crippled 2
Imam 1 muezzin 1 *khaṭīb* 1

Community of Christians in the said village

[names]

Households 17

Yield of the said village; share of a quarter

wheat	barley etc.	cotton	*kharāj* on trees etc.	tax on the press and Rūmānī olives
82½ *ghirāra*	24 *ghirāra*	5 *qinṭār*		
10725	1680	1000	1200	100

goat and bee tax	bride-tax and *bād-i havā*	total	*jizye* on Christians in the said village 17 households at 80 each in the year 1360
500	500	15,705	

IV Register n° 559

خاص ميرلوا	قريهء ناصره تابع م
	[names]
	خانه ٢١٥
	جماعت نصارا در قريهء مزبوره
	[names]
	خانه ١٧

	حصل		
	قسم من الربع		
خراج	حنطه	شعير	قطن
اشجار وغيره	غراره	غراره	قنطار
٥٠٠	٩٠	٢٥	٦
	قيمت [؟]	قيمت	قيمت
	١٢٦٠٠	٢٠٠٠	١٣٨٠

رسم معصره	رسم معز ونحل	رسم عروس وبادهوا
٢٤	١٩٦	٨٠٠

يكون
مع الرسوم
١٧٥٠٠

جزيه نصارى در قريهء م
نفرا ١٧
فى ٨٥
١٤٤٥

The village of Nazareth, dependent on the above-mentioned.
Khāṣṣ of the Sanjak Bey.
[names]
Households 215
Community of Christians in the said village
[names]
Households 17
Yield: share of a quarter

wheat	barley etc.	cotton	*kharāj* on trees etc.
ghirāra	*ghirāra*	*qinṭār*	
90	25	6	500

value	value	value
12,600	2000	1380

Tax on the press	goat and bee tax	bride-tax and *bād-i havā*
24	196	800

Total
with taxes
17500

iizye on Christians in the
said village
17 persons
at 85
1445

Population.

The population figures for the village, at the dates of the four surveys, are given as follows:

	I	II	III	IV
Muslims	43	95 + 1	200 + 11 + 7	215
Christians	6	6	17	17

The basic unit is the *khāne* or household, consisting of the taxpayer and his dependent family—probably an average of 5-7 persons. In general, bachelors (*müjerred*), who paid a lower rate of tax, are indicated in the registers. [1] In Nazareth they are shown only in the third register.

Two categories of persons were exempt from taxation and are usually noted as such. They are: 1) Muslim religious functionaries, such as the Imam, *khaṭīb*, and muezzin 2) disabled persons. In Nazareth these are shown only in the third register; a single Imam appears in the second register. [2]

Besides the Muslims, there was also a small Christian minority in Nazareth. The mention of Jews in the first register is certainly an error, as can be seen from the list of names, several of which are followed by the designation Naṣrānī—Christian.

Destination of revenues.

In the last three registers, the revenues accruing from Nazareth are shown as belonging to the appanage (*khāṣṣ*) of the governor of the province (*mīr-i livā* or, in Turkish, Sanjak Bey). In the first register, there is no indication of the recipient of the tax revenues, which are collected in the form of a *mushāhere*. The *jizye*, belonging by law to the *Bayt al-Māl*, or public treasury, is not included in the revenues assigned to the governor, and is listed separately. [3]

Assessment and collection of taxes.

Details on the methods and rates of assessment of taxes are given in the *qānūnnāmes*, containing the fiscal regulations of the provinces.

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[1] See *EI*², s.v. "Čift Resmi," (H. Inalcık).
[2] Compare Lewis, "Studies," 473 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, 480 ff.

Only one of the four registers of Safed, n° 300 of 963/1555-56, contains the text of a *qānūnnāme*. [1]

In the first register, the taxes are stated as a lump sum. This represents a fixed amount, agreed between the parties, and usually collected by a salaried government commissioner (*emīn*). In Nazareth, the sum was fixed on the basis of a monthly rate (*mushāhere*). [2]

This system was of brief duration. It appears only in the first register, and was soon abolished by imperial order, on the grounds that it was a blameworthy and harmful innovation. [3] In the three later registers, it has disappeared, and is replaced by a *qasm* or *qism*, an Ottoman form of the classical Islamic *muqāsama*. In this system, the tax is assessed as a proportion of the crop, varying from place to place. In Nazareth, the rate is one quarter. [4] Besides the taxes on the main crops, assessed in this way, there are certain other taxes assessed in money.

The quantity collected from each of the *qasm* crops is indicated, with a statement of its monetary value in aspers, probably at conventional prices fixed for purposes of accountancy. [5] The quantities are stated in *ghirāras* of wheat, barley, sesame and durra, in *qinṭārs* of cotton, and in *kailas* of beans. Other revenues are stated in money. The *ghirāra* of Damascus, which was used in the Sanjak of Safed, was of about 250 litres. The Syrian *qinṭār* was equal to about 4 Egyptian

[1] The Turkish text of this *qānūnnāme* was published by Ö. L. Barkan in his *XV ve XVI inci asırlarda osmanlı imparator luğunda zirai ekonominin hukuki ve mali esaslari*, I, *Kanunlar* (Istanbul, 1943), 229-230; French translation in R. Mantran and J. Sauvaget, *Règlements fiscaux ottomans* (Paris, 1951), 47-52, with additions from an unpublished Paris manuscript. A German translation from a manuscript version was given by J. von Hammer in his *Des osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung*, I (Vienna, 1815), 225-226.

[2] *Maqṭūʿ* is a technical term for the payment of taxes in the form of a fixed lump sum, without separate assessments. Thus, the *jizye* was at times paid collectively, *ber vejh-i maqtūʿ*, by the *dhimmi* communities, at a total figure agreed with the tax authorities (compare Heyd, 121-122, Lewis, *Notes*, 11); in the same way, certain remote or privileged provinces, liable only to a fixed annual tribute, were said to be *maqṭūʿa merbūṭ*. Here, the term relates to a fixed annual tax, stated in money, and based, no doubt, on the area cultivated, as opposed to the more variable *muqāsama* systems, based on a share of the crops. The term *mushāhere* indicates monthly payments. On *maqṭūʿ* arrangements, see Fekete, 741 ff., 757; B. Durdev et al., *Kanuni i Kanun-name* (Sarajevo, 1957), 153-154; R. Anhegger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bergbaus im osmanischen Reich* (Istanbul, 1943-44), 184, 309, 317-318.

[3] Mantran-Sauvaget, 52, following the Paris manuscript. This passage does not occur in the *qānūnnāme* of 963/1555, published by Barkan.

[4] Cf. *EI*, s.v. "Ḍarība" (H. Inalcık); Lewis, "Studies", 483-484.

[5] "Studies", 492.

qinṭārs, that is, about 180 kg. The value of the *kaila* is less certain. The *kaila* of Istanbul was about 1/25 of a Damascene *ghirāra*, or 10 litres; that of Egypt, about 7.5 litres. Possibly the Damascene *kaila* (1/12 of a *ghirāra*) is meant. [1]

The revenues of the four main *qasm* crops are shown in the four registers as follows:

	I	II	III	IV	
wheat					
	15	50	82 1/2	90	*ghirāra*
	1500	6500	10,725	12,600	value in aspers
	100	130	130	140	price per *ghirāra* in aspers.
barley					
	6	20	24	25	*ghirāra*
	420	1400	1680	2000	value in aspers
	70	70	70	80	price per *ghirāra*
cotton					
	4	15	5	6	*qinṭār*
	—	3800 [sic]	1000	1380	value in aspers
	[100] [2]	200 [3]	200	230	price per *qinṭār*
sesame					
	1	5	—	—	*ghirāra*
	—	1800	—	—	value in aspers
	[300] [4]	360	—	—	price per *ghirāra*

In addition to these, durra (at this date, probably sorghum) and beans are mentioned in the first, but not in subsequent registers. The first register also records the receipt of 400 aspers as *māl-i sulṭān*, a term the meaning of which is not known to me. In the *qānūnnāme*, it is mentioned only as something that has already been abolished. [5]

The taxes on trees, olives and presses appear in several different forms. The first three registers record the revenues from "Rūmānī" olive trees, together with the tax on presses. The fourth register lists the press separately, and makes no mention of olives. The third and fourth registers include a separate item, the "*kharāj* on trees", which is absent from the first two.

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[1] Notes, 16-17, 40; W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte* (Leiden, 1955), 37-38.

[2] The monetary equivalent of the tax on cotton is not stated here in the register. The price per *qinṭār* is taken from other parts of the same register.

[3] This is the price given elsewhere in the same register. The figure 3,800 is probably an error for 3000.

[4] The monetary equivalent is not stated. The price is taken from other parts of the same register.

[5] Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 230; Mantran-Sauvaget, 49-50.

These discrepancies can be explained by reference to the *qānūnnāmə* and to parallel material on other places. In all the *qānūnnāmes* of Syria and Palestine (though not, as far as I am aware, of anywhere else), a distinction is made between Islamic olives on the one hand, and Roman, or infidel, olives (*zaitūn-i Rūmānī* or *zaitūn-i kāfirī*), on the other. According to the *qānūnnāme* of Safed, Roman olives pay a *qasm* of half the crop; Islamic olives pay a money tax of 1/2 asper per tree. [1] The rates on other trees are also given in the *qānūnnāme* —fruit trees, 2 aspers on 5 trees; dates, mulberries, and full-grown nuts, 2 aspers per tree; young nut-trees, 1 asper per tree. The presses paid a fixed money tax of 12 aspers per press. [2]

The taxes on goats and bees are mentioned in all four registers, and were levied, according to the *qānūnnāme*, at the rate of 1/2 asper per goat or per hive. The combined yields of the two taxes show some fluctuation:

I	II	III	IV
700	100	500	196

The third and fourth registers list a figure, of 500 and 800 aspers respectively, as the combined yield of the bride tax and the *bād-i havā*. The bride tax (*resm-i ʿarūs*, *ʿarūs resmi*, *gerdek resmi*) was a tax on marriages. It is not mentioned in the *qānūnnāme* of Safed, but is well known from other parts of the Ottoman Empire. It was usually levied at the rate of 60 aspers on girls, and 30 or 40 on widows and divorced women. Sometimes a lower rate was accepted from poor families. The term *bad-i havā*, literally "wind of the air" (compare English "windfall"), is a general term, in Ottoman fiscal usage, for irregular, occasional revenues from fees, fines, confiscations, registration charges, lost property, and other casual and unpredictable sources of income. Unlike the other taxes mentioned, which probably represent a continuance of pre-Ottoman fiscal practice, the bride-tax and *bād-i havā* are characteristically Ottoman. In the early days of the conquest, it would seem, they were not collected; then, while certain

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[1] Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 230; Mantran-Sauvaget, 48. The latter translate *zeytūn-i Islāmī* as "oliviers appartenant à un musulman." Hammer takes the distinction to be one between olives grown on Islamic or infidel feddans of land. These two are defined in the *qānūnnāme* of Damascus (Barkan, 220; Hammer, I, 220; Mantran-Sauvaget, 4-5).

[2] The *qānunnāme* says six para, at that date equal to 12 aspers. Mantran-Sauvaget translate 6 aspers.



From register 427, showing the entry on Nazareth



From register 1038, showing the entry on Nazareth



From register 300, showing the latter part of the entry on Nazareth (part of the Muslim population, the Christian population, the statement of revenues)



From register 559, showing the latter part of the entry on Nazareth (part of the Muslim population, the Christian population, the statement of revenues)

pre-Ottoman taxes were abolished, others, belonging to the Ottoman system, were introduced and imposed. [1]

The *jizye*—the poll-tax on Christians and Jews—was levied in Ottoman Palestine at the lowest only of the three rates allowed by the Shari'a—that is, at one gold piece. In the registers, the yield of the *jizye* is shown in aspers, at the current rate of silver to gold coin. This is 80 aspers to the gold piece in the first three registers, 85 in the fourth. [2] The fixity of the figures given for the Christian population suggests that the *jizye* may have been paid at an agreed collective rate, which, presumably, was changed between the second and third surveys.

[1] See *EI*², s.v. "'Arūs Resmi", "Bād-i Hawā" (B. Lewis).

[2] On the Ottoman *jizye*, see B. C. Nedkoff, *Die Gizya* (*Kopfsteuer*) *im osmanischen Reich* (Leipzig, 1942); *EI*², s.v. "Djizya ii" (H. Inalcık).

BERNARD LEWIS
University of London

ORIGIN AND INTERPRETATION OF SOME KORANIC SYMBOLS

BY

ILSE LICHTENSTADTER

The "healthy distrust of overneat hypotheses and explanations that leave nothing to be explained," that A. B. Cook advocates, [1] led me to continue my search for a deeper understanding of similes and symbols found in the Koran, a search that I began in a previous article. [2] The "irregular edges [that] should not be hastily trimmed off," [3] so abundantly found in early parts of the Holy Book, seem to hold a better clue to the inner meaning of early Koranic imagery than deceptively easy, and often hackneyed, interpretations provide. By tracing their origins step by step, motif by motif, I hope, eventually, to establish a consistent interpretation of the earliest stratum of Muhammad's religious ideas.

This approach has become even more necessary now that Muslim "modernists" have joined the ranks of rationalistic interpreters of Koranic passages and of those who attempt to establish either historical or scientific backgrounds for intricate, or hard to understand, Koranic verses. [4] These rationalizations, though motivated by a desire to make the Koran more "intelligible" and less subject to derision by Muslim skeptics and non-Muslim detractors, apart from often being contrived, overlook the importance of ancient myths and beliefs in the formation of religious thought, and their survival, even in highly developed religions, in the form of symbols, rites, and hymnic or poetic allusions.

In particular, the Mūsā—Dhū'l-Qarnain sequence of the *Sūrat al-Kahf* has been the subject of interpretation that claims to penetrate its complexity by means of allegory or homiletics. [5] Continuing the

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[1] A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, II (Cambridge, England, 1925-40), p. viii.

[2] This article is a continuation of a study published in *Studi Orientalistici in Onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida*, II (Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto per l'Oriente n° 52, 2 vols., [Rome, 1956]), 58-80 (1-23 of the reprint). (Cited as *Studi LDV.*)

[3] Cook, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

[4] J. M. S. Baljon, *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960)* (Leiden, 1961); in the present context, see especially pp. 31 ff.

[5] Characteristic of this approach is the commentary by ʿAbd Allāh Yūsuf ʿAlī,

previous analysis of three symbols that dominate that sequence, [1] this essay will try to unravel its meaning further by the methods of comparative religion. The sura itself attempts to clarify them:

> As for the bark, it belonged to poor people who toiled on the sea, and I wished to damage it, for behind it was a king who seized on every bark by force. And as for the youth, his parents were believers, and we feared lest he should impose upon them rebellion and misbelief. So we desired that their Lord would give them in exchange a better one than him in purity and nearer in affection. And as for the wall, it belonged to two orphan youths in the city and beneath it was a treasure belonging to them both and their father was a righteous man and their Lord desired that they should reach puberty and then take out their treasure from thy Lord; and I did it not on my own bidding. That is the interpretation of what thou couldst not have patience with. (Kor. 18, 78-81).

However, this "interpretation" itself needs to be interpreted to become meaningful for us, including those people who, like Mūsā's *'abd* addressed in it, do not understand its mythos.

The Two Youths. The King. The Treasure.

The previous article led to the conclusion that the three main motifs appearing in the *Sūrat al-Kahf*, namely "the city" (*qarya*), "the laden ship" (*fulk mashḥūn*), and "the fish" (*ḥūt*), are symbols for birth, death, and resurrection—as, indeed, the legend of the *Aṣḥāb al-Kahf*, the legend of the Seven Sleepers, has always been acknowledged to be a myth of death and resurrection. Thus, we may expect the Koranic "interpretation" to show us the same idea, if in different images.

One of the most important findings of comparative study of religious thought is the fact that one religious idea is expressed in various ways, that a cumulation of diverse images is used to express the same religious concept, even when offered within the same presentation. [2] Thus, Mūsā's very statement, "I will give thee the interpretation of that which thou couldst not have patience" (Kor. 18, 77), is an indication of awareness that all the imagery used throughout the Mūsā—Dhū 'l-Qarnain passage of the sura has identical meaning.

The Holy Qur-an, Text, Translation and Commentary, II (New York, 1946), 747-757, and Appendix vii, 760-765.

[1] See *Studi LDV*, 63, and *ibid.*, n. 2.

[2] "Things equal to the same thing equal each other—axiom one of early, symbolism," Phyllis Ackerman in *Ritual Bronzes of Ancient China* (New York 1945), 71.

Three basic motifs are used in this explanation: (1) the rebellious youth and the pure boy, the latter already previously mentioned in verse 73; or, a substitute, though identical in meaning, the two orphan youths; (2) the treasure buried under the wall; (3) the king who seized every bark by force. Intertwined with these three symbols are the already familiar ones of the city and the wall, of people toiling on the sea (not "in a city," as in the verse previously analyzed), and the bark. Aware, from my earlier study, of the lingering memory of Egyptian myth underlying the "ship," "city" and "fish" idea in the Koran, I again turned to Egyptian mythology for the key to these symbols. [1]

The search for the prototypes of the rebellious youth and his counterpart, the pure boy, was not difficult; for the concept of a pair of brothers, [2] especially one creating and representing good, the other, the cause of evil, destruction and disruption, is widespread in folklore and religious thought. [3] The best known in Western religious lore

[1] See below, p. 8 ff.

[2] Often twins, also sisters or twin sisters, see J. Rendell Harris, *The Cult of the Heavenly Twins* (Cambridge, England, 1906); Theodor H. Gaster, *Thespis, Ritual, Myth and Drama in the Ancient Near East* (New York, 1950), 229, 231; Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods. A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature* (Chicago, 1948), 19, 350 n. 12.

[3] "Twins are both good and bad, restore or ruin cities, make or withhold rain, can be mild or extremely wrathful," Harris, *Cult*, 36; Gaster, *Thespis*, "The Poem of Dawn and Sunset," tr. n° viii, 255. See also Julius Wellhausen, *Reste Arabischen Heidentums*, 2nd edn. (Berlin, 1897), 22 f.: "Der Name Ja'uq wird bei Jaqut 4 1022, 17ss. als Correlat zu Jaghuth aufgefasst: er hilft und er hindert." However, Wellhausen's doubt of the validity of this explanation: "Solche conträren Namen finden sich allerdings bei Zwillingen und Zwillingsgeschlechtern, wie Tugîb und Turâghim b. Muâvia b. al-Sakun (Bakri, 37, 8), aber nicht bei Göttern. Jaghuth und Ja'uq waren keine Hälften, die erst zusammen ein Ganzes bildeten; der eine half nicht bloss immer und der andere hinderte nicht bloss immer," shows lack of understanding of mythological thought; and even if his own substitute "er gibt Acht, bewacht, bewahrt" is the correct meaning of the god's name, the two deities remain complementary. Indeed, twins are often identified as such by being "unlike" and complementary, see Harris, *Cult*, 46. In consequence of their contradictory nature, twins are believed to possess both good and evil influence on natural events and on agriculture; in particular, they can bring or withhold rain, see Harris, *op. cit.*, 24 ff.; *Sir James George Frazer, The New Golden Bough. A new Abridgement* . . . ed. with notes and foreword by Dr. Theodor H. Gaster (New York, 1959), 134. Their birth is considered a good or a bad omen, and almost invariably calls for an expiatory ritual or a purification ceremony for one or both of the parents, Harris, *op. cit.*, 16 f.; Frazer-Gaster, *op. cit.*, 89, 177. Cf. Olaf Petterson, *Chiefs and Gods. Religious and Social Elements in the South-Eastern Bantu Kingship* (Studia Theologica Lundensia, III) (Lund, 1953), 190 n. 56: "Among *Ganda* . . . the parents of twins have power to fertilize the gardens . . . and among *Zulus* twins are supposed . . . to foretell the weather . . .

are, of course, the two Biblical pairs: Cain and Abel, and Jacob and Esau. Cain, the ploughman, was, in Jewish folklore, the symbol of all godless deeds. As the builder of a wall, [1] he was the destroyer of the simple life. This concept emphasizes the contrast between sophisticated civilization and the natural pastoral life, symbolized in his slaying of Abel, the prototype of the pure shepherd who tenderly cares for life. The softspoken Jacob "who dwelt in tents," representing nomadism, another simple, inoffensive way of life, is similarly contrasted with his twin Esau who already in the womb was rough, and who spent his life as a hunter in the fields. Throughout their lives, they were fighting with, and competing against, each other, and throughout history, rabbinical tradition pinned the name of Edom (= Esau) on any contemporary antagonist of Israel and Judaism.

In the search for the earliest relevant sources, one is inescapably led to the Egyptian pairs of gods—brothers (often considered twins), or antagonists: Osiris and Seth, and Horus and Seth. [2] In following their dramatic relationship, entanglement and fight, the key will be found to the hidden meaning of the cryptic Koranic "interpretation" and to enhanced understanding of the *Sūrat al-Kahf* as an essential part of Koranic religiosity.

As told in the ancient Egyptian sources, the myth of Osiris, Isis, Horus, Seth and Thot, as main protagonists (with a large number of other deities participating, though not essential to the unravelling of the Koranic problem), is very involved. The main line, however, is clear. Osiris and his brother Seth were contesting for power. [3] Seth, the prototype of violence, always connected with raging tempests,

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Among the *Ronga* . . . women should try to make the rain of spring to fall . . . They have to visit the hut of one . . . who has given birth to twins . . . sometimes they pour water upon graves of twins, too." See also *ibid.*, in the text. Reference, at least, should also be made to the pairs of brothers or twins of Greek mythology, the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux, and the Cabiri with their secret cult at Samothrace.

[1] See *Studi LDV*, II, 65 n. 1. It is exciting to note that Osiris, like Dhū 'l-Qarnain (= Alexander), is supposed to have built many cities, in Ethiopia as well as in India, see E. A. W. Budge, *Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection*, I (London, 1911), 10 (referring to Diodorus Siculus, bk. i, chap. 25).

[2] Horus and Seth are often called "brothers," though in reality Seth was the brother of Osiris, Horus' father.

[3] See Budge, *Osiris*, I, 62 ff. (chap. iii); Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, Loeb Classical Library (= *Moralia*, V [Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, 1962]); R. T. Rundle Clark, *Myth and Symbol in Ancient Egypt* (New York, 1960), chaps. iii-vi, and pp. 186-217.

earthquakes, lowering clouds, and all untoward events in nature, [1] mortally maimed his brother Osiris. The latter's consort Isis succeeded in reassembling the scattered pieces of his body; [2] though unable to restore him to full life, she was able to conceive a son by him, Horus. There followed a time of mourning and helplessness for nature until Horus was able to succeed his father as king. But Seth disputed Horus' right to the succession and a prolonged and bitter strife ensued between the two contestants. At the suggestion of Thot, the personification of order, the conflict was eventually brought before the company of gods:

> O Thoth! What has come to pass with the children of Nut?
> They have created strife, they have stirred up confusion,
> they have done evil, they have raised rebellion,
> they have indeed made the great into little
> and made a secret destruction in all that I have created. [3]

When the gods had decided in Horus' favor, and he had assumed his rightful place, Osiris was revived, the natural order in the world restored, and the land that had been dead returned to fertility.

Another element of the Osiris-Seth/Horus-Seth myth enters into the Koranic *āya*, the Eye of Horus, the symbol of his creative power. During the fight with Horus, Seth tore it out; but Horus regained

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[1] Hermann Kees, "Der Götterglaube im alten Ägypten," *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-ägyptischen Gesellschaft*, XLV (Leipzig, 1941), 24; Clark, *Myth*, 115, 208. Cf. Plutarch, *De Iside*, § 49, p. 121: "But Typhon (= Seth) is that part of the soul which is impressionable, impulsive, irrational and truculent, and of the bodily parts, the destructable, diseased and disorderly, as evidenced by abnormal seasons and temperatures, and by obscurations of the sun and disappearance of the moon, outbursts, as it were, and unruly actions on the part of Typhon. And the name 'Seth' by which they call Typhon denotes that."

[2] Clark, *Myth*, 106, see also Frankfort, *Kingship*, 126; see also Samuel Mercer, *Horus, Royal God of Egypt* (Grafton, Massachusetts, 1942), 32. For a modern translation of the Ramesseum Papyrus, see Gaster, *Thespis*, 383 ff., especially 392-395. According to Plutarch, Osiris' phallus was swallowed by a fish, cf. also Hermann Kees, *Götterglaube*, 111, and *ibid.*, n. 4, and *idem*, *Totenglauben und Jenseitsvorstellungen der alten Ägypter* (Leipzig, 1926), 192f., 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1956), 134 f. However, Clark (*Myth*, 105) observes: "This is not attested by the native sources, although it is clear that the sexual organ is capable of revivification and is magically distinct from the other members." Cf. also Budge, *Osiris*, I, 65 who mentions this incident in the Tales of the Two Brothers, Bata and Anpu, in connection with Osiris' mutilation as told in Plutarch. This trait has some bearing on my interpretation of the whole Koranic legend, in context with the symbol of the *Ḥūt*, previously analyzed (see *Studi LDV*, II, 77 ff.).

[3] Clark, *Myth*, 110, Book of the Dead 175 A. See also Budge, *Osiris*, I, 312 ("the malefactor Seth"), see also *ibid.*, 87, 89, and Hermann Kees, "Horus und Seth," *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-aegyptischen Gesellschaft*, XXVIII (Leipzig, 1923), 28 ("Seth als Gottesfeind").

it and recovered his full strength. Then he gave it to his father Osiris who, through its power, was revived in the Hereafter. [1] The Eye of Horus (and its mythological equivalent, the Crown) [2] signify power over life and death, and, as such, are symbolic of revival. [3] In another version, Seth buried Horus' eye and two trees grew upon the spot where it was buried. [4] The Koranic verse echoes this version and joins it to the wall, itself a symbol of resurrection and life after death, previously invoked (verse 76). The buried treasure had to be retrieved, as had Horus' eye, [5] so that the two youths "should reach puberty" that is, that they should gain, or regain, their full vitality.

But, as Seth overpowered his brother Osiris by his violence, and brought suffering to Isis by dismembering and mutilating her son, [6] the Koranic "rebellious youth" brought suffering to his parents. A "youth of greater purity and affection" was desired in exchange. That is, it was hoped that Horus should overcome Seth, or, as the mythos implies, good should overcome evil and life should conquer death.

Pursuing our attempt at interpretation further with the help of the Osiris-Isis-Horus myth, the identification of the Koranic youth's parents with Isis and Osiris is obvious. However, somewhat more difficult is the answer to the quest for the identity of the "king who seized every bark by force," [7] and of the "poor people who toiled on the sea" to whom the ship belonged. In Egyptian myth, Osiris the

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[1] See Mercer, *Horus*, 32, 80, 82; Frankfort, *Kingship*, 41 ff., 131, and *passim*; Cf. Plutarch, *De Iside*, § 51, pp. 123 f., § 55, p. 135; cf. also Budge, *Osiris*, I, 64.

[2] Frankfort, *Kingship*, 112, 131, 136.

[3] See Budge, *Osiris*, I, 81, 88 ff.: "Osiris ate the Eye and as a result became mighty and lived. His renewed life was the direct product of the absorption of the Eye of his son Horus and the strength of his brave avenger entered into him as the Eye was absorbed by his body." See also Clark, *Myth*, 172; J. Spiegel, *Die Erzählung vom Streite des Horus und Seth als Literaturwerk (Papyrus Beatty I, Leipziger Aegyptologische Studien*, 9 [Glückstadt, 1937]), 85.

[4] This version apparently is only referred to by Mercer, *Horus*, 35. The eye as a mythological symbol is discussed in Clark, *Myth*, chap. vii, § 1, pp. 218 ff.

[5] Others of his members were retrieved from the sea with a fishing net, see Budge, *Osiris*, I, 63; from Seth's hand, *ibid.*, 82; they had been torn into fragments, see *The Tomb of Ramesses VI*, Texts; transl. with introduction by Alexandre Piankoff; ed. N. Rambova. (Bollingen Series, XL, i [New York, 1954]), 38; cf. H. Kees, *Götterglauben*, 192; 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1956), 134 f.

[6] For a full recent account of the myth, see Clark, *Myth*, chaps. iii-vi.

[7] Compare "There is no ship on the waters that does not belong to Amun, for his is the sea"; see W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity. Monotheism and the Historical Process*, 2nd edn. (Baltimore, 1946), 164.

king became, after his death, the lord of the netherworld. [1] He is the personification of the fright of death, [2] a trait found frequently in ancient Egypt, though not exclusively connected with Osiris. [3] The dead were ferried over the stream or river to the Island of Osiris by a ferryman; but only those who were "innocent and just before heaven and before earth and before the island of the earth" [4] accomplished the crossing. The dead pray that they might be rescued from the god who seizes the souls, swallows the hearts, feeds upon corpses.[5]

We remember the beautiful Koranic passage in which the sailors in the storm-tossed boat implore God to rescue them (Kor. 10, 23), and our interpretation of it [6] as symbolic for the fear of death and the certainty of resurrection. Quite clearly, the Koranic expression under discussion is another version of the same concept, cast into a form reminiscent of the passage of the dead to the netherworld in the bark of the god of death, in the Egyptian myth. In his quest for eternal life, for resurrection, Mūsā, who gives the "explanation" in the first person, "wishes to damage it (the boat)," that is, he desires to obliterate death.

Mūsā's intention in his "interpretation" of the troubling, mysterious events of his journey to the "confluence of the two seas" (*majma' al-baḥrain*) has now become perfectly clear. It is a reassertion of the

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[1] Budge, *Osiris*, II, 306: "In the final stage of the cult of Osiris and Isis, the former was the symbol of Death and the latter the symbol of Life."

[2] Cf. *Studi LDV*, II, 73 ff., especially the seventh century Christian passage cited on p. 75; see also Cook, *Zeus*, II, 3: "The coward on a voyage 'pops his head and asks the steersman if he is half-way across and how the weather strikes him'. Only, where we translate the weather, the Greek has literally 'the things of the god,' that is of Zeus," with a reference to "R. C. Jebb, on Theophr. *loc. cit.*, τά τοῦ θεοῦ."

[3] See for example, Hugo Prinz, *Altorientalische Symbolik* (Preisschrift der Königl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin, 1915]), 23 f.

[4] See Budge, *Osiris*, I, 313.

[5] See *The Egyptian Book of the Dead*, ed. Charles H. S. Davis (London, 1901), 147; chap. xvii, 82 line 73. See also Kees, *Totenglauben*, 430, 109 ff. (2nd edn., 288, 73ff.). Cf. also I. Engnell, *Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East* (Upsala, 1943), 7: "The characteristic qualities of the high god as ordainer of fates, his double aspect as both evil and good are here clearly expressed. Pharao is described as a benevolent and gracious god, but also as a consuming god of wrath." The boat, with the god in it, is attacked, see Gaster, *Thespis*, 41: "I beat back those who attacked the Barque of Neshmet (note: i.e., Osiris), and I overthrew the foes of Osiris"; but, according to Mercer, *Religion of Ancient Egypt* (London, 1949), 23, the dead in the underworld rejoice to see the sun and tow his boat. (Kees, *Götterglaube*, plate vii b shows the Sokar bark towed by the king.)

[6] See *Studi LDV*, II, 73 ff.

essential Koranic conviction that, though death is ordained for all mankind, resurrection is assured to all those who overcome evil. In the Egyptian myth, "Horus and Seth were the antagonists *per se* —the mythological symbols for all conflict. Seth is perennially subdued by Horus, but never destroyed." [1] In the Koranic context, this eternal conflict is sublimated from the sphere of physical strife into a spiritual struggle for faith, and eventually into faith itself, through the belief in God's omnipotence by which He creates, and recreates after death. Muhammad had to overcome the incredulity of the Meccans, for whom resurrection of man—never experienced in reality—was inconceivable. Again and again, Muhammad returned to that theme, trying to convince the Meccans of the possibility of this miracle, supporting his conviction by incontestable proofs: the creative power of nature, the wondrous revival after its seasonal "death" during the heat of summer, and especially, the greatest miracle of all, the very creation of man out of a blood drop, "created from nothing."[2]

A word may be added in justification of the attempt to interpret Koranic symbols through Egyptian, rather than Semitic, mythology, usually invoked in previous research. J. Horovitz, for instance, looked to Hebrew and Aramaic (Biblical and Rabbinic) and early Christian literature for the origin of Koranic legends; he also used

[1] See Frankfort, *Kingship*, 22; see *ibid.*, 351 n. 19 where Frankfort quotes W. B. Kristensen, *Het Leven uit den Dood* (Haarlem, 1926), 19-20: "that Horus and Seth represent the divine and demoniac powers in the world"; cf. *ibid.*, 351 n. 17. This polarity of the two gods is emphasized by Kees, *Horus and Seth*. Horus was the "Herr des Himmels" (p. 9), while "bei Seth war eine Verbindung mit Erde und Unterwelt nicht ungewöhnlich. Geb (Erde) und Nut (Himmel) gab ihm das heliopolitanische System zu Eltern, er gehörte also zu beiden Elementen; übrigens gerade bei ihm, zu dessen Wesen der Character als Herr des Windes, der Stürme und Unwetter gehört (cf. above, p. 430, n. 1), die aus der Wüste, wodas Sethtier hausen soll, über das Fruchtland hereinbrechen, keine schlechte Erklärung" (p. 45 f.). And further: "Das Binsengefilde [= Paradise], die horischen Stätten () die sethischen Stätten, Dir gehören sie insgesamt. Die Etymologie von horisch = himmlisch, erhaben. Sind aber die Stätten des Horus am Himmel, so verweist der Gegensatz die des Seths entweder auf die Erde oder ins Reich unter der Erde, in die Unterwelt und in den Gegenhimmel." (*ibid.*, 44.) Cf. also Horus and Seth as representatives of West and East (*ibid.*, 26f.), that is, Hell and Paradise (p. 51). S. Mercer, *Horus*, 69, citing Kees, enumerates a long list of things of dual and polarized character, most of which pertain to Horus and Seth. And lastly, Plutarch, *De Iside*, § 43, p. 105, calls Horus "the terrestrial universe," which has to contend with the destructive activity of Typhon [Seth]; cf. also *ibid.*, § 49, p. 121.

[2] Kor. 52, 35.

Iranian mythology as a source. [1] I. Friedlander [2] made extensive use of similar material in his investigation and interpretation of the *Sūrat al-Kahf*. However, consciously or unconsciously, these attempts assumed dependence of the Koran on literary sources, even though orally transmitted.

This does not seem convincing, particularly in view of Muhammad's own assertion of his being "unlettered" and his conviction of being divinely inspired. This can only mean that he found his inspiration deep within himself, in knowledge that did not originate with any immediate, tangible source. He was unconsciously recreating ancient traditional heritage, not literary material—legends told and retold from generation to generation.

The Meccans recognized this fact. They taunted him with telling *asāṭīr al-auwalīn* "tales of the ancients." Horovitz maintains that the word *asāṭīr* implies "book, scripture," identical with other expressions in the Koran, [3] on the strength, in particular, of Kor. 25, 6: "They (the Meccans) say '*asāṭīr* of the ancients,' which he has written down for himself while they were being dictated to him mornings and evenings." Horovitz observes further that this term is only used in polemical remarks of the Meccans against Muhammad (Kor. 8, 31; 16, 26; 83, 13; 46, 16; 23, 85; 27, 70). The last mentioned are, however, striking, for they are a repudiation of the possibility of resurrection which Muhammad predicts with absolute certainty. The Meccans retort "When we have died and have become dust and bones, shall we then be resurrected (*mab'ūthūna*)? We have been promised this, and our fathers (too) before; this is only *asāṭīr* of the ancients." [4] This statement does not sound like a reference to books or written scrolls [5] which the Meccans might have read, or at least

[1] *Koranische Untersuchungen* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1926).

[2] *Die Chadhirlegende und der Alexanderroman* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1913), cf. *Studi LDV*, II, 63 n. 1.

[3] *Koranische Untersuchungen*, 69 f., he agrees with Th. Noeldeke-F. Schwally, *Geschichte des Qorâns*, I (Leipzig, 1909), 16 n. 4, in considering it a loanword from the Aramic root *shetara* going back to the Babylonian. In support of this derivation, both Horovitz and Noeldeke-Schwally refer to South-Arabic inscriptions; Horovitz further adds that the root *str* occurs in pre-Islamic poetry (cf. I. Lichtenstadter, "Das *Nasīb* der altarabischen *Qaṣīde*," *Islamica*, V [Leipzig, 1931], 31). Horovitz, however, declines to accept Schwally's preference for the derivation of the Koranic word *asāṭīr* from Greek ἱστορίαι.

[4] Kor. 23, 84 and 27, 69 f., with *mukhrajūna* instead of *mab'ūthūna*. Kor. 46, 16 expresses the same repudiation though in different words.

[5] Already Noeldeke-Schwally, *op. cit.*, I, 16 n. 4, reject Sprenger's assumption that Muhammad had read and studied the Books of the Jews and the Christians.

have seen in the hands of learned men, but rather to resurrection myths and legends which they have heard, such as the Seven Sleepers' legend, or those of much more ancient times. That such legends had remained alive in Arabia as in other regions of the Near East, cannot be doubted in the light of the prolonged and far-flung survival of ancient myths. [1] For Arabia was never isolated from the rest of the Near Eastern world, since it was a transit station for its trade; Egypt was included in this from the most ancient times. [2]

Egyptologists point to contacts between ancient Egypt and West Asia, including Arabia, in particular Arabia Felix. [3] Mercer speaks of a seafaring people that came to Egypt in large boats and who "may have sailed around the Arabian Peninsula from the Persian Gulf, or may have crossed Arabia by land and the Red Sea by boats." [4] It was only natural that, on their return to their homelands by the same route, these sailors and traders should have brought with them a knowledge of Egyptian myths and rituals, and of the Egyptian gods. [5] And even if direct contact should have existed only between South Arabia and Egypt, indirect contact was established through the caravans which passed through North Arabia from the south and met with North Arabian traders in the northern trading posts,

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[1] In order to trace individual motifs and symbols, one may consult Antti Aarne, *The Types of the Folk-tale*, tr. and enlarged by Stith Thompsen (Helsinki, 1928), and Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index to Folk Literature*, 6 vols., Indiana University Studies 106-112 (Helsinki-Bloomington 1932-1936). As an aside it may be mentioned that much new material came to light only after the publication of Noeldeke-Schwally's work and Horovitz's *Koranische Untersuchungen*. The latter frequently referred to Ditlev Nielsen's work in his book and his lectures; but, for example, the Ras Shamra tablets had just been discovered, but not yet been deciphered by the time of his death in 1931.

[2] For example, Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, I (London, 1904), 334: "The city of Heliopolis appears always to have contained a mixed population and its situation made it a very convenient halting-place for travellers passing from Arabia and Syria into Egypt and vice versa . . ." See also Mercer, *Horus*, 9.

[3] Mercer, *op. cit.*, 32, 33; Sethe, *Urgeschichte und älteste Religion der Ägypter* (Abhandlungen zur Kunde des Morgenlandes, XVIII, 4 [Leipzig, 1930]), 14, 64, 66, for which compare also Frankfort, *Kingship*, 348 n. 4. See also Budge, *Gods*, I, 7, 8, 10.

[4] Mercer, *op. cit.*, 36.

[5] Budge, *Osiris*, II, 283: "And the foreign sailors and merchants who traded with Egypt in the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea must also have carried back with them to their coasts and islands and homes accounts of their gods." Compare also Albright, *Stone Age*, 164 (continuing the passage referred to above, p. 431, n. 7): "The Canaanite is thus represented as admitting that Amun is supreme and observing that he taught and equipped Egypt first, so that Egypt was able to instruct the Canaanites in the arts of civilization."

markets and depots. Thus knowledge, however distorted, of the Egyptian gods was spread, whether direct contacts between North Arabia and Egypt existed or not.

Only when we recognize the antiquity of this contact and assume that at least some of it still existed in Muhammad's time, can we understand why he sought a refuge for his persecuted followers in Abyssinia, across the Red Sea, and not in Syria, with the Ghassanids, or in Ḥīra on the Euphrates. Much has been made of the fact that Abyssinia was a Christian kingdom, and of the affinity which Muhammad felt for its king because of this religious factor. Yet the Christian settlements and tribes to the North of Mecca were far easier to reach and far closer to the Arab way of life to which the Muslim emigrants were accustomed. There must have been a compelling reason for the Prophet to turn rather to the Abyssinian haven, though it was far more difficult to reach; it must also have been in some way familiar to the fairly large number of Muslims who made the hard decision to emigrate across the Red Sea.

It is therefore not too daring to postulate a much closer relationship between Arabian and Egyptian ideas, and much closer continuous contact between them, than has so far been contemplated. Intensive archaeological research in the Peninsula, such as has so abundantly enriched our knowledge elsewhere in the Near East, might conceivably provide the answer for the problem discussed in these pages, as well as for many others.

ILSE LICHTENSTADTER
Harvard University